Posts tagged prison overcrowding

The Connecticut Supreme Court today released a much awaited opinion in Troy Baker v. Commissioner [.pdf] [see previous coverage here.] The basic issue is whether a Superior Court (in this case a Habeas Court) has the jurisdiction to hear challenges to parole eligibility designations. The Appellate Court held that the court did. The Supremes overruled.

The parole scheme in Connecticut classifies three types of inmates; those that are ineligible, those that are eligible after service of 85% of their sentence and those that “were” eligible after 50% of their sentence. [I used quotations around were, because, well, they were. Until this decision.] These three classes are laid out in the General Statutes. Today, the Supreme Court held that the only mandatory language in the statutes relates to those who are NOT eligible until 85%. As for the rest, the parole board can do whatever it wants.

The essential question, therefore, is whether the statutes create a liberty interest in parole eligibility. [Please note that there is a critical distinction between parole eligibility and parole suitability. Baker argues the former, not the latter. The Court writes:

We begin with the text of § 54-125a. Subsection (a), which the petitioner claims gives rise to his liberty interest in being considered eligible for parole after serving 50 percent of his sentence, provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person convicted of one or more crimes who is incarcerated on or after October 1, 1990, who received a definite sentence or aggregate sentence of more than two years, and who has been confined under such sentence or sentences for not less than one-half of the aggregate sentence or one-half of the most recent sentence imposed by the court, whichever is greater, may be allowed to go at large on parole in the discretion of the panel of the Board .

We see nothing in this text that affirmatively grants any inmate the right to parole eligibility after serving one half of his or her sentence. In contrast, subsection (b) of the statute instructs that an inmate deemed to be a violent offender by the board ‘‘shall be ineligible for parole under subsection (a) of this section until such person has served not less than eighty-five per cent of the definite sentence imposed.’’ . .

The Court then does something even more…interesting. It holds that parole eligibility is not part of a criminal sentence. This holding is extremely problematic, for both defense attorneys and prosecutors. Plea bargaining will take on a whole new facet. Based on my experience, the most common question asked by defendants to their attorneys is: “When will I be released?” Parole eligibility is probably the most significant factor in answering that question. It’s hard to reach the conclusion that it is not an integral part of the sentence, but the Court does just that.

Finally, the Court lets stand a prior decision, Johnson v. Commissioner, which challenged the same statute’s retroactive application. Johnson held that a retroactive application of this statute was unconstitutional.

What this also means is that if the legislature was worried about prison overcrowding before this decision, I wonder how they feel now.

Hmm. I must ponder this some more.