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No, it’s not my case; I’m still waiting for a decision. This is a case that was decided about a month ago, but I was waiting for LEXIS to put it up, so I could provide a cite.

Langston v. Warden, 2005 Conn. Super LEXIS 871 is a Habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. As most of you know, the standard for IAC is established by Strickland - and in plea cases, as modified by Hill. However, Langston is extremely interesting because of the standard applied by the judge. As I’ll explain below, the judge applies Cronic and Florida v. Nixon.

Langston was charged with and convicted of Commission of a Felony with a Firearm, Criminal Possession of a Firearm and Robbery First. The facts were as follows:

The victim, victim’s sister and her boyfriend were driving along in a car. They wanted to score some crack, so they approached two inviduals - one of them Mr. Langston - and tried to make a deal. After the victim was asked to show the money, one of the two individuals (allegedly Mr. Langston) returned with a gun, took the money and shot the victim as he was walking away. All three identified Langston as having possessed a gun and shooting the victim. Via cross-ex, defense counsel elicited that the victim was on drugs at the time of the incident and it ocurred in an alley that wasn’t well lit and that no one actually saw Mr. Langston shoot, just saw him with a gun. The police arrested Mr. Langston at his home and found a potato with electric tape and he allegedly said it was used as a silencer for a gun.

Petitioner raised 4 claims (that does seem to be the magic number):

1. During closing, defense counsel conceded that Mr. Langston participated in the robbery - but did so without his consent.
2. Trial counsel failed to file motions in limine to preclude a photo array and other prejudicial evidence.

The other two weren’t discussed that much and were dismissed, so I won’t go into them here. The court discusses 2 first, so I’ll do that as well.

The Court quite readily dismisses the claim as to the photo array because there was no evidence introduced regarding the photo array, not even the array itself, at the habeas hearing. The Court then addresses the introduction of the potato silencer. The problem wasn’t that a police officer testified about Langston’s statement regarding the potato silencer: that was after being advised of Miranda. The problem was that

[n]o motion in limine had been filed to exclude reference to this evidence and this was coupled with a failure to object to this evidence as it was being presented. It
is also true that there was no evidence presented during this trial
that a potato silencer was used during the robbery, seen by any victim
or witness, or mentioned in any conversation during, immediately before
or after the confrontation.

CT state law is quite clear that evidence as to articles found in the possession of a defendant subsequent to the commission of the crime for which he is being charged is admissible only if it tends to establish a fact in issue or to corroborate other direct evidence. State v. Groos, 110 Conn. 403, 407 (1930). Relying on that principle, the Court decided

It is difficult to see what possible probative value this evidence had
or what tactical strategy could have induced trial counsel not to take
steps to challenge the introduction of this evidence or move to strike
it. Defense counsel must be held to a standard that presupposes a
knowledge of evidentiary rules operative in our state for decades. It
was deficient performance under Strickland not to file a motion in limine regarding the introduction of this evidence or otherwise object to it.

That takes care of prong 1. But what of prong 2 - often the more difficult prong? Citing another case, State v. Acklin, 171 Conn. 105 (1987), the Court decided that it would be very difficult to not find prejudice, even with overwhelming evidence of guilt. "Any improper evidence that may have a tendency to excite the passions,
awaken the sympathy or influence the judgment of the jury, cannot be considered harmless." State v. Ferraro, 160 Conn. 42 (1970). The Court found that both prongs of Strickland were met and was of the opinion that Habeas relief should be granted on this claim alone.

But if he did that, we wouldn’t have the exciting Cronic and Nixon discussion! So, he went on.

In closing argument, defense counsel argued that it came down to the victim and the sister’s boyfriend, both of whom had felony records and were crack users. Counsel argued that the lighting was bad and impaired their ability to see what was in front of them. He also argued that the sister’s boyfriend said he saw Langston shoot the victim, but initially had told the police he only heard the shot. Then he conceded that the victim had been shot. Then he said the following:

"Remember, there were two people here that were involved in this, not
just Mr. Langston, but his unnamed partner who might have been his
partner in a drug deal or who might have taken the gun and decided, I’m
going to start shooting"

Ok. So he admitted Langston was involved in this. He admitted that there was a gun and he admitted that one of the two shot the victim. In the course of this train of thought counsel did say let us assume
there was a robbery and "I’ll concede for a moment a robbery did occur. " He then went on to say given this assumption maybe the second person was the shooter.

The State’s Attorney, bright as she was, picked up on this and in rebuttal argued that defense counsel conceded that Mr. Langston had the gun at some point.

At the Habeas hearing, defense counsel tried to explain that what he meant to do was create doubt in the jury’s mind and didn’t mean to explicitly concede anything. The Court didn’t like that too much:

But it was not what counsel’s intentions were that is controlling, but what he actually said.

But as the review of the closing argument indicated, defense counsel
explicitly said or implied at various points that Langston was involved
in the robbery but not the shooting:

"Remember, there were two people here that were involved in this, not just Mr. Langston . . . but his unnamed
partner . . . who might have taken the gun and decided, I’m going to
start shooting."

This theme of implying guilt of the robbery but not the shooting is woven throughout the remainder of the closing argument.

It was uncontroverted that defense counsel did not inform Mr. Langston that he was going to concede his guilt to the robbery.

Given that factual background, the Court dove right into the legal argument. It goes without saying that a criminal defendant has the right not to plead guilty and has the right to make the state prove it’s case beyond a reasonable doubt. No lawyer’s decision can deprive a defendant of these rights and these rights cannot be waived by defense counsel, Brookhand v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 5-8, (1966). Since there was nothing in this record to indicate that the petitioner
contemplated waiving or in fact waived these rights,  a
closing argument by defense counsel that effectively admits the
client’s guilt to a crime to which the client has pleaded innocent
without the client’s waiver or consent is necessarily deficient
performance under the standard set forth in Strickland. Having determined that there was deficient performance, the Court turned to the sticky proposition of determining prejudice under the second prong. What made it sticky was the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The Court admits that under the second prong, it can be reasonably argued that there is no prejudice.

Oddly, the Court then says,

Despite all this the court is constrained to find that the ordinary
prejudice analysis does not warrant the denial of habeas relief,
deficient performance having been found for the reasons stated. The
court relies on U.S. v Cronic and Florida v. Nixon.

Cronic, if you will remember, is the case that dealt with constructive denial of counsel.

The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to
conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a
critical stage of his trial. Similarly, if counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then
there has been a denial of rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable. No specific showing of prejudice was required in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), because the petitioner had been "denied the right of effective cross-examination" which "would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it." Id., at 318 (citing Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), and Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, (1966)).

Circumstances
of that magnitude may be present on some occasions when although
counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood
that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective
assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate
without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), was such a case.

However, Cronic is still inadequate because it talks in terms of presumed prejudice and guilt or innocence. That’s where Florida v. Nixon comes in. Florida conducts an analysis based on the recognition that a fundamental right is involved where defense counsel concedes defendant’s guilt. The Florida Supreme Court held

defense counsel’s statements to the jury were the "functional
equivalent of guilty plea" and therefore what was required was the
defendant client’s "affirmative, explicit acceptance of" the lawyer’s
strategy of conceding guilt.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed based on the facts of Florida - because it was a capital case, the distinction is important - but in non-capital cases it suggested that merely informing a non-responsive client of a strategy to concede guilt
is not enough to insulate such a course of action by defense counsel
from habeas attack. In a non-capital case the Supreme Court suggested
that the Cronic rubric of presumed prejudice is more likely to
be applicable–that is, merely informing the defendant who remains
unresponsive is not enough, an explicit waiver of the right to continue
the not guilty position may have to be made by the client.

The Habeas Court concluded,

In this case there was not only an absence of any explicit and
affirmative waiver by Langston of his right to maintain his innocence
throughout the trial, including closing argument segment, but there is
nothing to indicate that at trial counsel even informed the defendant
that during closing argument he would concede guilt as to one of the
counts.

The Court reversed Mr. Langston’s convictions and remanded for a new trial.

Two of the other criminal law opinions issued by the ACOTSOCT are State v. Boyd and State v. Orellana.

Boyd was convicted of kidnapping in the first and assault in the third. He allegedly sexually attacked a 16 yr old who was working with him. During the course of this attack, he allegedly banged her head against the floor twice, causing her to lose consciousness both times. Subsequent events, including her being temporarily paralyzed at a volleyball game, led to his arrest.

He raised 4 issues on appeal:

I. The Court improperly deprived him of his right to cross-examine by failing to release medical records pertaining to the victim.

Lucy Puryear, a psychiatrist who had treated the victim, was called by the state as a witness and was qualified as an expert in psychiatry and neurology. Prior to her testimony, the court stated that, as discussed in a chambers conference with counsel, Puryear’s progress notes concerning the assault required redaction.

Puryear testified that she treated the victim for PTSD, with symptoms such as loss of details regarding the traumatic event and reluctance to discuss all the details at one time.

Outside of the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked Puryear about a notation in her progress notes regarding ‘‘family stressors’’ that occurred prior to the assault. These stressors involved certain difficulties facing the victim’s sibling. In Puryear’s medical opinion, these stressors had nothing to do with the victim’s recollection of the assault.

Defense counsel continued to inquire about the victim’s relationship with her family, and Puryear testified unequivocally that the victim’s familial issues were unrelated to the symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder.

The standard for determining whether medical records should be turned over was outlined in State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166. The standard is that the defendant should make a showing that the confidential information must be turned over so as to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights. If such a showing is made, the state should obtain the witness’ permission to allow the court to conduct an in camera review of the documentation and if necessary, turn it over to the defendant. If the witness does not agree, then his/her testimony must be stricken.

However, the Court noted, citing State v. Palladino, 69 Conn. App. 630, that this applies only where there is no voluntary disclosure of the records.

neither our Supreme Court nor this court has held that such an in camera review   is necessary where a victim freely gives up any rights to confidentiality that she might otherwise have

In this case, the victim orally waived her right to confidentiality and turned over the notes to the prosecutor. At that point, the notes should have been turned over to defense counsel and there was no role for the Court to play. So you’d think that the Court would agree with the defendants claim? No. They determined that failure to turn it over was harmless error.

Because the defendant took full advantage of the numerous inconsistencies with respect to the victim’s testimony, any additional attempt to impeach her credibility would have been cumulative.

II. The Court failed to strike testimony that the victim was sexually assaulted.

There was, however, no objection to the questions asked during trial and the Court found that the ruling was not a constitutional evidentiary ruling and therefore did not warrant a Golding analysis.

We previously have stated that the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law and unless there is a resultant denial of fundamental fairness or the denial of a specific constitutional right, no constitutional issue is involved.

III & IV Prosecutorial Misconduct under Brady

These claims are offshoots of the first - in that the prosecutor was in possession of exculpatory material in the expert’s reports and notes and did not turn them over to the defense. The Court holds that upon review,

we conclude that although the records contain some exculpatory evidence, they do not contain any exculpatory evidence that is material under Brady.

Next up - State v. Orellana. This seems to be a more interesting case than Boyd.
In Orellana, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell, conspiracy to sell and possession within 1500 feet of a public housing project. The facts are as follows:

A police detective, Chute, was contacted by an informant he had worked with once or twice in the past, Jusino. Jusino set up a sting with Chute and contacted the defendant to sell her 350 packets of heroin. The defendant (and a Co-D) were to deliver the drugs in a certain specific car between 5:15 and 5:30 at either one of two locations. Ofcourse, everything happened as she said and the two were arrested.

Defendant raised the following claims:
I. His motion to suppress was improperly denied.

Defendant claimed that all physical evidence seized from his car should be suppressed "as the fruits of unlawful searches and seizures". Applying the clearly erroneous standard, the court ruled that, based on Chute’s prior working relationship with Jusino, they did have probable cause based on information from a reliable informant.

Our Supreme Court has ‘‘consistently held that an informant’s record of providing information that led to arrests and seizures of contraband is sufficient to establish the reliability of the informant.’’ State v. Smith, 257 Conn. 224.

On the basis of the court’s findings concerning the events leading to the search and seizure—the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge, the police surveillance that corroborated key details about the narcotics delivery related by Jusino as well as the behavior of [Co-D] when police approached the stopped automobile —we have little difficulty in agreeing with the court’s conclusion that the police had probable cause to believe that heroin would be  found in the automobile.

II. The trial Court improperly permitted evidence of prior misconduct.

One of the defenses put forth by defense counsel was that the defendant did not know that there was heroin in the car; that he was "an innocent bystander". The counter this, the trial court permitted the state to put on evidence of past dealings between the defendant and Jusino. On appeal, the defendant argued that the "limited" probative value of this evidence was outweighed by it’s prejudicial effect. The Appellate Court disagreed,

We conclude that the court properly determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. The admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal conduct does raise concerns that a jury might misuse the evidence by considering it as evidence of a defendant’s bad character or criminal tendencies. ‘‘Proper limiting instructions often mitigate the prejudicial impact of evidence of prior misconduct.’’ State v. Ryan, 182 Conn. 335, 338 n.5, (1980).

Here, the court adequately instructed the jury as to the role the evidence was to play in its deliberations. Specifically, the court instructed the jury not to consider the evidence [...] solely as evidence of the defendant’s intent and knowledge.

*This has become a long, long post. I’ll wrap it up by simply asking a question to regular readers. Do any of you even read these summaries? I do them because they help me and I figure someone who is interested would appreciate them too. Whether you do or you don’t, please leave a comment to let me know.

Immigrant rights groups are planning to march in Danbury soon. The Mayor, conceding that anyone can march, nonetheless is asking the rights groups not to march so as not to "[crank] up the tension four or five more levels". Right. Now it’s the immigrant groups that are cranking up the tension levels.

I’m still trying to find the federal legislation, or even DOJ directive, that permits deputizing local police as immigration agents. I did find, however, some reports and opinion articles from 2002, when this idea was first proposed by then Atty. Gen. Ashcroft and rejected by California and Washington. There is also some authority for this in the CLEAR Act. NY has also considered this. Here is a 1996 Memorandum Opinion from the DOJ on "Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens". Here is a recent report from an NBC affiliate in Arizona. Currently, Florida and Alabama are the only two states that use this authority granted by the Federal Government. CT, Oklahoma and Arkansas are considering it, as is California.

In Orange County, Sheriff Mike Carona is
proposing the largest use of the program in the country. He wants to
train as many as 500 deputies to catch illegal immigrants with criminal
convictions. Under the plan, he said, officers would only check someone’s status when they are in jail or while investigating them for other serious crimes. They
would not conduct sweeps.

Going back to the Memo of 1996, it summarizes the issue as follows:

1. Subject to the provisions of state law, state and local police may constitutionally detain or arrest aliens who have violated the
criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"). State police
lack recognized legal authority to arrest or detain aliens solely for purposes
of civil deportation proceedings, as opposed to criminal prosecution. (Section
II.A-B)

2. California
law allows state police to enforce the criminal provisions of federal immigration
law, although they may not make warrantless arrests for INA misdemeanor violations
unless the offense occurs in their presence. When illegally entering aliens have
reached a place of repose within the United States, the offense is completed and
is no longer subject to warrantless arrest by California police. (Sections II.A,
II.C3)

3. State police may stop and detain
carloads of illegal alien suspects only in circumstances that satisfy the requirements
of "reasonable suspicion." These requirements are inherently fact-specific and
therefore not readily reduced to clear-cut rules. Nonetheless, several basic principles
and considerations warrant emphasis. (Section II.C)

            
a. Persons may be detained for reasonable periods by state police on the basis
of a reasonable suspicion of a criminal immigration law violation. The critical
requirement for a reasonable suspicion detention is the existence of objective,
articulable facts suggesting the commission of a criminal offense by the persons
detained, rather than mere stereotypical assumptions, profiles, or generalities.

            b. In
particular, absent knowledge of an established federal policy of not prosecuting
such offenses, state police may, in our opinion, legally detain alien suspects
for disposition by federal agents when there is reasonable suspicion that the
suspects have violated or are violating the two commonplace misdemeanor provisions
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (lack of alien registration documents) or § 1325
(illegal entry), or other criminal provisions of the INA.

            
c. Written guidelines or policies adopted by state or local police forces may
generate additional legal complications regarding otherwise valid detentions based
on suspected violations of criminal immigration laws, insofar as such guidelines
or policies state that suspects may only be detained based on reasonable suspicion
of crimes that are unrelated to the immigration laws. Because any extended detention
of a suspect must generally be based upon the law enforcement purposes served
by the stop, a police force’s official disclaimer of any immigration-related detention
authority could undermine the validity of detaining suspects to await processing
by Border Patrol officers.

…

5. As a general rule, the involuntary vehicular transportation of validly detained
aliens by state police to Border Patrol agents would be deemed an arrest and require
probable cause rather than mere reasonable suspicion. (Section II.E)

…

7. There
is established statutory authority for the deputation of state law enforcement
officers as Deputy United States Marshals. This mechanism has been most commonly
used to allow state officers to perform federal enforcement functions in joint
federal-state law enforcement task forces (e.g., anti-drug and fugitive pursuit
task forces). (Section II.F)

            a. Where the Attorney General has exercised her authority to delegate supplemental
INA enforcement duties to the U.S. Marshals Service, state and local officers
can be specially deputized as Special Deputy United States Marshals in order to
perform supportive federal immigration enforcement functions.

            
b. Such arrangements were previously authorized by an Attorney General Order in
August 1994, for a period of one year, in order to deal with a potential mass
immigration emergency in the State of Florida.

Still waiting on AG Blumenthal’s opinion.

This story is not going away and rightfully so. After Danbury’s mayor asked that state police be deputized as immigration agents and after a meeting held by Citizens for Immigration Control in Danbury, several immigrant rights groups met with Mayor Boughton to discuss his intentions.

"We think it is our role, when possible, to lower the temperature when
there is tension," said Robert Fishman, president of the Connecticut
Immigrant and Refugee Coalition in Hartford, who organized the meeting.

Boughton asked the police to double up as immigration agents - thereby giving them the authority to ask anyone they detain their immigration status - because "illegal immigrants drain city services". However, there has been no specific information as to the actual number of illegal immigrants, the services they drain and to what extent.

Others in attendance at the mayor’s meeting Tuesday included Rabbi
Clifford Librach of the United Jewish Center in Danbury and Fernando
Betancourt, executive director of the Latino and Puerto Rican Affairs
Commission in Hartford. Betancourt’s commission advises the governor and state lawmakers on Latino issues.

While city officials maintain there are as many as 15,000
illegal immigrants in the city from places such as Brazil, Ecuador,
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic, Betancourt said he wanted proof
from City Hall. "We are confused when the problem is illegal immigrants because
no one can provide any specific statistics about how many there are,
where they live and what the specific problem is," Betancourt said.

Betancourt said if Danbury officials can provide precise
information on which services illegal immigrants impact, his group
could work with the city on issues such as affordable housing and
economic development.

Yes, that would be nice. Instead of saying "there is a problem with illegal immigrants", why can’t Boughton have said "there are a significant number of illegal immigrants in the city and we need to figure out how to adjust our services to cope with that."

It’s nice to know that now he is making a genuine effort to reach out to the immigrant community by agreeing to build three volleyball courts.

The Attorney General still hasn’t issued an opinion on Boughton’s request.

Today, as we all know, is the day that time changes. Well, time doesn’t change, our clocks do. Therefore, in honor of Daylight Saving Time, here’s a website that explains why we change our clocks and subject ourselves to mass confusion and invariable delays. I’ve already missed something this morning because of it.

Some interesting anecdotes:

• The Minnesota twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul once were not twins as regards to the clock. These two large cities lie a few miles apart on opposite sides of the Mississippi River, and are considered to comprise a single metropolitan area. In 1965, St. Paul decided to begin its daylight saving time period early to conform to most of the nation, while Minneapolis felt it should follow Minnesota’s state law, which stipulated a later start date. After intense inter-city negotiations and quarreling, the cities could not agree, and so the one hour time-difference went into effect, bringing a period of great time turmoil to the cities and all the surrounding areas.
• To keep to their published timetables, trains cannot leave a station before the scheduled time. So when the clocks fall back one hour in October, all Amtrak trains in the United States that are running on time stop at 2 A.M. and wait one hour before resuming. Overnight passengers are often surprised to find their train at a dead stop and their travel time an hour longer than expected. At the spring DST time change, trains instantaneously become an hour behind schedule at 2 A.M., but they just keep going and do their best to make up the time.
• In 1995, the British Time (Extra Daylight) Bill was introduced by John Butterfill, attempting the impossible — to legislate extra daylight. The bill did not pass.

Jurist reports that federal lawmakers have introduced legislation that would allow federal courts to hear habeas petitions involving an incapacitated person whose life support is about to be removed.

FL Sen. Mel Martinez, with support from FL Rep. Dave Weldon, filed Tuesday S. 539 [bill summary], which would extend federal habeas protections to incapacitated persons. Martinez said incapacitated persons such as Schiavo should have the same due process protections as those on death row. Terri’s husband Michael Schiavo’s attorney said the bill would lead to never-ending petitions for review of state court decisions. Previously, Florida state courts have ruled that Michael Schiavo could have Terri’s feeding tube removed, although a judge issued a stay of that order that has delayed any action until March 18. Terri’s parents Bob and Mary Schindler, who oppose removing the feeding tube, sought a new battery of medical tests [AP report] Tuesday to determine whether there is a chance Schiavo could regain brain function. Schiavo suffered severe brain damage when her heart stopped beating for several minutes in 1990.

The act, which can be found here, states

(b) Purposes- It is the purpose of this Act–

          
   
(1) to facilitate balancing the acknowledged right of persons to refuse consent to medical treatment and unwanted bodily intrusions with the right to consent to treatment, food, and fluids so as to preserve their lives; and

            
   
(2) in circumstances in which there is a contested judicial proceeding because of a dispute about the expressed previous wishes or best interests of a person presently incapable of making known a choice concerning treatment, food, and fluids the denial of which will result in death, to provide that the fundamental due process and equal protection rights of incapacitated persons are protected by ensuring the availability of collateral review through habeas corpus proceedings.

The proposed bill goes on to state

Sec. 2256. Extension of habeas protections to certain persons subject to court orders

`(a) For the purposes of this chapter, an incapacitated person shall be deemed to be in custody under sentence of a court established by Congress, or deemed to be in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, as the case may be, when an order of such a court authorizes or directs the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain the person’s life. In a habeas corpus proceeding under this section the person having custody shall be deemed to encompass those parties authorized or directed by the court order to withdraw or withhold food, fluids, or medical treatment, and there shall be no requirement to produce at the hearing the body of the incapacitated person.

`(b) Subsection (a) does not apply in the case of a judicial proceeding in which no party disputes, and the court finds, that the incapacitated person, while having capacity, had executed a written advance directive valid under applicable law that clearly authorized the withholding or withdrawal of food or fluids or medical treatment in the applicable circumstances.

      

`(c) As used in this section, the term `incapacitated person’ means an individual who is presently incapable of making relevant decisions concerning the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment under applicable State law.

      

`(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to create substantive rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or of the several States.’.

I’m not quite sure that the Habeas remedy was created for this purpose. It seems to be a stretch to say that an incapacitated person is "deemed to be in custody under a sentence of a court". In a normal proceeding, where someone is "incompetent", a guardian is appointed to confer with counsel. Taking the Schiavo case, who would the court appoint as counsel? This seems to be just another forum for collateral review of an already hotly contested case, put forth by those who might be against the idea of euthanasia or physician assisted suicide.