Category Archives: psa

Who’s the people?

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Did you hear the one about the woman who couldn’t fly to testify at a trial about the government’s “no-fly list” because the government put her on a “no-fly list”?

No? It happened this past weekend, when Raihan Mustafa Kamal, the daughter of the woman suing the Department of Homeland Security – and incidentally a U.S. citizen – tried to board a plane to San Francisco in Kuala Lumpur and was told by Malaysian Airways that the Department of Homeland Security had put her on a no-fly list.

Not an Onion article. I swear.

The Identity Project blog is covering the trial, which kicked off earlier this week with a ridiculous situation, highlighted by BoingBoing. Apparently, one of the people set to testify in the case, Ibrahim’s oldest daughter, Raihan Mustafa Kamal (an American citizen, born in the US), was blocked from boarding her flight to the US to appear at the trial, and told that she was on the no fly list as well. Kamal, a lawyer, was an eye witness to her mother being blocked from boarding her flight. The US knew that Kamal was set to testify and from all indications, in a move that appears extremely petty, appears to have purposely blocked her from flying to the US. Kamal was directly told by the airline that DHS had ordered them not to let Kamal to board. The airline even gave her a phone number for a Customs and Border Patrol office in Miami, telling her to call that concerning her not being able to board.

Just so you understand what’s happening: the Federal government is being sued. The Federal government, in defending that lawsuit, has apparently just blocked the opposite party from providing a witness. It’s as if the state charged you with murder, but you have a rock solid alibi of your family, so on the day your family was going to testify, they took your family and moved them to Guantanamo and then pretended like nothing happened and they didn’t know anything.

Ban the Box but abandon the ex-felon: the Kennard Ray saga

We are a country whose favorite pastime is not football, but incarceration. In such a country, we take delight in locking up young, minority men from the age of 14 to the age of death. We disproportionately incarcerate men of color and we saddle them after the fact of their convictions by heaping consequences upon consequences that are so onerous that almost no one, once burdened by the shackles of a felony, can free himself of them and re-enter Valhalla: middle class America. Onerous and mercurial probation conditions and registries and the constant mass media coverage are enough to drive most men mad.

Standing against this tide that inevitably washes out any traces of opportunity is a thing called “ban the box”. I’ve written about Ban the Box since at least 2009. It’s a policy [more information here - PDF.] that “bans” a box on employment forms asking if the applicant has a criminal record.

The purpose of this is to ensure that people aren’t denied employment simply because they have a criminal record. Cities and states that have enacted BTB policies are required to complete the application process, make a conditional offer of employment to the applicant and then conduct a background check. At that point the applicant can voluntarily disclose any relevant record and explain it. The employer can then choose to continue with employment or withdraw the offer. If the offer is withdrawn, the applicant can appeal that decision.

It’s a bloody brilliant idea that seeks to make the procedure a “record-blind” procedure, thus forcing employers to make decisions based on experience and talent and suitability for the job1.

Hartford, the capital of Connecticut, has such an ordinance [PDF] that requires “banning the box”2.

But the problem with Ban the Box, just as with other rules of equality and fairness the Government is entrusted with enforcing, is that someone has to really want to.

Ban the Box is nothing without political backing or the fortitude of the hirer to stand behind her decision to offer a job to someone with a criminal record. We3 are aware that there is a large section of the population for whom a generic criminal is worse than the genetic offspring of Osama Bin Laden, Obama bin Barack and Adolf Hitler combined. These are the people who comment on news stories.

These are the people who are going to be outraged with pitchforks and demand that the newspaper investigate why the city is giving a job to a criminal when there are perfectly good people in America who aren’t criminals and need a job. In other words, people incapable of nuance and context.

If the policy is to succeed, it takes someone with the conviction4 to say “I am standing by my decision to hire this individual because they are qualified for the job and will be an asset, despite the criminal history of their distant past.”

Hartford Mayor Pedro Segarra apparently is not such a man. On Tuesday, he announced that he was hiring a man named Kennard Ray as a his Deputy Chief of Staff. On Wednesday, Mr. Ray had withdrawn his name from consideration because “questions were asked about his criminal record“. Mr. Ray had a criminal record:

Ray’s criminal history includes a 1997 conviction for the sale of narcotics, a 1998 conviction for possession of narcotics, a 1998 conviction for carrying a pistol without a permit and a 2004 conviction for criminal possession of a gun.

Shit, you can get that record in Hartford just by driving through the city5. Mayor Segarra had this to say:

“Mr. Ray is a qualified individual with solid references from former supervisors and community leaders,” Segarra said. “However, public servants, especially those in leadership positions, must be held to a higher standard.”

I am at a loss to understand what that means. If Mr. Ray was utterly qualified for the job and came with strong recommendations and a demonstrated dedication to the city of Hartford and public service, then the fact of his criminal convictions should not alter the equation one iota. In fact, Mayor Segarra didn’t seem too perturbed by the fact that this individual might suddenly become undesirable because he might turn out to have a criminal record, demonstrated by the fact that when the Hartford Courant contacted the Mayor’s Office on Wednesday, one day after announcing the hiring, he had not yet conducted the background check6.

And so something happened when the Courant contacted him and he realized that Mr. Ray has a criminal record. Either Mr. Ray suddenly became unappealing solely because of his criminal record, or Mayor Segarra got scared of potential “bad press” and suggested to Mr. Ray that he might want to withdraw.

He certainly could have taken a firm stance and said that this is America, the purported land of second chances, where we love redemption and the underdog and that the purpose of Ban the Box was to permit such hires and that it would set a tremendous example for the community.

That doesn’t seem to be what happened and it certainly isn’t the stance taken by the Mayor in public. It also isn’t something that has been implied by Mr. Ray.7

It’s sad. Here was a perfect opportunity to explain to residents of a city with a massive crime problem and an even bigger reintegration problem that people are deserving of second chances. That people are better than the worst thing that they’ve done and that there is no shame in hiring someone with a criminal record – and to a position of trust and importance at that.

But instead the Mayor wants to “review” the policy and perhaps revise it to conduct background checks before job offers are made, which would render Ban the Box completely useless.

Because one should only do the right thing if it looks good.

—–

For more, see The Hartford Guardian; Real Hartford.

 

Can the prosecution prevent you from giving discovery to a defendant?

In January 2010, new rules were enacted [PDF] in Connecticut ostensibly in an effort to do away with problematic “open file”1 policies of prosecutors and to ensure that all individuals charged with crimes in the State of Connecticut had ready, Constitutionally required access to the evidence the prosecution claimed to have2.

As I wrote in January 2010:

Each court here in the State was its own fiefdom prior to this change. In some jurisdictions you’d get all discovery on the first court date, without even having to ask, and in others the only way you’d get to see a police report is if you sat in the prosecutor’s office and read it – and perhaps copied it by hand – while they stood over your shoulder. Some jurisdictions would give you whatever you wanted and others wouldn’t give you what you were entitled to.

The system was a mess. Prosecutors in certain jurisdictions kept two files: one their public “open file” and another, their real file. Guess which one had all the relevant documents and information in their possession and which one didn’t.

This is an issue of Constitutional importance because integral to our system of justice is the right to notice: to be informed of and aware of the charges, allegations and supporting evidence so that one may properly defend against them.

However, even with the enactment of these rules making uniform the disclosure of discovery, there was a big problem that was overlooked as part of the compromise. The discovery rules prohibit giving copies of the documents, reports, statements and records to the person with the greatest individual stake in the outcome of the case: the accused.

In order for the man charged with the crime to be able to get his own copy of the allegations and peruse them at his own leisure, the prosecutor must permit and barring that, a judge.

Many in the defense bar argued back then that this was problematic and once again last week, the problem erupted again.

Unsurprising to most, the practice of permitting defendants to have a copy of their own discovery is just as arbitrary and haphazard as it was before the rule changes.

Some prosecutors office routinely grant the requests and some offices routinely deny. Some judges grant in all cases while some judges change their tune depending on the position of the prosecution and even then not always so.

So we end up with a patchwork system of discovery denial and defendants throughout the state have different access to their own discovery than their cell mate, all depending on which jurisdiction they’re in.

It is incredibly hard to explain to a person accused of serious crimes by the state that:

  1. You are in possession of witness statements that implicate him and police reports that tie it all together;
  2. But you cannot give it to him.
  3. He can read it in front of you, but he cannot take it with him.
  4. He must rely on his memory in a correctional institution to recall all the details and to become well-versed with his own case, because he is not allowed to have any participation in the defense of his liberty and freedom;
  5. Especially when his cell-mate has 3 boxes of legal materials.

As numerous ethics opinions and judicial decisions have affirmed, the file and everything it contains does not belong to a lawyer. It belongs, unmistakably, to the individual party. Lawyers aren’t even parties to the criminal case.

There is no legal basis for withholding these documents from the individual, who must feel like he is intentionally being kept in the dark and blocked from the process of justice.

If the client demands of you, the criminal defense attorney, that he receive a copy of his file, I am unsure that you can refuse. It certainly would be a greater concern of mine that I might be held in violation of the rules of professional conduct than a judge or prosecutor getting upset with me that I flouted a Practice Book rule.

Of course, the question – just as with this scenario – is whether anyone will make that stand or will there always be some compromise worked out?3

It is a ridiculous burden to place on criminal defense attorneys and yet another sign of how the business of our justice system is conducted in full view of and in full neglect of the individual charged with a criminal offense.

The Harmless Writ: whether you get due process depends on how guilty you are

In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton argued that the Constitution should provide for the writ [of habeas corpus] “in the most ample manner” because it served as a bulwark against “arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended offenses [and] arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions.” The drafters of the Constitution imbedded it in Article I before adopting the Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court has attested to the writ’s significance on many occasions. At different times, the Court has declared that habeas corpus is intended “to liberate an individual from unlawful imprisonment,” a procedure for “securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights,” and “the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom,” which, if withdrawn, “risk[s] injury to an important interest in human liberty.”

Most recently, the Court described the writ of habeas corpus as a “vital instrument” to securing “freedom from unlawful restraint,” such freedom being “a fundamental precept of liberty.”

Taken, once again, from this law review article [PDF]. To those who don’t know, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is a post-conviction1 avenue to challenge the legality of their incarceration.

As the legendary Judge Weinstein quoted in his report on 500 habeas corpus cases:

The writ tests only whether a prisoner has been accorded due process, not whether he is guilty.

Because, at one point in time, in this country and this legal system, we valued the process as much as the outcome. We placed emphasis on doing things correctly, because we possibly recognized that we all weren’t so blissfully immune from the powerful crosshairs of a runaway government. To that end, judges across the various states and in the federal system were given broad authority to hear these “habeas petitions” challenging the legality of convictions.

Concomitantly, they were given broad powers to fashion remedies, because the harm caused by a violation of a Constitutional right must be made whole as completely as possible.

In Hilton v. Braunskill, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote

Federal habeas corpus practice, as reflected by the decisions of this Court, indicates that a court has broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief.

So, for example:

Riggs v. Fairman, 399 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir.2005), a district court has considerable discretion in fashioning a remedy tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation, and a court must consider the unique facts and circumstances of a particular case; Jeanty v. Bulger, 204 F.Supp.2d 1366 (S.D.Fla.2002), a court granting a writ of habeas corpus may also issue an injunction in aid of the writ; Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265 (6th Cir.2000), a habeas court has broad discretion in fashioning habeas relief; Hannon v. Maschner, 981 F.2d 1142 (10th Cir.1992), a district court may exercise its broad authority in habeas cases to grant any relief it deems necessary, including 638*638 permanent discharge of a successful habeas petitioner; Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987), federal courts have largest power to control and direct the form of judgment entered in cases brought up on habeas corpus; Jean v. Meissner, 90 F.R.D. 658 (S.D.Fla.1981), where appropriate, a habeas court may grant injunctive, declaratory and mandatory relief; Hobson v. Murray, 485 F.Supp. 1340 (E.D.Va.1980), federal courts are not narrowly restricted in fashioning an appropriate remedy on granting petition for writ of federal habeas corpus relief but instead, the court is charged to dispose of the matter as law and justice require; U.S. ex. rel. Marrero v. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary, 483 F.2d 656 (3rd Cir.1973), immediate and unconditional release is not the only remedy available in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Gentry v. Deuth. In Connecticut, this power, which derives from the habeas corpus court being a “court of equity” is identical to the power of the federal court. There are a set of statutes in this state, duly enacted by the legislature, that create special “habeas corpus courts”2 In CT, the legislature deemed it efficient to consolidate all these petitions in one courthouse in Rockville and assign 2-3 judges there to hear and dispose of all these cases. When I say “habeas court”, I’m referring to a judge assigned to sit as a habeas judge by the administration of the judicial branch. Once a judge has been administratively assigned to assume that role for a period of 2 or 3 years3, the judge takes on the duties, responsibilities and powers of the habeas corpus court which are given to it either by the common law (all the quotes above) or by statute, which states:

(a) The court or judge hearing any habeas corpus shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts and issues of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments in the case, and shall inquire fully into the cause of imprisonment and thereupon dispose of the case as law and justice require.

Emphasis added by me. Because as of today, that bolded portion is functionally excised from the law books and placed in the metaphorical trash heap which the CT Supreme Court is doing a fine job of filling with your and my individual rights and liberties.

In a decision today [PDF] in H.P.T. v. Commissioner that is one in a long line of utterly confused and confusing decisions about what, exactly, one must do in order to correct a Constitutional wrong when it comes to bad advice given by an individual’s lawyer, the court effectively divests these “habeas corpus” courts of their long-standing and inherent power to fashion the appropriate remedy.

This supreme court, for some reason, has gotten it into its head for over a decade now, that impartial habeas courts whose job is to determine whether a person has been “accorded due process”, not to sit and once again decide “whether he is guilty” are the wrong jurists to determine just what is to be done once they have decided that there was no due process.

A habeas court, generally, decides three things:

  1. Was there a Constitutional violation?
  2. Was there harm to the individual?
  3. How do we fix it?

There is absolutely no precedent whatsoever for questions 1 & 2 to be decided by one court and question 3 to be answered by another court altogether. And yet here we are in CT where this is precisely what has happened.

Here’s what the court wrote:

the proper remedy remains the same in most cases, namely, remanding the case to the trial court, which is vested with the discretion to [return the individual to pre-harm status]

Except, as we have seen just above, it is the habeas court, not the trial court that is “vested with the discretion”.

In order for its proposition, this opinion in H.P.T. cites only two cases4. One is its own opinion from last year in Ebron v. Commissioner, which is based primarily on a (deliberate?) misreading of Lafler and Frye and Lafler itself. The problem is that the SCOTUS cases of Lafler and Frye deal with setups where the trial court and the habeas court are one and the same, which is clearly not the scenario here in Connecticut.

So, in this opinion today, the CT Supreme Court has, without being asked to or without any due consideration, effectively repealed a statute duly passed by the State legislature. It has done so for one reason and one reason only:

In our view, the determination of the appropriate remedy will, in most cases, more properly be made by the trial court than by the habeas court because the former generally will have greater experience than the latter in crafting criminal sentences and, in some cases, may have access to information about the petitioner and the crime that is not available to the habeas court.

In other words, because the trial judge will know if he’s a really bad guy who needs to be locked up. The beauty of having an independent court not only evaluate the harm, but then also direct the remedy is that by virtue of being independent, the court has no stake in the game. It is not being asked to second guess or explain its own decision making.

Remember that the trial judge is the one that presided over the case when it was initially pending. This is the judge who may have ruled on discovery requests and, more importantly, conveyed plea bargain offers to the individual’s lawyer. This is the judge who was informed of the vagaries of the case and the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack thereof. This is a judge who has formed an opinion of the individual’s guilt.

The supreme court says today, in stark contrast to centuries of habeas corpus jurisprudence, that guilt is relevant to determining whether an individual should be afforded the protection of the Constitution against illegal convictions.

The court affirms that as long as someone is guilty, it doesn’t matter how that conviction was obtained.

A Constitutional harm is being weighed not against the principle that was violated or the actual harm caused to an individual, but against the character of that person.

What this decision today does, is give rise to a scenario where questions 1 and 2 above may be answered in the affirmative and question 3 may be answered by a judge with an emotional stake in the outcome who might proffer a middle finger by way of remedy.

We may end up with a situation with absolutely no relief for a proven Constitutional violation. A harm without a remedy is no harm at all.

This court has managed to take the “best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom” and turn it into a harmless piece of paper.

—–

The petulance of power

petulant

Let’s lay it out there: who here doesn’t believe that anyone arrested for a crime is automatically guilty of it? Who here doesn’t believe that there is a very good reason someone’s been arrested: they must’ve done something. Who here doesn’t believe that the system is a necessary inconvenience; a rigmarole we must go through before we arrive at the “truth” that everyone’s known about since the time of arrest.

The legal system – and the criminal justice system in particular – is increasingly viewed as an annoying detour on what should be a very short road from arrest to incarceration. If an arrestee is later found guilty by a jury, well then, I told you so. If an arrestee turns into an acquittee, it doesn’t mean he didn’t do it, just that the State couldn’t prove it. What has come before me, I do not know1.

And while it may be excusable for the masses to believe that the system is a technicality, it is exceptionally shameful for those educated in the law and charged with its conveyance to similarly believe so.

While this desire to dispense with the due process of law because we know better is foul when it emanates from law professors2, it is particularly odious when it extrudes from the pores of our own Champions of Justice: a terrible habit that seems to routinely recur.

Prosecutors can’t seem to keep their hands out of the misconduct jar. And when they engage in this misconduct, they do it over and over again, and indignantly soBecause they know better. Because they know how the system really works and how defense attorneys and the “constitution” are just impediments and tricks that prevent them from doing real justice: putting people who they’ve decided are rapists and murderers behind bars.

They have the power to decide who is a criminal and who is not and by God they’ve decided that long before they start to pick a jury.

Take Sharmese Hodge. A prosecutor in Danbury, Connecticut, who prosecuted a man named Michael Maguire. Hodge alleged that Maguire had sexually assaulted an eight-year old. In fact Hodge was so sure Maguire was guilty of this hyenous3 crime that she said the following4 [PDF] to the jury:

Defense counsel concluded his argument by stating: “I don’t ask you for pity. I don’t ask you for mercy. I ask you for justice. I ask you to set [the defendant] free.”

The prosecutor began her rebuttal closing argument as follows: “Ladies and gentlemen, that’s not what he’s asking you for. What he’s asking you for is to condone child abuse. What he’s asking you for is to allow a world in which a forty-one year old man sticks his hand down the front of an eight year old’s pants, claims to tickle her . . . [t]akes his hand out, smells it while his erect penis is sticking out of his pants, and, because he did that to an eight year old child, because he did it in a room where no one else was present, because he did in it in a house where mom and dad were separated and there was a woman staying the night . . . you can’t find him guilty. That’s what defense [counsel and the defendant want] you to believe. That’s what they want you to do. They want you to condone child abuse in this courtroom. They don’t want you to look at that little girl that sat on the stand and testified before you . . . . They don’t want you to look at her testimony. . . . They want you to say, hey, guess what? Because she’s eight [years old] and it was just her [testimony alone, you should find the defendant not guilty].”

After asserting that defense counsel had “lied to [the victim]” when he told her that his questions were not intended to trick her, the prosecutor returned to her earlier theme, stating: “So when [defense counsel] sits here and says to you today, we’re not here to condone child abuse or we’re not trying to beat up . . . on the [victim], listen to that. . . . Is he telling you the truth . . . when he says that?”

Finally, the prosecutor made the following argument with respect to the defendant’s own testimony: “I would assume what you wanted to hear was the truth, not a bunch of excuses, not . . . a big cloud of smoke and mirrors . . . . You wanted to hear the truth. That’s not what you heard. You heard a . . . coached conversation between a defense attorney and his client.” The prosecutor further argued: “[I]t’s not a secret that child abuse is a crime. But what counsel’s asking you to do is to say that . . . child abuse that happens in secret is legal, and that is not the law. I ask you to find the defendant guilty . . . .”

In addition, during the trial, Hodge and the defense attorney Norm Pattis had agreed that the interview of the complainant should be edited to remove portions that did not deal with the current allegations5. Pattis asked the interviewer if he had asked the complainant about inconsistencies in the story (he had not). Hodge then argued in front of the jury that the interviewer indeed had asked about those inconsistencies, but it was in the redacted portion of the interview that the jury was not allowed to see.

Which is not a misrepresentation but a blatant lie.

Why, if you must ask yourself, would a prosecutor argue to a jury that the defendant is asking them to condone child abuse? Why would the prosecutor make an argument so beyond the pale?

Because she believes it. Because she believes it and also believes that juries aren’t to be trusted. Because she knows that her best bet at “winning” is getting people angry. Because emotion is the surest way to a conviction. Because she has decided that Maguire has done wrong and she’ll be damned if she lets due process get in the way of a conviction.

Fortunately, this time our supreme court intervened6:

We agree with the defendant that the prosecutor’s repeated assertions, during her rebuttal closing argument, that the defendant and defense counsel were asking the jury to “condone child abuse” and to find “that . . . child abuse that happens in secret is legal,” and, further, that defense counsel was lying when he stated otherwise, were highly improper and intended not only to appeal to the jurors’ emotions but also to demean the defendant and defense counsel in the eyes of the jurors. In characterizing the defense theory of the case as she did, the prosecutor sought to demonstrate, unfairly, and without a factual basis, that the defense was illegitimate and wholly unworthy of consideration, for no juror reasonably could be expected to credit a defense predicated on condonation or approval of child sexual abuse.

While Mr. Maguire gets a new trial7. it seems that there are no consequences for Ms. Hodge, who appears free to repeat her questionable behavior.

This prosecutorial hubris is not an isolated incident. Defendants and defense counsel are not immune to the petulance of prosecutors. As a jurist, if you stray too far outside the line, you may find yourself banished to traffic court - a tactic seemingly only employed by prosecutors in San Diego8 - or the subject of a 2-year long inquiry into your impartiality. All because you rule in favor of defendants. Another way of saying that is ‘you rule in favor of individual rights and the rule of law.’ But no one says that. You’re partial and need to be banished if you rule for defendants and prosecutors will spend countless hours writing 70-page complaints against you9.

If none of this bothers you, ask yourself why. Even if you are that convinced of the infallibility of individuals who are given this extreme power, doesn’t their petulance and arrogance at being questioned give you pause?

—–

Restoring sanity to child sex cases

For as long as I can remember, there has been one fundamental truth in Connecticut if you are charged with a crime involving a sexual assault: you’re screwed1.

There’s the “liberal” standard of admitting prior sexual assault allegations in a case involving sexual assault, there’s straight up “once a sexual assault criminal, always any other type of criminal” and the almost unhindered admission of any type of “expert” testimony of an “expert” who claims to be an “expert” in the area of child sexual abuse [read: anecdotal evidence predicated solely on confirmation bias] despite a somewhat half-hearted effort to walk that back just ever so slightly and always distinguishably2 and then there’s the only-salvageable-by-judicial-fiat-Risk-of-Injury-statute, which is probably the most dangerous statute for due process and individual liberty and freedom that exists in Connecticut.

Zealous advocacy is not bound by your discomfort

Annex - Monroe, Marilyn (Seven Year Itch, The)_07

In what has become a hallmark of the site, Above the Law yesterday “posted” about a fascinating Massachusetts case and managed to distill it down for their LCD readership: man argues that upskirt photography is protected by the First Amendment.

That led a LawProf Jessica Smith to redistribute the same article with a comment appended:

Mark Bennett, fresh off his 1st Amendment win, does a brilliant job of explaining why not only is this argument the correct argument and that, if the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wishes to follow the First Amendment, it will be constrained to find the statute unconstitutional, but also that any lawyer who failed to make this argument for a client charged with that statute might well have been ineffective.

Since he’s done the legal mumbo-jumbo, I won’t repeat it. What struck me, though, was the attitude taken that this argument: that a statute is facially or as-applied unconstitutional is outside the bounds of “zealous advocacy”.

Both the post at ATL and Prof. Smith’s appended comment were of a similar vein: have you no shame?

The motivator for that approach, perhaps, is their individual distastes for upskirt photography and their discomfort at the very nature of its existence.

It is one thing for lawyers to hold personal beliefs about laws and acts and what should and shouldn’t be legal1 and another to chastise and impugn another lawyer for making an argument that any halfway competent lawyer should have made.

For if the measure of what is zealous advocacy is one’s personal discomfort for that position, then what would ATL and Prof. Smith have to say about, for instance, Bernard S. Cohen and Philip J. Hirschkop, who argued Loving v. Virginia in a time where interracial marriage wasn’t exactly de rigueur. Or Matthew J. Perry, Constance Baker Motley and Jack Greenberg, who argued for Bouie, et. al., two black college students who were refused service at a restaurant and then ordered to leave for “trespassing”, charged and convicted. Or Doug Nash, of New Haven, CT, who successfully convinced the Connecticut Supreme Court that Judith Scruggs was not guilty of the indecipherably vague “Risk of Injury” statute when her son hanged himself.

It is one thing, for instance, to argue that all non-consensual sexual encounters should be legalized2 and quite another to argue that a person cannot be convicted of sexual assault if a reasonable person would have believed that the complainant actually consented.

It is precisely this attitude3 – that something that affronts us personally must be a violation of the law – that has led to the current state of the system we are in, where the predisposition is toward guilt, where there is no intellectual honesty and where the public are but sharpening their pitchforks at every turn.

The law is motivated and controlled more by emotion today than at any time in the past. For a law professor who purportedly teaches judges and other public employees about the law to question the ethics and zealous advocacy of a lawyer who is seeking to protect our individual rights guaranteed under the Constitution is more discomforting to me than Marilyn Monroe standing above the vents of the subway tracks.