The guilt by association exception to the Fourth Amendment

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cat_group_pic

now which one-a-youz ates that bone?

Tomorrow at 10:00am, the Connecticut Supreme Court will hear argument in one of the most important cases to come before them in a long time. The case involves the authority of the police to stop and detain individuals just because they happen to be on a public street alongside someone the police might be looking for. In other words, the authority to automatically detain the companion of someone who is a suspect. In fewer words: guilt by association.

The defendant’s brief is here [PDF], the state’s brief is here [PDF] and the reply brief is here [PDF].

First, some setup. The Constitutional provision at play here is the Fourth Amendment, which protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures”. Normally, in order to enter a home or to arrest someone, the police need a warrant based on probable cause. In rare circumstances, a warrantless arrest or seizure can also be made, but it also must be justified by probable cause.

“[A] police officer is permitted in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes if the officer believes, based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity, even if there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”

State v. Clark; see also Terry v. Ohio. What that means is that even if an officer is making a brief investigatory stop, he has to be able to articulate a reasonable suspicion as to why he believes that particular person is engaged in criminal activity.

The facts. Got it? Okay. So, in State v. Kelly, police officers were looking for a guy named Gomez. They had the most generic of descriptions of Gomez before they set out that day: 20-22 year old Hispanic male. 5’5-5’7, 130-150lbs, medium complexion and very short hair. Everyone whom that description fits, raise your hands. They wanted to serve a warrant on him for violating his probation. They didn’t know how he had violated his probation or what he was on probation for. Despite their considerable resources, they hadn’t even bothered to look at a photo of Gomez before setting out.

They got a tip from one of their informants that Gomez might reside in the area of Brown Street in Wethersfield. So off they went, with only the most generic of descriptions. They come upon two men, Burgos and Kelly. While Burgos is Hispanic, he apparently had very lengthy hair. Kelly is African-American. So, in no way could Kelly be mistaken for Gomez.

Yet, the two officers decide to stop the two men and displaying their badges, motion for them to come over. [Under Connecticut state law, a broader definition of seizure applies than under the Federal Constitution - meaning we have greater protections. So a person is seized when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave a police encounter. State v. Oquendo.] Burgos asked “what for?” and Kelly said “I live here”. The police continued to order the men to come to them at which point they both took off running. For some reason, the police abandoned their chase of Burgos-who-they-thought-was-Gomez and focused on Kelly. They say him drop a baggie of something and he was eventually apprehended and charged with possession of cocaine.

The argument Kelly raises on appeal is essentially this: if, as described above, the police need particularized and individualized suspicion to infringe on someone’s Fourth Amendment right and the only reason they stopped him was because they were looking for Gomez, then his seizure and detention is in violation of the Constitution. The police admitted during the suppression hearing that they did not suspect Kelly of committing any crime when they stopped him and that they stopped him merely because he was walking next to the guy they thought they were looking for.

The State argues, however, that this violation of a Constitutional right is permitted because of the so-called “automatic companion” rule: that any time the police suspect that a person on the street is someone they are looking for or want to investigate, they have the authority to stop whomever else that person is with, in the name of officer safety.

The Appellate Court likened this situation to the line of motor vehicle stop cases in the United States Supreme Court, which has held that it is Constitutional for an officer to order a passenger out of the car during such a stop. Maryland v. Wilson. SCOTUS has also said it’s okay to detain passengers while the car is searched for contraband pursuant to a warrant. Michigan v. Summers.

Those cases, in my opinion, are quite different:

  • First, SCOTUS has carved out a very specific exception to the Fourth Amendment for motor vehicles due to their distinct nature. The automatic companion rule is not just an extension of the motor vehicle exception, but is another new comparable exception.
  • Second, passengers in a car are different than two people walking on a street. Passengers in a car are, by definition in some sort of companionship relationship together and, more importantly, it is physically impossible to stop a car and detain only one person inside while letting the others go on their way. That is not the case with two people walking on the street. It is far easier for officers to approach one individual – the one for whom they have reasonable and articulable suspicion or probable cause – while asking the others to step aside or go on their way. They are severable in a way that passengers in a car aren’t.
  • Finally, the motor vehicle cases presuppose that the entire car has been legally detained and then say that, once legally seized, to ask a passenger to step outside is a de minimis intrusion that is justified by officer safety. Here, that first step is at issue: is Kelly legally detained to begin with? The answer, of course, is no, unless you adopt the view that you do not need a specific particular individualized reason to stop him as long as he is with someone else whom you do have reason to stop.

The implications of permitting a rule whereby police can stop every person for whom they may or may not have reasonable suspicion and every companion in their immediate radius are frightening. One need only look at the allegations of racial profiling that have landed East Haven in trouble or the trial of the stop and frisk policies of New York City Police to know that permitting wholesale detention and seizure of people on inner city streets based on nothing more than “guilt by association” would result in, well…just look at these stats:

In 2010, New Yorkers were stopped by the police 601,285 times.
518,849 were totally innocent (86 percent).
315,083 were black (54 percent).
189,326 were Latino (33 percent).
54,810 were white (9 percent).
295,902 were aged 14-24 (49 percent).

In 2011, New Yorkers were stopped by the police 685,724 times.
605,328 were totally innocent (88 percent).
350,743 were black (53 percent).
223,740 were Latino (34 percent).
61,805 were white (9 percent).
341,581 were aged 14-24 (51 percent).

In 2012, New Yorkers were stopped by the police 533,042 times
473,300 were totally innocent (89 percent).
286,684 were black (55 percent).
166,212 were Latino (32 percent).
50,615 were white (10 percent).

If you think that’s a NYPD specific problem, look at these Philly PD allegations.

But it’s about more than all of that. It’s about the strength of our rights and the Constitution. Do we want an America where we can walk down the street and talk to whomever we want, without fear of being stopped by the police just because of the person next to us, even if they don’t suspect us of doing anything wrong?

Should we not require that bare minimum? If the police want to stop a person – any person – they should be required to say why they stopped that person that’s not “because he was talking to a drug dealer”? Talking to a dealer isn’t a crime. Our police forces shouldn’t have license to stop anyone they feel like without a suspicion that they are committing or have committed a crime. And, let’s be honest, that standard is absurdly low. Just look at their inept efforts to apprehend “Gomez” and how they bumbled into Burgos and Kelly instead. Was the stop of Burgos legal? How can we permit what happened to Kelly? And if this is permitted, what else will be?

 

This month at the Supreme Court: blockbuster session

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not an actual judge

not an actual judge

I’m reviving a series I briefly dabbled in, back in 2008, called ‘This Month‘, which serves to preview the cases assigned for oral argument in the CT Supreme Court in the upcoming month. I may also include cases of special interest in SCOTUS, depending on whether I’m in the mood. I’ve also added a permanent link to this post in the sidebar, alongside the above picture, so you can find it at any time. The link will be updated every month to the most current ‘this month’ post.

The reason for reviving this is this upcoming April term, in which the court is scheduled to hear at least four cases that can have significant and profound impacts on the state of individual rights in Connecticut: State v. Kelly; State v. Brown, Brown v. Commissioner and State v. Santiago, impacting, in turn, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments.

The following is the listing of criminal cases scheduled for oral argument in the CT Supreme Court by date.

Monday, April 15 @ 10:00am: State v. Richard Annulli. [Briefs available here.] The defendant was charged with several sex related crimes. During the trial, he wanted to cross-examine the complaining witness to show that she was lying by questioning her about another separate instance in which she allegedly lied to the police in order to get someone else arrested. The trial judge, after hearing what that evidence would be, disagreed with the defendant’s characterization that she “lied” and thus did not permit the defendant to question her about that. The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction and the Supreme Court will review whether his Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accuser was violated by the trial court. There is also a claim that the evidence was insufficient, but that’s going nowhere.

Tuesday, April 16 @ 10:00am: State v. Jeremy Kelly. The link to the left is to a separate post for this case. I don’t often engage in hyperbole but it is my opinion that this is one of the most important cases the CT Supreme Court will have to deal with for a while (except that other case coming up on April 23). This case involves the ability of the police to seize or detain groups of people when they have a reasonable suspicion to stop only one person out of that group. The implications of permitting such an “automatic companion” rule are staggering, especially for policing in minority neighborhoods, given the dubious “stop and frisk” tactics that are already employed there.

Wednesday, April 17 @ 10:00am: State v. Brown. [Briefs available here.] One of the fundamental concepts of the privilege against self-incrimination is that you have the right to remain silent. The police, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, generally advise a suspect of his rights. So, if a person chooses to invoke his rights and remain silent, that fact cannot be used to show that he is guilty. See Doyle v. Ohio. The question in Brown is whether post-arrest silence can be used against the defendant if the defendant first puts on evidence that he was co-operative with police and answered their questions. Has he, in essence, “opened the door” to harmful questioning? Once he does that, can the prosecutor show that when asked by the police how much he (in this case) had to drink, the defendant remained silent? The Appellate Court said yes and the Supreme Court will decide if that important protection of Due Process has an exception of these circumstances.

Interestingly enough, on the very same day, the United States Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Salinas v. Texas, in which the issue to be decided is whether the pre-arrest silence of a suspect can be used to show his guilt. [Greenfield has more here.]

Wednesday, April 17 @ 11:00am: State v. Stephen J.R. [Briefs available here.] The defendant, who was accused of sexually abusing the minor victim on four occasions, was charged with eight counts of sexual assault in the first degree and eight counts of risk of injury. At trial, the victim testified that the defendant abused her on “three or four” occasions and that she was forced to engage in two sexual acts each time. The defendant subsequently was convicted of all sixteen charges. He argues that the victim’s testimony was too vague to support the guilty verdicts on all sixteen charges, as she described generally what happened each time the abuse occurred but did not differentiate between the incidents. In addition, the defendant contends that the trial court, after conducting an in camera review of the records of the department of children and families pertaining to the victim and her family, improperly failed to fully disclose all of the relevant records. Finally, the defendant asserts that the prosecutor, during closing argument, improperly appealed to the emotions of the jury and thereby denied him a fair trial.

Thursday, April 18 @ 10:00am: O’Neil Brown v. Commissioner. [Briefs available here.] A case that will decide the applicability of Padilla v. Kentucky here in Connecticut. Padilla said that it was a lawyer’s responsibility to advise a defendant about any immigration consequences of a guilty plea. While Padilla was an important case for defendants going forward, the question here is whether it applies retroactively to people whose convictions are final and who may be awaiting deportation. While SCOTUS has said no, Chaidez v. US [PDF], they have also said that states are free to provide retroactivity under state law, Danforth v. Minnesota. Further, last year the Connecticut Supreme Court also said too bad you’re shit out of luck to a guy who sought to vacate his 1999 conviction because he was facing deportation in 2010 and no one told him that he could be deported. He relied on CGS 54-1j, but the Court said no, that only provides relief within the first three years. So O’Neil Brown is critical for defendants who may have pled guilty without any knowledge of the negative deportation consequences of that plea.

Monday, April 22 @ 10:00am: State v. Pires. The issue in this case is whether the defendant properly invoked his right to represent himself and whether that right was violated. The Appellate Court said no and the Supreme Court will review that decision.

Monday, April 22 @ 11:00am: State v. Mitchell Henderson. In 1993, the defendant was found guilty of several crimes and due to his extensive criminal record, was also found to be a persistent serious felony offender and a persistent dangerous felony offender, both of which triggered a greater punishment than normal. As a result of this, his sentence was lengthened or “enhanced”. In 2007, our Supreme Court decided that any such “enhancements” must be based on facts that are found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a judge. So Henderson argued that his enhanced sentence is illegal because the facts weren’t found by a jury. The Appellate Court said no, the 2007 rule doesn’t apply backwards. The Supreme Court will now review.

Tuesday, April 23 @ 10:00am: State v. Eduardo Santiago. [Briefs available here.] This is the other big one this month, which will decide whether the prospective repeal of the death penalty is Constitutional or whether the entire death penalty needs to be scrapped or whether the repeal needs to be repealed. Keep in mind that the hearings on the racial and geographic disparity in the application of the death penalty are still pending.

Wednesday, April 24 @ 10:00am: State v. Milner. Here’s another fascinating case (and the last one of) this term. Milner was placed on probation in 2005. Sometime later, he was charged with a new crime and as a result of that, also charged with violating his probation. He apparently had a hearing on the violation of probation (VOP) first and a judge decided to revoke his probation and sentence him to jail. He appealed that judge’s decision. While that appeal was pending, he pled guilty to one of the new charges that formed the basis for the violation of his probation. He didn’t appeal that conviction (he couldn’t, really, because you typically can’t appeal from a guilty plea), but he did challenge its legality by filing a habeas corpus petition. The Appellate Court held that it wasn’t the same, his conviction was final and so his pending appeal (from the VOP) was moot. The Supreme Court will decide if that’s the case.

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If you have the briefs in any of these cases, please email them to me. If you’re going to see oral argument in any of these cases, please leave a comment with your observations.

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Image via. License details there.

 

 

 

 

But for video: everywhere edition

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The Verge has this well-done video report on the growing use of personal video cameras by law enforcement to record everything that they do. While dashboard cameras have been in use for a while, this technology records from the vantage point of the individual officer and is being used as a supplement to the ubiquitous cell phone recording technology that we all have at our fingertips today.

I’ve long been a proponent of recording every interaction that the police have with private citizens; it helps not only to expose abuses of power but also to settle interminable arguments between the prosecution and defense on the voluntariness of statements.

Of course, there are still logistical issues to be worked out, such as when does the officer have to turn on the recording and there are still questions of just how to interpret what is being seen on the screen, but at least the conduct is out in the open for all to observe, rather than a secret act which can be hidden behind a wall of blue.

Bonus: this fantastic, lengthy piece by Radley Balko on why we need to stop exaggerating the threat to cops. On the other hand, this may not be the best thought to combine with videotaping every interaction an officer might have.

 

 

A prior restraint on due process

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[Fair warning: the only things I know about the First Amendment are what I learn from reading Popehat and Randazza and that it's a good thing.]

See updates below.

A story that I first read here at Reason last week is increasingly gaining steam and it is this: In the pending case of the People of Colorado vs. James Holmes, the trial judge entered a pre-trial order ‘Limiting Pretrial Publicity’ as well as several “gag” orders preventing prosecutors, defense attorneys and law enforcement officers from discussing certain details of the case with the press.

In July 2012, a reporter at Fox News named Jana Winter published a “scoop” about a diary penned by the Aurora suspect James Holmes. Here is what she “revealed”:

“Inside the package was a notebook full of details about how he was going to kill people,” the source told FoxNews.com. “There were drawings of what he was going to do in it — drawings and illustrations of the massacre.”

…

A second law enforcement source said authorities got a warrant from a county judge and took the package away Monday night. When it was opened, its chilling contents were revealed.

…

Both of FoxNews.com’s sources said the intended recipient of Holmes’ notebook was a professor who also treated patients at the psychiatry outpatient facility, located in Building 500, where the first suspicious package was delivered. It could not be verified that the psychiatrist had had previous contact with Holmes, who was a dropout from the school’s neuroscience doctoral program and had studied various mental health issues and ailments as part of his curriculum.

So, recently, James Holmes’ attorneys filed a motion with the court seeking to disclose the source of the leak. The gag order, of course, applies only to the parties to the proceeding and most certainly not to the press, see Nebraska Press Association vs. Stuart. For a judge to prohibit the press from writing about a public case would be a prior restraint on speech and that is almost universally prohibited.

Continue reading →

Treating juveniles as adults: there are no winners

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Just try to imagine the circumstances that lead a man to abandon his teenage son in a criminal courtroom and walk away, never to have contact with him again. Imagine the trauma already felt by a 15 year old boy, charged as an adult, told he’d have to walk around with a felony conviction and register as a sex offender for the rest of his life and then turn to see the only person there to support him – his father – leave during a recess and never come back.

That’s what happened to one young teen in New London, CT, back in February. The Day has this absolutely heartbreaking story of the problems of juvenile sex offenders, the harsh laws that we have and the absolute lack of any viable treatment options for these teens (The Day has chosen to name the 15 year because he’s being tried as an adult; I disagree with their tact, so I’m not going to name him). Continue reading →

Racism in the death penalty? We’re North Carolina after all!

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Tar_Heel_postcard

What do you call people from North Carolina? Whatever that word is, they were faced with a choice: do they appear to be racist murderers or just plain Northeastern Liberal Sissies?

I know what I’d choose and I know what stereotype says that the North Carolinians would choose. And proving that stereotypes are stereotypes for a reason, they chose the former. The Senate just repealed (here‘s the bill) the Racial Justice Act, which allows inmates to use statistics to prove that their death sentences are obtained based on racial injustice.

Just last year I was congratulating the Second in Flight State for a decision reversing the death sentence for a man who proved that racial bias played a significant role in the jury selection process. The opinion by Judge Weeks [PDF] said that:

Race played a “persistent, pervasive and distorting role” in jury selection and couldn’t be explained other than that “prosecutors have intentionally discriminated” against Robinson and other capital defendants statewide, Weeks said. Prosecutors eliminated black jurors more than twice as often as white jurors, according to a study by two Michigan State University law professors Weeks said he found highly reliable.

The opinion relied in part on a study [PDF] by Michigan State University. This was all made possible due to the Racial Justice Act, an avant-garde piece of legislation enacted in North Carolina that did exactly what the United States Supreme Court prohibited a quarter century ago in McCleskey v. Kemp. Continue reading →