a public defender

Via CDW comes this fantastic new paper by Jules Epstein, which examines the problems with eyewitness identification testimony and the short-comings of using cross-examination to challenge it. It is a must read for the practitioner. The first 40 pages or so trace the history of eyewitness identification and of cross examinations and their place in our adversarial system. Then it underscores the need for expert testimony in eyewitness ID cases by shattering the myth propagated by judges and appellate courts that cross-examination will bring out any untruths.

That is because, often, eyewitness testimony does not contain untruths. The problems associated with eyewitness testimony are such that it is nearly impossible to expose them on cross.

1. Cross racial IDs: How does one go about questioning a witness regarding this sensitive issue, which has been demonstrated to be a serious problem in identifications? One cannot simply ask a witness if he/she is better at identifying people of their own race or if they are aware that studies show that such a bias exists.

2. Weapons focus:

The entire premise of weapons focus is that it is often a subconscious phenomenon—without realization of the occurrence, the witnesses’ eyes are drawn toward the weapon. It is precisely the extent to which the witness is unaware of the diverted attention that cross-examination proves ineffective.

This might be the only area where it is possible to do something on cross. As the example in the paper illustrates, the cross can elicit significant details about the weapon, thereby proving (or sowing seeds of doubt) that the witness was not focused on the face, but rather on the weapon.

However, the problem still remains that many jurors believe that a weapon increases attention overall and makes the eyewitness more reliable.

3. Stress: One can easily prove the fact of stress, but it is almost impossible to prove the impact or consequence of stress via cross. These are scientific results and ideas that cannot be elicited through the lay witness on the stand and often-times, the witness will use stress to affirm their recollection.

4. Memory Retention and the Confidence-Accuracy disconnect: This is another one that’s impossible to establish on cross. Asking a witness whether their memory has gotten worse over time and that just because they think they’re right doesn’t mean they’re right will result in them simply re-affirming their identification.

5. System variables (sequential lineup, double-blind, etc.): What can be established via cross is the occurrence of imperfect ID procedures, but not the significance, as with stress above. So the witness was not told that the suspect may or may not be in the lineup. What does it mean to the reliability of the ID? How are you going to get that out on the cross of anyone, including the cop?

So what is to be done? One method – the example used in the paper – is the one I prefer. To go over the events in a chronological order, breaking it down into tiny, tiny bits. One piece of information at a time.

Of particular importance is the technique of “time-framing”—the art of breaking the event or crime into a series of discrete acts, each in isolation.

I’d like to hear from you, my practitioner reader. What have you found useful? Has anything worked at all? I seriously doubt we’ll ever get the “aha!” moment during the cross of an eyewitness.

What I think this paper does is gives us a roadmap to arguing the admissibility of expert testimony. The offer of proof is one thing, but setting up why it is necessary goes a long way to informing the judge that he/she should admit the testimony. This paper lays out all the reasons why it is necessary to inform the jury of the pitfalls of eyewitness testimony. Use it. Even if you don’t get the expert testimony in, it gives you leverage to argue to the judge that you need to either ask jurors about it or be able to argue some of it in closing and have the judge give a detailed instruction on the fallibility of eyewitness testimony.

I’ve uploaded it here [pdf]. It’s available for free from SSRN, so I figured I could make it available here too. If that’s a problem, someone let me know and I’ll take it down.

(Courtroom sketch: Wired News/Norman Quebedeau)

SCOTUS issued its much-awaited (by me, atleast) decision in Danforth v. Minnesota [pdf] today, ruling 7-2 that Teague’s retroactivity prohibition applied to Federal courts on federal habeas corpus review. State courts are hence free to apply decisions articulating violations to cases on direct and/or collateral review.

As Justice Stevens makes clear, what the Court does, in say Crawford, for example, is state that a particular act or omission violates the Constitution. It is then left to the states to decide how to remedy that violation.

Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the authority of the States to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas.

…

Our subsequent cases, which characterize the Teague rule as a standard limiting only the scope of federal habeas relief, confirm that Teague speaks only to the context of federal habeas.

He wraps it up very succinctly:

A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of trial—only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts.

Whatever this means for federal habeas corpus practice, it is pretty clear that us state practitioners can now argue – with a stamp of approval – that our state courts should provide remedies for constitutional violations recently articulated.

It makes much sense, too, if you think about it in the context of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied to the states through the Fourteenth. The Court has maintained that States are free to provide greater protections than afforded by the Federal Constitution. This falls in line with that quite well.

Read the whole decision – it’s very interesting. Justice Stevens conducts an in-depth analysis of Justice O’Connor’s plurality in Teague and cites Justice Scalia heavily. Then there’s this odd footnote; perhaps someone can explain:

13. That same year, we similarly denied retroactive effect to the rule announced in Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), prohibiting prosecutorial comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 (1966). Shortly thereafter, in a case involving a Griffin error, we held for the first time that there are some constitutional errors that do not require the automatic reversal of a conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 22 (1967). Both Shott and Chapman protected the State of California from a potentially massive exodus of state prisoners because their prosecutors and judges had routinely commented on a defendant’s failure to testify.

A much better in-depth analysis from Scotusblog here. More from SL & P.

H/T: SL & P.

I’ll spare you the “a person who represents himself has a fool for a lawyer” line, but someone probably should have told Daniel Riles that. After vowing to take on the legal community by himself (whatever that means), he proceeded to represent himself at trial. Not to be outdone by the twinkie defense, he decided to invoke jurors’ emotions by comparing himself to the New York Football Giants and the State as the Patriots. The trial was in Bridgeport, so he had a good shot at getting Giants fans. Didn’t work, though, as the jury convicted him of attempted bank robbery.

That’s a pretty serious charge, isn’t it? So what would possess a man to do something like this? The following might give a clue:

Riles said that he has taken on a number of cases for individuals at the Bridgeport Correctional Center.

Ah, now it all makes sense. He’s a jailhouse lawyer. I’m pretty sure those individuals are now writing to the Court asking to get their public defender back. [As Scott reminds me, he might just be trying to disprove the Dunning-Kruger effect. More on this here.]

Jailhouse lawyers are a good thing, to an extent. They help other clueless inmates file petitions, write motions and keep their legal affairs in some semblance of an order. It’s a business, a commodity in prison, and those that can do it passably should. But not when it comes to a trial. Certainly not a criminal trial where you’re facing a lot of time.

I wonder what the waiver canvass was like and if the judge had felt any pangs of doubt when this happened:

He started by asking prospective jurors what they thought of bank robberies. All said they do not support them. “Well, how about attempted bank robberies?” he asked.

Yikes. Mr. Riles, please let a public defender represent you on appeal.

Bringing a case that drew national attention to an end, the prosecutor in the “banned words” trial decided not to try the defendant for a third time.

This is the case where the judge banned the use of the words “rape”, “sexual assault” and “victim” (rightly so, in my opinion) and in which the accused later sued that same judge.

Two trials ended in mistrials and after initially indicating that he would try it a third time, the prosecutor announced that he wouldn’t.

Lancaster County Attorney Gary Lacey says he decided not to pursue a third trial in a sexual assault case because the judge barred the testimony of 2 key witnesses.

Bowen’s lawyer Wendy Murphy says Lacey’s explanation doesn’t make much sense because the judge barred testimony from those two witnesses before the second trial last summer.

Murphy says the loss of those witnesses didn’t prevent Lacey from trying to prosecute Safi last summer.

Double jeopardy isn’t a bar to retrial after a mistrial, but at some point the state has to decide whether it’s worth pursuing anymore. It seems that this prosecutor reached that point.

While all the hullabaloo surrounding SCOTUS today may have been centered around Baze, the Court also issued a minor, but nevertheless terrifically interesting decision. In Wright v. Van Patten [pdf], the Court wrote, per curiam, that the Circuit Court’s grant of a habeas was improper because the State supreme court’s decision denying the habeas was not contrary to clearly established federal law (which is one of the two grounds on which a valid State conviction can receive federal habeas corpus review).

Mr. Wright sough habeas review in the first place because at his plea hearing, his lawyer phoned it in. Not phoned it in in the colloquial sense (or even the widely used “he was crappy” sense that forms the basis of most habeas petitions), but rather in the literal sense. He appeared for the plea hearing via telephone.

In a state as small as CT, that is unheard of. Perhaps in them larger jurisdikshuns where theys gots lots of open land and such, it may be common practice (what was I going for there? I have no clue). Still, the idea seems very…dirty. If my client is pleading guilty, I want to be there to stand by him – if for nothing else than to offer support. It’s not only my client’s case, it is my case as well and having been through the whole process side by side, I’d rather not end it speaker to ear.

Anyway, the Court reserved for another day the substantive question of whether appearing by telephone is legally adequate (maybe that answers your question, Scott?). This case was reversed on purely procedural grounds.

Image license info here.

A very faithful reader sent along this humorous decision from the Court of Appeals of Texas, Seventh District. It’s not from today, or yesterday, but a day almost 4 years ago. Yet, it is funny enough for me to pass along.

Here’s the excerpt from Lexis:

Assistance of court-appointed counsel was not rendered ineffective by the fact that counsel was on the indicting grand jury. Apart from bald assertion of conflict, defendant failed to show how attorney could have represented him more effectively.

As they say, only in Texas. At least it wasn’t a death case.

When do police officers have the power to carry a weapon, patrol the streets and make arrests, but yet cannot be questioned for their actions? When they’re University Police. Back in May, a 16-yr old boy was arrested for riding his bike on a sidewalk. He was then charged with breach of peace and briefly held in jail.

When his public defender sought disciplinary records for the officers making the arrest, she was told that the records were private and did not have to be disclosed.

While some elite liberal arts schools are nestled amid woods and cow pastures, Yale occupies the heart of a city racked by poverty and crime. Its police department was founded in 1894 when two New Haven cops, assigned to campus, resigned and became special constables for Yale. Today the department has 80sworn officers — roughly a fifth the size of New Haven’s. Its officers have a visible presence downtown and members of the bike patrol are frequently seen, it turns out, pedaling on city sidewalks.

As a private police force, Yale argues, it is exempt from open-records laws. In 1992, New Haven formally relinquished any oversight it may have had. Today, Yale hires, fires, promotes and disciplines its own officers and neither city nor state provides retirement benefits.

Despite that independence in hiring, Yale Police is almost identical to New Haven police in all other aspects. They drive similar cars, wear similar uniforms, have the power to make felony arrests all over the State, receive similar training, follow the same state regulations and even take the same oath.

Yet, they are private and their records are not subject to release. Similar challenges have occurred in other parts of the country, almost always resulting in no success:

The courts, so far, have taken a narrower view. In Georgia, Virginia and Massachusetts, attempts to gain access to campus crime records have failed, but legislatures in all three states have since introduced sunshine laws to bring more transparency.

By hiding behind the shield of student privacy, the schools are jeopardizing public safety, says S. Daniel Carter, vice president of Security on Campus, a national watchdog group. “Our concern lies with making sure communities are informed about crime and what’s being done to protect them,” he said.

This matter has been appealed to the FOI Commission. The mighty power of Yale is being tested.

“Falling on the sword”. This is a phrase you will hear often if you are a criminal defense lawyer. What it generally refers to is owning up to your mistakes during your representation of a client, at a later habeas corpus proceeding. In other words, take responsibility for any errors you made during trial – big or small.

Unfortunately, the only ones you ever hear use this phrase are the good ones; the ones that hardly make mistakes and if they do, they’re minor and don’t really affect the outcome of a trial. The hacks – the ones that routinely plead clients out without investigating, or give bad advice or are just plain clueless never use this phrase. Perhaps their guilty conscience pricks them.

Skelly seems to be one of the good guys. He writes here at length about the inner turmoil he experienced when called to testify at a former client’s federal habeas.

He wanted to help; he really did. The problem was he didn’t do what the client said he did and like any ethical lawyer, he couldn’t lie.

My former client’s federal petition claimed that back in 2002, prior to his guilty plea, I told him that he did have a particular plea bargain, and that I lied when I told the trial judge that he did not. I testified that I did not tell him that he had a plea bargain. I testified that once he and I rejected the state’s first offer, there was no other plea bargain. Offer, counter-offer, and second counter-offer, sure, but no acceptance from the state, no meeting of the minds, no deal. I testified today just I said in open court that day in 2002, at the moment when my old client’s words turned from “not guilty” to “guilty,” there was no plea bargain. His current counsel referred to that statement as my “perception.” I replied that the state appellate courts also had reached the same perception. And I had tried so to stay pleasant! When the insinuation was that I lied either to my client, to the state trial judge, or to both, well, maybe I bristled just a bit more than I intended to.

Scott points out an obvious mistake here – calling him a “liar”. That certainly is not the way to get a former attorney to help.  Scott also asks: why don’t habeas attorneys try to contact the trial attorney in advance? Talk to them?

It’s a darn good question. In all the habeas cases I’ve handled, I’ve made it a point to try and contact the trial attorney before filing the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, so as to weed out any frivolous claims (or claims that there is just no support for). Unfortunately, not all attorneys do that and on the flip side, not all trial counsel are willing to co-operate. There are some that just won’t return phone calls. Why they don’t get that if they do return the phone calls, there’s a good chance the habeas will go away, I don’t understand.

Anyway, habeas is an extremely uphill battle and in only the right circumstances – in the rarest of rare cases – does a petition get granted. It isn’t the State that the defendant is battling, it is the standard. Strickland sets the standard so high, that in most ineffective cases, it is almost impossible to meet, unless the error is so blatant and glaring that even a judge cannot ignore.

But in those cases, don’t count on help from counsel. They don’t know what “falling on the sword” means.

Intriguing news out of SCOTUS today. The IAC during plea bargaining case, Arave v. Hoffman, reported with much fanfare here, may not go forward after all. Per Scotusblog (via SL&P), attorneys for both sides have asked the Justices to vacate the Ninth Circuit opinion and dismiss the case as moot. Defendant’s motion is here [pdf] and the State’s response is here [pdf]. It really is curious. It seems that the defendant wants the relief imposed by the federal habeas court: vacate the death sentence and impose life.

Hoffman was convicted of first degree murder in 1993 and sentenced to death in an Idaho court. Almost a decade later, a federal habeas court vacated the death sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of the trial. The habeas court rejected a separate ineffective assistance claim relating to pre-trial negotiations, when Hoffman’s attorney advised him not to accept the state’s offer of a life sentence on the mistaken theory that Idaho’s death penalty scheme would later be found unconstitutional. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed on the pre-trial claim in mid-2006, requiring the state to release Hoffman unless officials offered him the original plea bargain. Idaho appealed, and the Court granted certiorari on November 5.

In the motion to vacate and dismiss, Hoffman’s lawyers say the inmate wished to withdraw the pre-trial ineffective assistance claim in order to proceed with the resentencing originally ordered by the federal habeas court for the penalty phase ineffective assistance claim. According to the motion, a status conference is set for December 13 before an Idaho state judge. Joan Fisher of the Federal Public Defender’s office in Idaho wrote that Hoffman made his decision “[a]fter extensive consultations with counsel,” and that his “trial and habeas counsel fully concur with his decision.”

I wonder what made him decide to do this. It’s not like the State was arguing that the death penalty should be re-imposed. Anyone have any ideas?

It’s disappointing that this may not be heard. The issue was truly interesting and I would have liked to see what today’s justices had to say about it.

The big news of the weekend thus far, for me at least, has been the announcement by the NYCLU that it is filing suit in New York, alleging Constitutional violations by the State for its failure to provide adequate resources to public defenders.

From the press release:

“Every day, in courtrooms throughout the state, New Yorkers are denied justice simply because they are poor. Justice should not depend on your ZIP code or the size of your wallet,” said Donna Lieberman, executive director of the NYCLU. “We filed this lawsuit today as a last resort, in response to the constitutional deficiencies identified by a commission appointed by Chief Judge Kaye to evaluate our public defense system, and the failure of lawmakers to compel the state to repair what is clearly a broken and unjust system.”

The class action lawsuit charges that a lack of adequate funding, oversight and statewide standards is denying New Yorkers accused of crimes their lawful right to competent, qualified and timely representation at all stages of the justice process, a violation of the U.S. Constitution, the state constitution and the laws of New York.

It is extremely annoying that it has to come to this. New York could have, at the very least, learned from Connecticut. It was a CCLU and ACLU lawsuit in Connecticut – Rivera v. Rowland – that forced the legislature to increase funding by millions and double the number of positions in the system. The settlement of that lawsuit led to a wholesale revamping of the public defender’s system in CT, with better pay, more positions, more training, lower caseloads. This was in 1999. Now, almost 8 years later, New York is facing the same crisis.

It is great, on the other hand, because this will undoubtedly force New York to take action. New York is one of only 6 states remaining that have no statewide responsibility or oversight mechanism for public defense and remains among a minority of states, including Alabama and Mississippi, that have failed to join the movement toward full state funding.

Make no mistake: this is not a panacea. Caseloads will still be high, public defenders will still be understaffed, berated and maligned. However, they will be in a better position to fight those charges and the charges brought by the State against indigent defendants.

For more, read the ABA’s report entitled “Gideon’s Broken Promise” and The Spangenberg Group’s report to NY’s Indigent Defense Commission.

In an exciting move, SCOTUS today granted cert. in a capital habeas case [petition here, opposition here] to decide whether someone can receive ineffective assistance during the plea bargaining process. The actual facts are slightly more complicated, but as Scotusblog notes, the basic question (which was added later by the Court) is what is:

the remedy that [is] available for ineffective defense lawyer’s efforts during plea bargaining, if the individual was later convicted at a fair trial.

Most of the commentary and discussion in the blawgosphere has centered around whether ineffective assistance during the plea bargaining process is a valid IAC claim, where the defendant then goes on to receive a fair trial. The answers that I have seen thus far have been no. I will respectfully disagree. The answer should be: “yes”.

For example Crime and Consequences says:

The fact that a better lawyer might have gotten him a windfall is not a miscarriage of justice if the final result is a just verdict for the crime he actually committed. Habeas is about correcting injustices, and justice is not a game. Plea bargaining is something we barely tolerate out of necessity. It is not a right to which defendants are entitled, and not getting a deal is not an injustice.

There are several problematic things about that paragraph, but today I’ll deal with just the last. Yes, there is no Constitutional right to plead guilty, but the SCOTUS has held that there is a Constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the criminal proceedings. Strickland, 466 US at 686. The plea bargaining process is and must be a critical stage of the criminal proceeding.

plea bargaining is an integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts.

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63

Then we come to Hill v. Lockhart. In Hill the Court held “that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”, relying on McCann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (all defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel). Really, there cannot be another conclusion.

In this case, the attorney misadvised the defendant about taking an offer. Consider a situation where the attorney fails to inform the defendant of an offer that he would have taken. Regardless of whether the ensuing trial was fair or not, the defendant was not informed of the availability of a plea bargain. How can he be said to have provided effective assistance if he failed to inform the defendant of a favorable resolution of the criminal prosecution? How can you say that the trial would have occurred in the first place?

So what then, is the remedy, if it is found that the attorney was ineffective? It has got to be specific performance. But for the ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant would have taken the offer. He must be put back in the position he was in when the offer was made and given the option to either take the offer or reject it and proceed to trial.

“Poor lawyering” in the pre-trial process cannot be negated by an otherwise fair trial. Maybe I’m just spoiled by CT law. See Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139.

The Second Circuit issued an interesting decision recently. I’ll let the Second Circuit Blog do the talking here:

In this curious but very troubling case, the court seems to have concluded, sub silentio, that Crawford trumps Bruton.

Obviously, [the defendant's] Confrontation Clause claim raises Bruton issues; indeed, this is the classic Bruton situation – the out-of-court statement of one defendant is used against a co-defendant. But here, the court never even got to Bruton. It held that Bobby’s out of court remarks were not “testimonial” under Crawford, and thus “our Confrontation Clause inquiry is at an end.” In other words, the court denied the Bruton claim without even mentioning Bruton.

This case, if it stands, would limit Bruton to cases where the co-defendant’s out-of-court statement was taken by the police, or is otherwise “testimonial” for some reason. The court might well be right – although only the Supremes will tell us for sure. But one would have hoped that if the court really wanted to take on such a radical and new issue (as of this writing, no other Circuit has so held), it would come out and say so directly, rather than leaving the entire bar to guess. Let’s that hope the [co-defendants] file cert petitions.

I don’t think the opinion is publicly available yet. Maybe they’re redacting something. Here it is.

The Appellate Court released two criminal opinions (yes, they are criminal!) today. In State v. Mourning [pdf], they upheld the defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit murder, manslaughter and possession of a firearm.

Two interesting issues raised on appeal were that 1) there was insufficient evidence to prove the conspiracy and 2) the jury’s verdicts on manslaughter and conspiracy to commit murder were legally inconsistent. The court quickly dismissed the insufficiency claim, holding that there was plenty for the jury to conclude as it did. On the inconsistency argument, the appellate court conceded that the specific intent required for each was different. However, it then pointed to appellate precedent to claim that it didn’t mean they were mutually exclusive. The defendant claimed that where, as in this case, the “act” was a single gunshot, you cannot have two separate intents. With the same gunshot, you cannot intend to kill the victim and seriously injure him.

No dice, says the appellate court, seemingly saying that one is a lesser of the other. I think they’re plain wrong.

There is also an interesting confrontation issue, involving an inmate who claimed he had seen the shooting. The inmate provided a statement, but prior to testifying, invoked his fifth-amendment privilege. The appellate court held that the claim was unpreserved because defense counsel did not pursue the offer of proof. Habeas alert!

Oh wait, no. The court seems to kill any habeas claim by stating that it’s possible that this inmate’s testimony was cumulative, which is why his statement was not admitted by the trial court.

I hate when they do that.

On to the next: State v. Moreno-Cuevas. Here, the defendant- who appeared pro-se – raised some vague claim of constitutional error in addition to prosecutorial and judicial misconduct impropriety. He was convicted of trespass because he chose to remain on campus at his university well past the 10pm limit that was imposed. The Court says there isn’t an “inkling” of a Constitutional claim here. Goodbye.

By the way, if you’re a PD in Connecticut, after you read this, you better go to New Case News and read a fuller synopsis.

Image license info here

One of the things I consistently see in stories about the Jena Six is this quote:

After being represented by a public defender who did not call witnesses in Bell’s defense, an all-white jury convicted him

Over time, details of the incidents have emerged, but none of the trial itself. The most fleshed out paragraph about the trial and representation by counsel is this:

Despite this, when Mychal Bell, the first youth to go to trial, refused to take a deal in exchange for testifying against his friends, he was quickly convicted by an all-white jury. Bell’s public defender Blane Williams, visibly angry at Bell and his parents because the youth did not take the deal, called no witnesses and gave no meaningful defense.

So we know that the jury was all white and the defense called no witnesses. What is only now being revealed is that the jury pool was all white. Which included a friend of the victim’s father.

But let us turn to the matter of this attorney. I find it extremely difficult to believe that his attorney would not call any witnesses because he was angry. For one, if there were witnesses whom the defense could have called independently and the attorney made it clear that he wasn’t going to call them, my experience tells me that the defendant would have said something (maybe not, but so little is known at this point…). Surely there’s a transcript out there somewhere.

But a defendant doesn’t always have to call witnesses. The State bears the burden of proof and the defendant can choose to leave the State to its burden. This is a frequent jury instruction and almost always a question during voir dire in a criminal case.

It is counter-intuitive, for sure. You have been accused of doing something, you tell your side of the story. If you have a defense, an alibi, you will present it. Prospective jurors, upon question, usually state that they understand why the defendant can choose not to present a defense. But do they believe it? I think the Jena Six coverage has a hint of that. He didn’t call any witnesses!?! is the incredulous tone.

Now, it’s possible that Bell’s attorney should have called witnesses – I don’t know what the evidence presented was – but it disturbs me a little that people automatically look at it unfavorably. It is a dilution of the burden of proof and we must believe that.

The second thing I wanted to say (I guess as a response to this question by Prof. Berman) is that we should study this case for the racial disparity in the charging process, keeping in mind that this is not a one-off thing. Racial disparities in charging and sentencing are wide spread and are being documented more and more. As this CSM piece points out:

Nationally, black youths are significantly more likely to be tried as adults than are white youths, according to a January report from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. The same report states that while black youths make up 16 percent of the general adolescent population, they make up 38 percent of the approximately 100,000 youths being held in local and state detention facilities.

The irony, some say, is that mass outpouring of support in cases like the Jena 6 may, in fact, obscure the real issues, where many criminal-defense lawyers can point to examples of prosecutorial zeal when dealing with black defendants.

“The public at large basically thinks that these cases are aberrations, and that’s one reason why so much attention is paid to them,” says Professor Nunn. “It’s the idea that it’s the redneck sheriff doing this and not the way we sort of stack the odds against black criminal defendants. We can point to a few bad apples, say, ‘See, it’s them,’ and the rest of us feel great because we’re demonstrating how we disagree with racism.”

Wow. This post has reached Greenfield-esque proportions, so I’ll stop now.

We all know the story of the Texas lawyer who fell asleep during a capital trial, but now Scott points to one in New York. Unfortunately, as was the case with the Texas appeal, the court in NY also found that it was not ineffective, because, in essence, the lawyer did some “lawyering”.

Here’s another *ahem* reason the petition was denied: the judge that heard the petition for a new trial was the same judge that presided over the trial itself.

Scott does a good job, as usual, of pointing out how stupid this decision is, but misses one important question: What was the same judge doing hearing the petition for a new trial? If the defendant had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the judge should have recused herself. Precisely for the reason that no judge will admit that there was a sleeping lawyer in the courtroom and they did not catch it, should this judge have not been presiding over this hearing.

I don’t know much about the NY post-conviction process, so maybe someone can clue me in. Was this a petition for writ of habeas corpus? If not, is that available to this defendant?

Either way, judges do the darnest things.