juries

Two – count ‘em! – two reversals (among other denials) from the Appellate Court today. The first, State v. Phillips [pdf], revolved around whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for new trial following a hearing that revealed evidence of possible racial bias on the part of a juror.

Four of the jurors testified that they believed juror B to be racially prejudiced against the defendant, who is a black man. Juror H, a black man, testified that juror B, a white man, made racist remarks to him. Juror H also reported that juror B told him that ‘‘when he saw [the defendant] he made up his mind that [the defendant] was guilty because of his demeanor. . . . He said when he first saw [the defendant], he knew—he knew that he was guilty.’’

According to juror H, juror B made reference to the fact that a person alleged to be part of the crime was Puerto Rican and to the way that ‘‘those people treat their women,’’ and also made a comment to one of the jurors of Vietnamese origin. Juror B also asked juror H why he had big feet. Juror H stated that juror B was very difficult to interact with and that it reached the point where juror H did not want to attend court any longer. In response to the judge’s question whether juror B’s conduct influenced his verdict, juror H stated, ‘‘yes, trying to get him to see the other part of the case.’’ He also said that ‘‘it was a compromise on my behalf.’’

Juror K, another black member of the jury, testified that he believed that juror B was racist. He said, ‘‘you didn’t hear the word n**** in that room, but you could feel it.’’ Juror M, the jury foreperson, testified that juror B made inappropriate comments of a racial nature during deliberations, including asking the black jurors questions that did not belong in the jury room, questions that he did not ask of the other jurors. Juror M also testified that juror B’s particular racial bias against the defendant presented some confusion in the room that may have affected the jurors’ ability to deliberate openly and fairly. Juror M said, ‘‘I think that we came to the decision that we could no longer go forward [and that] was because of the . . . I believe and we all believe . . . the racial bias by [juror B] in the room.’’ Juror R confirmed that one of the jurors made racially motivated comments and that his conduct caused the other jury members to ask him whether ‘‘he had racial problems.’’

When he testified at the postverdict hearing, juror B acknowledged the racial overtones throughout the jury’s deliberations. He testified that two members of the jury called him a racist. He said that during deliberations, he commented about the defendant’s demeanor at a certain stage in the trial and that as a result, ‘‘I was told I was a racist because black people and people of minority are more apt to demonstrate with their hands and to say things like that.’’ Juror B also believed that indirect threats were made to him. Juror B testified that juror K at one point said ‘‘something along the lines [of], ‘Boy, if this was a basketball game, I’d beat the shit out of him,’ or something like that.’’

The trial court found that there was no evidence that Juror B’s conduct affected the deliberations or the verdict. The Appellate Court held that the trial court had applied the wrong standard. Instead of requiring actual prejudice, it should have limited its inquiry to objective evidence of racially related statements and behavior. The court should then have decided whether that evidence amounted to racial bias against the defendant on the part of one or more jurors, which would have automatically warranted a new trial.

The second reversal was in State v. Moore [pdf], where the conviction was overturned on the grounds that the trial court erred in not striking the re-direct testimony of a state witness. This state witness was a co-conspirator and after implicating the defendant on direct, changed course and absolved him of any involvement on cross. He stated that he was pressured by the State into fingering the defendant and did so for considerations in his own case.

The state attempted a rehabilitative re-direct, but the witness soon invoked his 5th Amendment privilege and refused to answer any more questions. Re-cross was not possible. The defense objected and argued that the testimony on re-direct should be stricken, because to let it stand without doing so would violate the defendant’s 6th Amendment confrontation right. The Appellate Court agreed.