I have written before that despite the successes being touted by the criminal justice head honchos here in Connecticut, we still treat our children differently when it comes to those that are alleged to have committed the most serious of crimes.
According to law in Connecticut, anyone 14 and above who is alleged to have committed a Class A (murder, felony murder, arson, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault) or a Class B felony (sexual assault, robbery 1, assault 1, risk of injury) is automatically transferred to adult court. For instance, in 2012, approximately 209 children between 14-17 had their criminal cases transferred to adult court.
A 2002 study [PDF] commissioned to consider the impact of the 1995 legislation mandating automatic transfers revealed that 36% of all juveniles1 transferred to adult court2 between 1997-2002 were sentenced to incarceration. That equals 141 children in Connecticut who got jail time in adult court, with adult convictions, with adult conviction consequences. That’s 141 too many for me, but those with the authority to change things seem to disagree.
[If anyone has updated statistics, I’d love to see them. Further, if you’re a legislator, request updated statistics from OLR – specifically ask for a breakdown of automatic transfers, discretionary transfers, the ages of the defendants at the time of the commission of the offense and the sentences received.]
But these again, are the people who, had protection of children really been their goal, would have seen it fit to fix a glaring problem in our General Statutes. In a moment of wisdom that is all too rare these days, our legislature saw fit to enact this legislation:
(a) Any admission, confession or statement, written or oral, made by a child under the age of sixteen to a police officer or Juvenile Court official shall be inadmissible in any proceeding concerning the alleged delinquency of the child making such admission, confession or statement unless made by such child in the presence of the child’s parent or parents or guardian and after the parent or parents or guardian and child have been advised (1) of the child’s right to retain counsel, or if unable to afford counsel, to have counsel appointed on the child’s behalf, (2) of the child’s right to refuse to make any statements, and (3) that any statements the child makes may be introduced into evidence against the child.
That’s a pretty intelligent piece of legislation which seeks to protect a child of a certain age from being subjected to the very adult world of police interrogations without a parent or guardian being present.
In both Canady and Ledbetter, the juvenile defendants argued that they too, should receive the protection of the above statute because it simply doesn’t make any sense that the legislature intended to offer these protections only in situations where the consequences were minimal. Logic dictates, they argued, that children are more deserving of protections like the right to have a parent present and the right to have an attorney present when the consequences expose them to adult convictions and adult jail time and registration as a sexual offender.
You’d think, said the supreme court, but it ain’t so:
The defendant also contends that our interpretation of § 46b-137(a) in Ledbetter is inconsistent with the primary purpose underlying the enactment of that statute, namely, “to provide needed protection to children who are subjected to questioning by the police.” State v. Ledbetter, supra, 263 Conn. at 16, 818 A.2d 1. As the defendant maintains, those rights are no less implicated when a juvenile is tried in criminal court than when he is tried in juvenile court. Nevertheless, as we explained in rejecting the identical claim in Ledbetter, “[w]e agree, of course, that limiting the scope of § 46b-137(a) to proceedings in juvenile court necessarily will deprive some children of the protections to which they otherwise would be entitled under § 46b-137(a). To avoid this result, however, the defendant [in Ledbetter] would have us construe the words, `in any proceeding concerning the alleged delinquency of the child’ … to mean in any proceeding concerning the child. We may not disregard the words `the alleged delinquency of,’ because `[w]e presume that the legislature had a purpose for each sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment, and that it did not intend to enact meaningless provisions.’
And then, of course, the reality laid bare:
Furthermore, Ledbetter was decided more than six years ago, and the legislature has taken no steps to amend § 46b-137(a) in response to our holding in that case. “[A]lthough legislative inaction is not necessarily legislative affirmation … we … presume that the legislature is aware of [this court’s] interpretation of a statute, and that its subsequent nonaction may be understood as a validation of that interpretation.”
In other words: the legislature could have clarified this mess, but they haven’t, so it’s pretty clear that they don’t think children should have protections against police interrogations if those confessions can be used against them to secure convictions in adult court. Shameful.
Where’s the surprise, though? They are the same people who’ve seen it fit to leave the discretion to save or ruin a child’s life in the hands of prosecutors and only prosecutors. A judge cannot block the transfer to adult court; a judge cannot require that the case be returned to juvenile court and a judge cannot sentence a juvenile to anything less than the law requires.
We all know what happens when prosecutors are given that sort of unfettered discretion and power. And if you think they won’t flex their muscle just because the defendant is 14 years old, well you aren’t paying attention.
This is all the more puzzling in light of the fact that our legislature has, in certain circumstances, given judges the power to ignore the mandatory-minimum sentences:
The execution of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the provisions of this subsection shall not be suspended, except the court may suspend the execution of such mandatory minimum sentence if at the time of the commission of the offense (1) such person was under the age of eighteen years
Why such a clause cannot apply to all juveniles in adult court in all crimes is beyond me. Keep the maximum intact and let a judge decide what the appropriate sentence is in each case.
And why should anyone need to fix these problems, right? It’s not like juveniles who commit crimes can go on and become productive members of society. It’s not like they become social workers or victim advocates or reporters or pediatricians.
It’s not like children are, you know, children.