Posts tagged connecticut
Connecticut civil union statistics
Jun 25th
The Office of Legislative Research publishes interesting reports every month. This one, published in May, was about the following:
You asked for statistics on the number of civil unions performed in Connecticut by town.
The table below displays information provided by the Department of Public Health showing the number of civil unions by town, from October 1, 2005, when the law authorizing civil unions took effect, through the end of March 2007.
The long and short of it is that there are several towns where there hasn’t been a single one (Barkhamstead, Deep River, Franklin, Hartland, Harwinton, Ledyard, North Canaan, Scotland, Sherman, Sprague, Union and West Haven) and the leaders are the major cities and towns (Hartford, Bristol, New Haven, Danbury, Enfield, Groton, Greenwich, Guilford, Hamden, Manchester, Stamford, West Hartford, Branford and Bridgeport).
In all, there were 649 unions in 2005, 722 in 2006 and 78 this year, for a total of 1449.
Some CT prison population fun facts
Jun 21st
Via the Office of Policy and Management‘s “Comprehensive Plan For the Connecticut Criminal Justice System 2007 [pdf]“:
- Connecticut’s Rate of Incarceration per 100,000 of population is the highest in the Northeast at 373.
- The average for the Northeast is 298 per 100K
- Connecticut’s Rate of Incarceration is 28th in the country, however.
- The top offense among the incarcerated population is Violation of Probation, accounting for 13.57% of all inmates
- Second on the list is Sale of a Narcotic substance, accounting for 11.12%.
- The rest are all under 5.32%
- 92% of the prison population is male.
- Parole is granted in 82% of cases that make it to a full panel or administrative review.
- There are 1663 crimes in the State of Connecticut for which incarceration is a possible sentence.
There is also a 2007 Recidivism Study, which reveals the following information:
- The overall reconviction rate was 39%.
- The overall resentenced to prison rate was 22%.
- Not shockingly, inmates released from prison with no community supervision were most likely to be reconvicted and resentenced to prison for a new offense.
- Inmates convicted of property offenses have the highest recidivism rates.
- Recidivism rates for sexual offenses was the lowest (22%), even lower than motor vehicle offenses (31%) [Full chart on page 6]
There is so much more in these reports. I will continue to sift through the information and present it.
Technorati Tags: connecticut, prison population, statistics, recidivism
En Garde!
Jun 17th
Ah, this I haven’t seen in a while. A good old net fight (light-hearted, of course). It started with SHG of Simple Justice responding to a post by Jamie Spencer about (of all things) “expunction” or “expungement” or, as us normal people like to call it, erasure. In that response, he might have called on them to stop whining. Mark Bennett jumped in and lay down the gauntlet. He provides a laundry list of why practicing in Texas is better than practicing in New York. (Edit: Scott has responded with a call to arms) Now, I don’t practice in New York, but I can’t resist getting involved in a good dogfight. So here goes:
But if you’re charged with any crime in Texas, from a traffic ticket on up,
• You are most likely entitled to reasonable bail. Bail can be denied only if the State proves that one of a few exceptions to the constitutional right to bail applies.
Check.
• If you’re accused of a felony, you may get an opportunity to make a presentation to the grand jury, which might result in a dismissal if you’re really really innocent.
No grand juries anymore in Connecticut, but you can challenge probable cause and are entitled to a hearing in probable cause if you’re facing life. Rate of success in both is about the same.
• You probably won’t be treated respectfully by the judge, the prosecutor, or the court staff, but your treatment will be much more respectful than, for example, the treatment David Feige describes citizens accused receiving in the Bronx.
Eh, this really isn’t an “advantage”. It varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. I will say that in my experience, I’ve seen only a few judges be harsh to defendants and there only a few prosecutors that exhibit some animus toward defendants.
• If you have funds to hire a lawyer, you can choose a lawyer from the finest criminal defense bar in the world.
Hey, we’ve got some damn good lawyers too and some of them even belong to the private bar! (One blogs) Also, really? In the world?
• You have a right to a jury trial. No ifs or buts.
I had no idea that in some states, you didn’t have the right to a trial by jury.
• Your lawyer gets to actually talk with the jury panel while choosing the jury instead of relying on a judge to do it for him; he’ll certainly do a better job than the judge would and will probably do a better job than the prosecutor.
Yep, same here. In fact, our lawyers get to talk to the prospective jurors one on one. (Yes, we’ve been back on forth on this in past weeks. Couldn’t resist one more shot, though 
)
• If there is a factual dispute over the way the government obtained its evidence against you, you can get a jury to resolve it, and the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the police acted legally.
Now this one is actually interesting. I haven’t really thought about it much, but I can’t dismiss it out of hand.
• If, by some combination of bad luck and bad facts, the jury convicts you, you can have them set punishment.
Which could cut both ways. You also could have to go right to the sentencing hearing, meaning your lawyer doesn’t have time to prepare.
• When the state accuses you of a crime in Texas and can’t prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, you can (eventually) clear your name.
We got that too; it’s called erasure of records. Who do you think we are? New York? 
As for the advantages of practicing in CT, I think they’re pretty obvious: one execution in 40 years, lawyers required to stay awake during trials, appointed judges and the best public defender system in the country.
C’mon folks. Where would you rather be arrested?
[poll=8]
Image courtesy: Kings County College
CT’s failed EyeID reform bill
Jun 15th
Update: Graciously agreeing to my request, the EyeID blog has this post about CT’s reform bill and, more generally, the interaction between the good goals of such bills and the realities of politics.
That said, we closely followed ID legislation from around United States this session, and one pretty hard and fast rule developed: Though virtually all bills started out looking like Connecticut’s — with a host of specific best practice requirements — the key to passage seemed to be pulling back from the specific and compromising on legislation that mandates best practices generally. These new laws then established some sort of committee (with law enforcment members and others) to draft best practice requirements. (I’m thinking about West Virginia and Maryland here). These bills also sometimes included a few more specific, non-controversial requirements, generally instructions to witnesses and written recording requirements.
The “generally-requiring-best-practices-but-leaving-the-
specifics-to-commitee” approach is not necessarily a bad development. Police generally seem strongly opposed to a specific list of requirements, but not opposed in general to reform and to good science. A best practices approach allows some time for adjustment, and also allows police to “buy-in” to the reforms. Of course, if police try to delay or defeat the drafting of best practices after these sorts of bills pass, then more specific legislation can always be passed later. But the jurisdictions that have adopted a best-practices-by-Committee approach (for example, Wisconsin) have not experienced those problems, at least not to my knowledge. The more common reaction of police who consider the reforms in good faith is eventual strong support.
Original post: In my last post on the recently concluded legislative session, I ran down a list of the “winners” and “losers”. Over the next few days, I will attempt to go through each one individually. I want to start, though, with a bill that didn’t even make it out of committee. The eyewitness identification reform bill (HB 1240). The statement of purpose for this bill reads:
To improve the reliability of eyewitness identification by establishing procedures for conducting a police lineup including having a lineup administrator who does not know which person is suspected as the perpetrator, informing the eyewitness that the perpetrator might not be in the lineup and presenting the persons or photographs in a lineup sequentially rather than simultaneously.
There are a lot of good provisions in this bill, such as
(1) When practicable, the person conducting the identification procedure shall be a person who is not aware of which person in the photo lineup or live lineup is suspected as the perpetrator of the offense;
(2) The photo lineup and live lineup identification procedures shall be conducted in sequence so that the eyewitness is shown each photograph or each person one at a time rather than viewing the photographs or the persons simultaneously
The eyewitness must also be instructed that the suspect may not be a part of the lineup, that he/she should not feel compelled to make an ID, that they will be viewed one at a time in random order.
Also,
(4) The photo lineup or live lineup shall be composed so that the fillers generally fit the description of the person suspected as the perpetrator and, in the case of a photo lineup, so that the photograph of the person suspected as the perpetrator resembles his or her appearance at the time of the offense and does not unduly stand out;
(5) If the eyewitness has previously viewed a photo lineup or live lineup in connection with the identification of another person suspected of involvement in the offense, the fillers in the lineup in which the person suspected as the perpetrator participates shall be different from the fillers used in any prior lineups;
(6) At least five fillers shall be included in the photo lineup and at least four fillers shall be included in the live lineup, in addition to the person suspected as the perpetrator;
(8) In a live lineup, any identification actions, such as speaking or making gestures or other movements, shall be performed by all lineup participants;
(12) Nothing shall be said to the eyewitness that might influence the eyewitness’s selection of the person suspected as the perpetrator;
(13) If the eyewitness identifies a person as the perpetrator, the eyewitness shall not be provided any information concerning such person prior to obtaining the eyewitness’s statement that he or she is certain of the selection;
(14) A written record of the identification procedure shall be made…
Unfortunately, this bill died in committee. Perhaps the experts at the EyeID blog can take a look at the provisions and see if they really are worthwhile.
The good news, as I previously reported, is that the legislature did approve funding for a pilot project for the next two years. Whether more than one jurisdiction signs up for this pilot project and implements the recommended changes remains to be seen.
Domestic violence bill signed by Governor
Jun 13th
I’ve promised a recap of criminal law related bills passed by the legislature, I know. I’ll do it tonight, I promise. In the meantime, here’s a story about one of the bills the Governor signed. The bill, dubbed the “domestic violence bill” creates a new crime: strangulation.
It also gives police the power to set conditions of release for those released on bond over the weekend or between the time of arrest and arraignment.
The bill, which passed the General Assembly unanimously after stalling last year, drew criticism from defense lawyers who said it was unfair for police to ban defendants from contacting victims or returning home.
Supporters recognized those concerns but said the bill was crucial to protecting victims, especially those attacked overnight or on weekends. Such victims typically must wait until the next court date for a judge to impose protective orders or other conditions on their accused attackers, experts said.
“The problematic component is that we are allowing police officers discretion normally left to a bail commissioner or a judge,” said state Sen. Andrew McDonald, D-Stamford, co-chairman of the legislature’s Judiciary Committee. “But we thought it was important because of the potential harm to victims of domestic violence.”
Violating conditions set by an officer would be a felony or a misdemeanor, depending on the charges in the original incident.
Police officers are “not neutral” and may unfairly ban suspects from their homes without weighing “both sides of a dispute,” wrote Jon Schoenhorn, president of the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. Legislators added a clause to the bill saying officers must try to contact a bail commissioner before imposing the conditions, McDonald said. Officers can set conditions only if bail commissioners are unavailable or they fail to contact one after making reasonable efforts to find one.
An interpreter must explain conditions of release to defendants who do not speak English. That may not be enough to satisfy critics, who have said judges should be responsible for any conditions of release. About three dozen states issue protective orders on evenings and weekends, but most pay judges to be available to sign them after hours. Last year’s bill failed in part because it would have cost the state about $250,000 to pay for the after-hours judges, McDonald said. The officer’s conditions would hold only until the defendant appears before a judge, who could revoke them or set his own, he said.
As for the new crime of strangulation, it seems eerily similar to one already existing: assault. Thankfully,
Juries will not be allowed to convict defendants of strangulation, assault and unlawful restraint in the same case, a rule that prevents the piling on of charges defense lawyers feared.
There was another thing that bothered me about this. So I went to a dictionary. It turns out strangling someone doesn’t necessarily require killing them. You learn something new every day.
So what happened to the death penalty bill?
Jun 10th
For those interested, I promised to answer this question over the weekend. Here’s the answer: It got screwed.
The bill was HB 7365 – An Act Concerning the Procedure in a Capital Felony Trial. The provisions were that if a death penalty jury was deadlocked on the punishment to be imposed, the jury would be discharged and the judge would impose LWOP. It was voted out of the Judiciary Committee and then things started going downhill. Among other things, I wanted to point out this amendment that was proposed:
(a) any person convicted of a capital felony and sentenced to death who takes a direct appeal of such conviction to the Supreme Court shall file such appeal not later than twenty-one days after imposition of sentence.
(b) The defendant’s briefs and the state’s briefs shall be filed in accordance with a schedule that will ensure that all briefs are filed not later than four months after the date of the imposition of sentence.
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule oral argument not later than six months after the date of the imposition of sentence.
This amendment called for oral argument in a death penalty case within six months of the imposition of the sentence. This would have been a logistical nightmare. I’m not sure transcripts would be ready in 6 months, let alone the four month limit for filing the briefs.
It also affected the timeline for filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus:
(a) An application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a capital felony conviction or the imposition of a sentence of death shall be brought not later than one hundred eighty days after the date of the imposition of such sentence. Such application shall fully plead all cognizable claims that the defendant’s conviction or sentence was entered in violation of the Constitution or laws of the state or the Constitution of the United States.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the filing of a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be barred if (1) the facts underlying the claim were unknown to the defendant or the defendant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence prior to the filing of the earlier application, and (2) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would have reasonably led the original trier of fact to have either found the defendant not guilty or not sentence the defendant to death. The court shall hold a hearing on such subsequent application not later than one hundred eighty days after the filing of such application.
Anyone that practices Habeas law will tell you that filing an Amended Petition in a regular felony trial case within six months is a tall order, let alone a capital felony trial case. Keep in mind that the Habeas and direct appeal would proceed simultaneously under the provisions of this amendment.
There needs to be serious debate in the legislature about the death penalty. The last time there was serious debate, the abolition of the death penalty received 60 votes. The debate was shelved pending the execution of Michael Ross, because legislators felt it was an inappropriate time. Since then, it has not been revived. Aside from geographical disparities in the imposition of the death penalty, there are racial disparities as well, which need to be evaluated and discussed. With an election year next year, there’s little hope of serious debate any time soon.
Technorati Tags: connecticut, death penalty
State-wide struggle over ways to deal with sex offenders
Jun 10th
The Courant had this article over the weekend, chronicling the efforts across the state to deal with sex offenders after release.
The debate in Stafford was feisty and political.First Selectman Allen Bacchiochi, a Republican, had proposed an ordinance that would ban convicted sex offenders from public parks and recreation areas.
At the selectmen’s May 10 meeting, Democratic Selectman Gordon Frassinelli questioned the utility and deterrent value of the ban, likening the initial written warning and $100 fine on the second offense to an unshoveled sidewalk violation.
Bacchiochi snapped back, “Do you want to protect the children or do you want to protect the person who has already been a sex offender? I want to protect the children of this town.”
“I think that’s pretty universal,” Frassinelli replied in a quiet voice.
Stafford is the latest to wade into the debate, with the selectmen passing the ordinance, copied from one in Danbury, last month. Afterward, Bacchiochi immediately pulled it back for legal and enforcement review before sending it to a town meeting vote.
A state-wide bill to restrict sex offenders from living within 1000 feet of schools and child-care centers passed the House but didn’t come up for vote in the Senate. Connecticut has been slow to enter the fray, which has seen a rush of bills nationwide. This has actually been a good thing. As the debate has gathered steam, more data has become available and Connecticut has been able to see the effects of passing such laws.
If it saves even one child, it will be worth it, proponents say.But new research and treatment experts say it has a slim chance of doing even that.
“I know of no case where it’s saved a child from being molested,” said psychologist Dennis Gibeau, program director for the Center for the Treatment of Problem Sexual Behavior in Middletown. “The idea that we’re instituting laws that restrict where sex offenders can live, where they can frequent, doesn’t really address the issue of protecting children.”
Bridgeport is amending a proposal that would restrict sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of schools and child-care centers and prohibit them from parks unless accompanying their own children. Its sponsor, Councilman Keith Rodgerson, projects it will come before the common council again in July.
Rodgerson says there is more council and city support for the move since his research showed the unequal density of sex offenders in Bridgeport compared with Fairfield County towns and the state at large. Bridgeport has almost 16 offenders per square mile, while Danbury and the state as a whole have less than one.
“You walk out of your front door and you’re going to bump into one,” Rodgerson said.
Other cities in the State are dealing with the problem in the context of CT’s small size. New London considered a residency restriction ban, but it wasn’t pursued. The Mayor said it would have been hard to enforce.
No parent, politician or pundit could find fault with the intent of keeping children safe from sexual abuse. Of more than 600,000 registered sex offenders in the nation, Connecticut has almost 4,500.But can the recent laws, some of which virtually leave the convicted offender nowhere to go, work?
First of all, in 80 to 90 percent of sex offenses, the predator knows the victim, experts say. The stranger in the park case is rare.
Second, many of the ordinances, including the Danbury one, do not differentiate between child molesters and other offenders. The crimes of the 10 registered offenders in Stafford range from first-degree sexual assault to public indecency.
Third, the jury is still out on whether registering offenders or restricting their activities reduces the number of sex crimes.
“The general idea of limiting sex offenders in mixing with children certainly makes good common sense,” Attorney General Richard Blumenthal said. Blumenthal supported the public safety legislation and has suggested more aggressive steps, such as electronic monitoring of serious offenders.
But a study released in April by the Minnesota Department of Corrections, tracing 224 repeat sex offenders, concluded that not one would have been deterred by a residency restriction law. Social proximity was the key factor, it found, with half of the offenders establishing contact with victims through friends or acquaintances. Only 35 percent of the offenders made direct contact with victims, and none of the juvenile cases involved contact near a school, park or other prohibited area.
At least the media is now taking note of the DOJ study that debunks the myth that sex offenders have a high rate of recidivism.
At the forefront of the debate is the presumption, once a child molester, always a child molester.A premise in the Danbury and Stafford ordinance states, “the recidivism rate for released sex offenders is alarmingly high, especially for those who commit their crimes on children.”
But a 2003 Bureau of Justice Statistics study followed 9,691 released sex offenders, 4,295 of them child molesters, in 15 states from 1994 to 1997. In that span, only 5.3 percent of the total group repeated sex crimes, and 3.3 percent of the child molesters were arrested for another sex crime against a child.
“The conventional wisdom is that they all go out and reoffend. I don’t think you’re going to find the data to support that,” said Charles Olney, research associate at the Center for Sex Offender Management in Maryland, a project for the U.S. Justice Department. “That 100 percent recidivism rate – I’ve only heard it in speeches.”
Dan Casagrande, the Danbury corporation counsel who helped draft the sex offender ordinance, pointed to an Indianapolis ordinance that was struck down in federal court as too restrictive. “It kept anyone on the registry from entering the city of Indianapolis. You can’t even be on the interstate,” he said.
Police in Georgia and Iowa have said the laws have seriously undermined efforts to keep track of offenders. “We’re going to see sex offenders who are unable to live in communities and they’re going to go further underground where they can’t be monitored,” Renee Redman, legal director of the ACLU Foundation of Connecticut, said.
It will be interesting to see how cities (and the state) react to growing data on residency restrictions and whether they attempt to shape bills in a meaningful way.
Here is my post on what acceptable registry and residency restriction laws would look like.
Amero defense files Motion for New Trial
Jun 5th
Just posted to the Norwich Bulletin online is this story about Julie Amero’s attorneys filing a Motion for a New Trial.
Amero’s attorney, William Dow III, based today’s motion for a new trial on “evidence discovered after the verdicts and now in possession of the state and the defense.” In light of the new evidence, Dow said the jury reached inaccurate conclusions about Amero’s alleged Web surfing.
The judge is expected to rule on the Motion prior to tomorrow’s sentencing. I’ll have more as I know more.
Technorati Tags: julie amero, connecticut
A call for change on mandatory sentences
Jun 3rd
The Stamford Advocate has this story today, chronicling the problem with minimum-mandatory sentences in drug cases and the growing calls for a change in the legislation.
The problem with mandatory-minimums has become apparent over the past few years and many states have or are considering abolishing them. However, they still exist in Connecticut and defense attorneys and judges have the same complaint:
Few people are convicted of mandatory minimum charges in drug cases. Instead, prosecutors use the threat of a mandatory minimum conviction as leverage to entice guilty pleas to lesser charges.
A variety of attorneys, judges and experts statewide want mandatory minimum laws scrapped or adjusted. About two dozen states have adjusted mandatory minimum rules in the last decade as critics complain they result in severe sentences and prison overcrowding.
Connecticut has a task force whose job is to review sentencing schemes and recommend changes
“I think we should just get rid of them,” said Thomas Ullmann, a public defender in New Haven and a member of the task force. “Prosecutors bully people all the time with mandatory minimums.”
Prosecutors admit they use mandatory minimum charges as a negotiating tool. But they point out that police choose the charges in most Connecticut jurisdictions, including Stamford and Norwalk. The bargaining, prosecutors say, saves defendants prison time by giving them the chance to plead guilty to lesser charges instead of risking a trial and a minimum prison term.
“The legislature put us in a straitjacket,” said David Cohen, state’s attorney for the Stamford-Norwalk judicial district, “but if we don’t feel a mandatory minimum is appropriate, we can lower the charges.”
Well, either the state is bound by these mandatory-minimums or can offer a plea on lesser charges. What usually happens, however, is that the threat of min-man sentences are used to pressure the defendant into pleading to something and not seeking acceptance into a program.
The statistics are overwhelming:
There are about 26,000 cases each year statewide involving mandatory minimum charges, according to a 2005 state study. In about 21,000 of those cases, the main charge is selling drugs or driving under the influence of alcohol.
The rest involve violent crimes such as rape, murder and kidnapping.
Six different drug charges require mandatory minimum sentences ranging from two to 10 years.
Police often charge drug defendants with several of those charges in the same case; about 70 percent of mandatory minimum charges are drug-related, the 2005 study found.
Judges have some discretion, but not enough. This is the knock on rigid sentencing schemes, including guidelines like those in Federal court. Sentencing should be case-specific, based on the individual facts and circumstances of each prosecution. Mandatory-minimum sentences take away that discretion and there is no ability to shape the sentence to best suit the facts of a particular case.
State makes first arrest in wake of MySpace’s divulgence
Jun 1st
Connecticut may have made the first arrest nationwide of a sex offender posting on MySpace. After MySpace agreed to divulge the details of the users it had deleted recently, the information was received by Connecticut’s AG who shared it with law enforcement. That led them to Chris Montefusco.
Christopher Montefusco 30, of West Haven, was taken into custody Thursday by state Department of Correction officials. He was one of what is now believed to be more than 200 sex offenders in Connecticut using MySpace. He had registered two different profiles of himself on the site, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal said.
Although Blumenthal had no details about Montefusco’s underlying criminal charge, he said that one of the conditions of Montefusco’s parole was that he not use a computer, the Internet or access social networking sites such as MySpace without first obtaining permission from his parole officer.
The news story notes that the AG is seeking permission from Montefusco to search his computer in order to determine who he was contacting.
In Connecticut, Blumenthal is pushing the legislature to approve a bill this year that would require sites like MySpace to verify users’ ages and require minors to get parental permission before they could post profiles. Blumenthal said that the networks could apply computer technology already used by credit card and tobacco companies to verify users’ ages. Sites that fail to comply would face civil penalties of up to $5,000 a day.
But officials from MySpace have questioned the effectiveness of age verification. Hemanshu Nigam, MySpace’s chief security officer, said that it could create more dangers for children by giving them a false sense of security if a predator manages to pass through the age-screen using bogus information.
Nigam and MySpace favor an alternate proposal – which Connecticut’s House of Representatives unanimously approved last week – requiring convicted sex offenders to register their e-mail addresses and other Internet identifiers as well as their home addresses when they are released from prison.
Again, I question the reliability of either proposal. It isn’t that difficult to lie about your age and it is ridiculously easy to keep creating new e-mail addresses. Maybe computers should come with parenting guides.
Previous coverage:
What is appropriate compensation for a wrongful conviction?
May 31st
James Tillman was exonerated a few months ago and last week, the CT legislature voted to compensate him $5 million. On the other hand, Alan Cortzer was denied $1.25 million in compensation by Florida’s legislature. So, this CSM story asks, what do states owe the exonerated? (HT: Corrections Sentencing)
This is a question that an increasing number of states have had to answer in recent years, with the good work of defense attorneys and the Innocence Project, brought about by an advancement in DNA technology and science. But are states adequately prepared to deal with the exonerated? Should there be any remuneration for those wrongfully convicted?
As DNA exonerations become more plentiful – and more publicized – some states are moving on the compensation front. Of the 200 men who have been exonerated based on DNA evidence, about 45 percent have received some sort of compensation, according to the Innocence Project, with amounts that range from $25,000 to $12.2 million.
Twenty-one states, along with the federal government and the District of Columbia, now have standardized compensation laws on the books – offering exonerees amounts ranging from $15,000 total to $50,000 per year of imprisonment. Thirteen states have introduced bills this year to either create or improve compensation for the wrongfully convicted. Some of those bills, like the one that gave Mr. Tillman $5 million, dealt only with individual prisoners, but other states are trying to standardize the compensation.
Texas, where 13 men have been exonerated in Dallas County alone, is considering a package of bills that would, among other things, raise the compensation amount from $25,000 to $50,000 per year of incarceration.
Vermont – which hasn’t yet had a prisoner exonerated by DNA evidence – has passed a comprehensive bill that would provide between $30,000 and $60,000 per year of incarceration as well as access to healthcare and reintegration services. It’s currently awaiting the governor’s signature.
Connecticut did have a bill proposed this session that would have studied the creation of a standardized system, but it didn’t make it past committee.
But these are states that are providing for compensation. What about those that aren’t, like Florida? What of the Alan Cortzers?
“In Florida, if you’re a parolee they give you $100 and a bus ticket,” says Michael Olenick, the Tallahassee attorney who represented Crotzer pro bono. “Al Crotzer got no bus ticket, and no $100.”
He also didn’t get access to counseling, and he says he’s struggled with some things since his release: He still wants to turn his light off at 11:47 every night, for instance, and he keeps everything in his room neat enough to pass a cell inspection.
Neither Mr. Olenick nor Crotzer can be sure why the request for $1.25 million failed, especially after the Florida House unanimously approved it. Senate leaders said they didn’t have the money – a common reason that states cite in not providing compensation. In Crotzer’s case, some also suggested that lawmakers didn’t want to grant any more individual compensation bills, but instead wanted to pass a “global” bill that would address all cases. However, the three such bills that were introduced in past years didn’t go anywhere.
Some believe Crotzer may also have been hurt by the fact that he was convicted of a beer store robbery when he was 18 – a fact that would have excluded him from compensation under one of the laws proposed in Florida.
So what do you think? What would be adequate compensation? Here are some of the laws already on the books:
California: $100 per day of incarceration
Montana: Educational aid for those exonerated through postconviction DNA testing
New Hampshire: Maximum of $20,000
New Jersey: Whichever is greater – twice the amount of the claimant’s income in the year prior to incarceration or $20,000, for each year of incarceration
Tennessee: Maximum total of $1 million
CT Senate passes harsh “Jessica’s Law” and “tender years” exception
May 30th
Yesterday the Senate passed SB 1458 [scroll down to the first full bill discussed], also called “Jessica’s Law”. I’ve blogged about this bill in the past and it really does provide for stiff penalties. It increases the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual assault of a minor under the age of thirteen to twenty five years.
This is also the bill that creates the “tender years” exception to hearsay. My thoughts on this are well documented. I do not like it and I don’t think I ever will.
Not all is bad, though. They amended the “Romeo and Juliet” law to increase the permissible age difference between participants to three years instead of two.
The sad thing is that the bill was based partly on incorrect information:
While the current trend among lawmakers is to move away from mandatory minimum prison terms, Kissel said this was one instance in which such enforcement is necessary. Research has shown that many sex offenders are prone to a pattern of behavior and could offend again if given the opportunity, [Senator] Kissel said.
No, not many. The latest studies show that sex offenders have the lowest recidivism rates. Also notable is the fact that law enforcement agencies have come out against high mandatory-minimums because it makes it difficult to prosecute. Defendants are less likely to accept plea deals and prosecutors have less flexibility in structuring an appropriate sentence.
Here’s another news article with a quote from a prosecutor:
Stephen Sedensky, the State’s Attorney for Danbury Superior Court, applauded lawmakers for taking steps to protect sexual assault victims.
“The legislature realizes the seriousness of these type of offenses and wants the sentences to reflect that,” he said.
He added that the 25-year mandatory minimum for the aggravated sexual assault charge could lead to fewer defendants taking a plea agreement and more cases going to trial.
“It’s too soon to tell whether that will be good for the victims,” he said, noting that the victims could be called upon to testify during a trial. “I’m anxious to see how it will play out in court.”
Well, time will tell how these statutes are utilized and whether they stand up to Constitutional muster.
Technorati Tags: sex offenders, mandatory minimums, connecticut legislation, tender years.
CT persists with “tender years” bill despite Crawford
May 23rd
The Connecticut legislature is set to vote on a “tender years” exception statute. In spite of the obvious Constitutional hurdle of Crawford, the sponsors of the bill are pressing ahead. This is the text of the proposed statute:
Sec. 9. (NEW) (Effective July 1, 2007) Notwithstanding any other rule of evidence or provision of law, a statement by a child under thirteen years of age relating to a sexual offense committed against that child, or an offense involving physical abuse committed against that child by a person or persons who had authority or apparent authority over the child, shall be admissible in a criminal, juvenile or civil proceeding if
- the court finds, on the basis of the time, content and circumstances of the statement, there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy,
- the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party an intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement at such time as to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, and
- either (A) the child testifies at the proceeding, or (B) the child is unavailable as a witness and there is independent nontestimonial admissible evidence of the alleged act.
For the purposes of this section, “child” includes a person who is chronologically thirteen years of age or older, but who has a mental or developmental age of less than thirteen years because of mental retardation or developmental disability.
I have highlighted the problematic portions of the statute. Firstly, what is “apparent authority”? Does a simple command such as: “Come here” constitute “apparent authority”? Does kidnapping constitute “apparent authority”?
Secondly, it only allows to “provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it”. It does not require that the opponent of the statement have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the time the statement was given, as required by Crawford.
Finally, what does the legislature mean by “independent nontestimonial admissible evidence”? Does a statement by the victim to her mother count?
It seems that there is a general belief that children under an arbitrarily chosen age are more prone to truthful statements. I am unsure of the veracity of this belief and whether it is supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, as practitioners will attest, children are susceptible to suggestion – suggestion that is more often than not planted by a parent or someone in a position of authority (or apparent authority ).
Hopefully the legislature will take note of Crawford and realize that the statute as written is problematic.
Here [pdf] is the written testimony of the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers’ Association in opposition to this statute.
Here [pdf] is the written testimony of the Chief State’s Attorneys’ Office, which seeks to clarify the difference between testimonial and non-testimonial statements.
Here [pdf] is a general statement in opposition by the Chief Public Defender’s Office.
Here [pdf] is a statement by the Judicial Branch asking that the legislature not move forward with this bill, since the issues are currently being considered by the Code of Evidence Oversight Committee.
Previous coverage:
Gay marriage oral argument roundup
May 14th
Update: Well, I spoke too soon. Apart from the CTNewsJunkie post, GLAD liveblogged the argument and CTLocalPolitics has commentary in the comments here.
Original: So, now that the oral argument has been conducted, what mattered to the justices? I had the oral argument playing in the background while I worked today, so I wasn’t paying rapt attention. I did get a general gist of what went on, though.
Justice Borden was very concerned about the civil union bill and how integral it was to plaintiff’s argument. He wondered if the Court were to find that the bill is a violation of the EP clause and the legislature repealed the bill the very next day, would plaintiffs lose? Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the bill only underscored their argument and was their argument was not dependent on it. I’m not sure Justice Borden was convinced.
Judge Harper asked whether there was a right to same-sex marriage as opposed to just marriage. One of the justices said that the plaintiffs were free to marry whomever they wanted (as long as they were of the opposite sex). I think this is essentially the argument. It will turn on whether the judges feel that gays and lesbians are a “suspect class” deserving of greater scrutiny.
From the Courant:
If the justices determined that gay and lesbian couples fell into this status, they would more intensively scrutinize the state’s motives in distinguishing between civil unions and marriage, and whether those objectives were both rational, and narrowly tailored. It was this type of analysis that formed the underpinnings of the 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling that afforded same-sex couples the right to marry.
Plaintiff’s counsel made a very strong point:
Klein replied that the fundamental principles of marriage are not based on gender.”It is really a relationship of two legal equals based on mutual consent by which they take responsibility for each other, and that relationship is protected by the state,” he said.
Also, Lawrence was invoked a lot.
Plaintiff’s opening brief is here and the Reply brief is here [both pdf]
As of this point, I have no idea what the outcome will be. If I were to guess, I’d guess that the Court would deny the appeal, but strongly suggest that the legislature make it happen.
I was going to link to other CT blogs that might have more info, but only one has a post about this so far.
Previous coverage:
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Gay marriage oral argument tomorrow today
May 13th
The big news tomorrow today is going to be oral argument scheduled before the Supreme Court in Elizabeth Kerrigan et al. v. Commissioner of Public Health et al, which is the gay marriage case. Plaintiffs have made the argument that Connecticut’s civil union law is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution and amounts to “separate but equal” treatment.
There are about 20 amicus briefs filed, leading to the recusal of both new Chief Justice Rogers and her replacement on the panel, former Chief Justice Sullivan.
The Judicial Department has issued this release for tomorrow’s arguments, in case you are planning to attend. Note that arguments will be broadcast live [the link should work tomorrow, but if doesn't just go to the home page] on CT-N tomorrow.
Here is the excerpt of the issues from the Judicial Branch’s website:
Same Sex Marriage; Whether Prohibition of Marriage Between Same Sex Couples Violates Equal Protection and Due Process Guarantees of Connecticut Constitution.The plaintiffs are same sex couples who were denied marriage licenses. They commenced this action seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring that any statute, regulation or common-law rule that is applied to deny same sex couples the right to marry violates the Connecticut constitution. While their action was pending, the legislature enacted Public Acts 2005, No. 05-10 (the civil union law), which confers on same sex couples who register their relationship with the state the same rights granted to opposite sex couples whose unions are legalized. The act also restricts the term “marriage” solely to opposite sex couples.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. In arguing that they were entitled to the unique status of marriage, the plaintiffs claimed that (1) marriage is a fundamental right; (2) a civil union is a legal institution of a lesser status than marriage; (3) the use of two different terms – “marriage” and “civil union” – denotes a form of segregation akin to that under the “separate but equal” doctrine; (4) the lack of general recognition of the term “civil union” means that they must constantly explain their legal status to others; and (5) because civil unions, unlike marriages, are not recognized in most other jurisdictions, the plaintiffs may not be able to avail themselves of federal and interstate rights and benefits.
The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. In so ruling, it found that the legislature’s intent in enacting the civil union law was to confer on same sex couples rights that are not only equal to, but are identical to, those enjoyed by opposite sex couples. It stated that although the plaintiffs feel that they have been relegated to a second-class status, the text of our statutes does not place them there. It further stated that the fact that different groups are referred to by two different names does not provide the basis for an equal protection or due process challenge. The court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the absence of the term “civil union” in common parlance was speculative, and even if they should have to explain its meaning, that fact does not amount to legal harm. It acknowledged that other jurisdictions’ lack of recognition of same sex civil unions creates a host of ills and uncertainty for the plaintiffs in their attempt to avail themselves of rights outside of Connecticut. It stated, however, that the problem does not stem from the nomenclature used in the Connecticut legislation, but rather, from the other jurisdictions’ refusal to enact legislation that recognizes the basic civil rights that Connecticut has recognized.
In this appeal, the Supreme Court will determine whether the trial court was correct in rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Tomorrow sure will be fun!
Technorati Tags: connecticut, same sex marriages, gay marriage
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