Category Archives: rewind

Rewind: The maelstrom that is cover your ass-ery

Ah, just one glorious day before Gideon returns to the Constitution State to resume blogging duties. With the trip coming to a close, it’s a good idea to remind ourselves of our ethical duties. So here’s the most commented post at “a public defender”:

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My post two days ago about the appropriateness of comments made to the media has sparked intense discussion in the comments here and in posts from Scott and the Texan.

Let’s take Mark’s post first. He writes:

Let me be the dissenting voice here. Scott is wrong. Miranda is way wrong. I’ve written about this before — it’s a common ethical violation.

Everything I tell my client is privileged. The fact that I have discussed a plea offer with my client is privileged. The advice that I gave him regarding that offer is way privileged.

As Scott does, I disagree with Mark. It’s not that “this is how it has always been done”, but that it’s not privileged at all. It does not require disclosing the content of anything conversation, but simply the fact that you have discussed it with the client (which is an ethical obligation in of itself). Taking Mark’s position a little bit further, he is then implying that parts of the Boykin canvass are unethical. What’s the difference between stating on the record: “I have discussed the State’s offer with my client and advised him of the consequences of the plea and he has decided to accept/reject the offer” and responding to the Judge’s question during a canvass: “Have you discussed [insert any of the requirements of a valid plea here] with your client?”

Scott and Mark then misinterpret certain comments made by me and Miranda. First Mark writes:

If you want to make a record to prevent your client from having a chance of prevailing on a writ of habeas corpus, first ask yourself whether it is for your own sake or for his. Then, if you think that there is no conceivable way your client will suffer because you make a record, don’t do it publicly. Do it privately — in a letter to the client, with a copy to your file. Nobody but you and the client needs to know.

Scott follows up with:

But let’s turn to the really fascinating aspect of this debate, Miranda’s position that a lawyer’s CYA statement, in anticipation of a writ of habeas corpus or ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim, justifies doing SOMETHING to protect the lawyer. I feel confident that Mark and I will agree that this is blasphemy.

What smacked me upside the head was Miranda’s, and to some extent Gid’s, suggestion that lawyers should engage in defensive lawyering for fear of an IAC claim. Why? If a defendant later claims that you failed to represent him adequately, so what? Will you melt? Will your self-esteem crumble? Will your friends and neighbors shun you? Who cares?

We’re not suggesting that you do this to protect yourself from a future IAC claim; rather that it is good practice (and we’d prefer) that the record be clear. Clients, in habeas petitions, claim all sorts of things. If the lawyer doesn’t do a good job of peppering the file with memos and correspondence (with many do not) and if the record isn’t clear as to what the client was advised of, then it is unimaginably difficult, given the high IAC standard, to determine what is a viable claim and what is not.

Imagine the scenario where the attorney does not state on the record whether he has discussed the state’s offer with the client. The transcript referencing the rejection of the offer is one of a court appearance where a continuance was sought and the judge opens the proceedings by saying simply: “I have been informed that the offer has been rejected. This matter is placed on the trial list. Continued to xx/xx”.

The client then claims that he was never informed of this offer and thus could not have rejected it.

How easy would it be for an unethical lawyer to simply show up for the habeas trial, get on the stand and say: “Oh I discussed it.”

Who is the habeas court going to believe?

It is to protect the client that we are recommending making complete records.

Rewind: Is the “broken window” theory itself broken?

Brr. It sure is freezing in Vladivostok! The vodka’s great, though :) However, seeing some ramshackle buildings here brought to mind this old post from March 2006:

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The Boston Globe had a fascinating article a few weeks ago, that I just ran across (so my apologies if this has scorched its away across the blogosphere and I’ve missed it). Is the “broken window” theory a legitimate theory?

The broken windows theory first came to prominence in 1982, when criminologists George Kelling and James Q. Wilson published a lengthy article on the subject in The Atlantic Monthly. The theory, as they explained it, holds that people are more likely to commit crimes in neighborhoods that appear unwatched and uncared for by residents and local authorities.

The crux of Wilson and Kelling’s argument was that perceptions affect reality-that the appearance of disorder begets actual disorder-and that any visual cues that a neighborhood lacks social control can make a neighborhood a breeding ground for serious crime. As Kelling and Wilson put it in The Atlantic, ”one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.”

The remedy for this, as proposed by Wilson and Kelling, was to get tough on the small crime. Small crime begets big crime, the theory posits. So if we nip crime in the bud, as it were, neighborhoods will be safer and more peaceful.

Recently, however, new critics have emerged and old ones have been emboldened by the rising crime rates in Boston and elsewhere. One widely read challenge comes from ”Freakonomics,” the best-selling book by University of Chicago economist Steven D. Levitt and journalist Stephen J. Dubner, which presents a controversial theory claiming that the legalization of abortion in the 1970s was the biggest factor in the crime drop of the 1990s. According to this hypothesis, the decline in the birth of unwanted, often poor and fatherless children in the ’70s, led to a decline in the number of juvenile delinquents in the ’80s and hardened criminals in the ’90s. As for broken windows, Levitt and Dubner write, ”There is frighteningly little evidence that [Bratton's] strategy was the crime panacea that he and the media deemed it.”

I could quote the whole article, but that would be wrong, so please take 5 minutes out of your day to read (if you haven’t already) and then come back to give me your thoughts (if you’d like).

Personally, I don’t think the broken window theory, by itself, is the cure for crime. It strikes me as rather simplistic and ignorant of the underlying rationale for crime: social and economic environment. Maybe this is the defense attorney in me speaking, but I believe (perhaps foolishly), that most tendencies to commit crime can be traced to a disadvantageous socio-economic background.

Rewind: Deal or No Deal?

Bonjour from Lyons! It’s the middle of the week and Gideon is lazily sitting on the Riviera sipping some shom-pan-ya. While doing so, it occurred to him to pose this question, from February 2007, again (ps: For those might be confused, these posts have been written in advance and scheduled to post in the future):

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Mike at C&F lamented yesterday that plea bargaining

has turned our system into one that is supposed to convict the guilty and free the innocent into a risk-management system. It has turned lawyers into actuaries . “Is going to trial worth the risk?” is what lawyers ask clients. Innocence has little to do with the decision to take a deal.

Cases that highlight this dilemma abound. Julie Amero, for one. The border agents case is another. So what can be done? The logical suggestion is to leave the state to its burden of proof in each case and take everything to trial.

Windypundit jumps in with some radical ideas for criminal justice of his own. His suggestions:

Reverse Truth-In-Sentencing – if you don’t serve felony time – a full year – it doesn’t count as a felony.Performance Pay for Indigent Defense – pay indigent defense lawyers for their performance.

Punishment in Lieu of Exclusion – If a judge rules that a piece of evidence was obtained illegally, allow the prosecutor to immediately indict the responsible police officers for “improper evidence obtainment,” a newly-created crime with a mandatory minimum sentence of, say, 60 days in jail. If the officers are convicted and sentenced before the main criminal case goes to trial – easily done if the prosecutor and the officer have agreed ahead of time that the officer will plead guilty immediately – the illegally obtained evidence is allowed back in.

Limited Incarceration Without Trial – This would allow the worst of the worst to be imprisoned even if the cases against them have technical flaws.

No Miranda Warning

While I have not yet given full thought to his suggestions, one not so radical idea did seem to me a way to streamline the process. As several jurisdictions have done, all interrogations should be videotaped. This, in many instances, will eliminate the problem of the forced confession and lead to less Motions to Suppress.

This idea is gaining steam in some sectors, but I’d like to see it implemented nationwide.

Rewind: Should we shorten criminal trials?

Hello from New Zealand! Hope everyone is doing okay. There’s no jumpstart this morning – the Kiwis don’t like internet. So here’s a post from June 2005, in which I ask if we should do everyone a favor and shorten trials.

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Have opinion, will travel asks if we should put the 6th Amendment up for bid. He talks of a story from England that the Lord Chancellor is cutting down criminal trials in order to save costs.

By having an agreed statement of facts, he explained, lengthy fraud trials could be made much shorter. If cases over-ran, lawyers – rather than taxpayers – would absorb the extra costs.

So the question is: would this work in the U.S.?

A couple of things jump to mind – one is that the state has to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. If parties in a criminal trial were to stipulate to certain facts, that would eat into that hallowed principle. It then leads into issues of due process and equal protection that I’m just not willing to discuss on a Sunday.

The other thing that pops into mind is that if the lawyers are going to be forced to pick up the tab for lengthy trials, there will be greater incentive to pressure their clients into taking deals that might not be favorable. The state would have the incentive to be hard-lined about their offers and defense attorneys, knowing that they’d have to pony up money, would perhaps not go all the way.

It must be noted that it seems that in England, trials last far longer than they do here, so perhaps the motivation might not be as strong in the U.S. A standard trial here could last anywhere from one day to three weeks. You’d be hard-pressed to find a trial that goes on for over a year. The percentage of cases going to trial is also minute as compared to cases that end up in pleas.

Also, Ken explores the question of indigent defense by contract.

Thoughts?

Rewind: Did you have a public defender or a lawyer?

While the blog is vacationing in Bora-Bora, this is as good a time as any to remind my readership that if you wonder whether public defenders are lawyers, you are not alone. Here’s a post from March 2005:

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So says State Senator Newton, during a public hearing held on January 31, 2005 on the Anti-Death Penalty Bill. The question was posed to Lawrence Adams, a man from Massachusetts, who spent 32 years in prison (roughly 9 of them on death row) before he was exonerated and released. He came to CT to testify against the death penalty. The transcript reads as follows:

SEN. NEWTON: Thank you. I want to thank you for coming to Connecticut to give your testimony. When was it that they found the DNA, after how many years?

LAWRENCE ADAMS: It wasn’t DNA. It was exculpatory evidence. It took 31 years.

SEN. NEWTON: Thirty-one years?

LAWRENCE ADAMS: Yes.

SEN. NEWTON: Did you have a public defender?

LAWRENCE ADAMS: Excuse me?

SEN. NEWTON: Did you have a public defender or a lawyer?

LAWRENCE ADAMS: In the beginning, I had a public defender.

[CHAIRMAN OF THE JUD. COMMITTEE] SEN. MCDONALD: All right. Senator, I really don’t even know how to address that.

SEN. NEWTON: The point I’m trying to get at, and you all laugh, but this is very serious, is that in some cases, it’s been proven that those who can afford attorneys have a better chance. I’m not saying anything bad about public defenders, but in some incidents, you know, cases have been proven.

If you have a high-price lawyer, you stay out of jail. You know, that is the point I was trying to get to, not to disparage anything about our public defenders throughout this country. When you have your own lawyer, it seems that he might be able to collect that evidence, as you said. You know, that was the only point that I was making.

LAWRENCE ADAMS: It has been my experience, right, that I would say that I was unique in the fact that my lawyer, Mr. John Battarac, did work that I don’t think anybody else could have done. I was fortunate to that extent.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you very much. I should just note for the record that actually the Chief Public Defender’s Office has probably the greatest breadth of information in history on the defense of capital cases than any other group of attorneys in the state. Are there other questions? Senator Handley followed by Senator Cappiello.

Then the hearing continues.

Amazing, just amazing. Not like we don’t get crap from our clients anyway, now we have a state Senator who doesn’t acknowledge that public defenders are lawyers. Not once did the Senator make the distinction in terms of public defenders as opposed to private attorneys. He kept referring to private attorneys simply as “attorneys”.

In any event, if you have time time, read as much of the transcript as you can – it’s pretty powerful, moving stuff.