In doing the math for this post on the rate of success in the CT Supreme Court, I ran across this opinion, again by the Chief Justice, in the matter of State v. William Brabham [PDF]. It’s one of those opinions that’s a slow boil, so I put it on the backburner, until my outrage was sparked again1 by this recent opinion from the CT Appellate Court in Saksena v. Commissioner [PDF].
If you needed more proof of the fact that our “Constitutional rights” are but a mirage, provenanced from the goodwill of those entrusted with the enforcement and application of those rights. They are more grants of favor by judges than inexorable and inimical fundamental rights.
How else would you explain the frequency and ease with which violations of these fundamental rights are dispensed with, overlooked and excused?
Take, for example, the aforementioned Brabham. Brabham was, to be sure, a lout. He was also an absconder. He wasn’t, shall we say, the most honest person. He was charged with larceny and burglary, so he decided to do what seemed logical: run. Then:
After the jury returned its verdict, but before sentencing, the defendant posted bond and fled to London, England. As a result, the defendant failed to appear for sentencing on September 22, 2000. He later was rearrested and returned to Connecticut. The defendant’s sentencing was set for March 26, 2004, but before that date, he once again posted bond and fled to London, England, and again, did not appear for sentencing. The defendant again was rearrested, and on November 18, 2008, he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of fifteen years imprisonment. This appeal followed.
On appeal, he claimed, among other things, that the State had failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the judge had failed to properly instruct jurors. So these arguments, if successful, would undermine the reliability of the conviction, implicating due process.
But he ran. And we don’t like people who run. And the fact of his running apparently outweighs the reality of his conviction being unconstitutional. There is such a thing as the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
What it means, basically, is that if you’re charged by the State and a jury convicts you, no matter how erroneously or unlawfully, your illegal, tainted conviction will stand because fuck you. No one shows up the State and gets away with it.
Keep in mind that Brabham wasn’t on the lam when this appeal was heard: he was in custody serving an obscenely inflated sentence2. There is an argument to be made that a defendant who is on the run isn’t entitled to an appeal while he’s on the run. Fair. I disagree in principle, but in effect, I might be inclined to agree. This is not that case. Here, he’s in the State, sentenced to an outrageous sentence (see footnote 3 above).
The court listed the 43 rationales for “fugitive disentitlement”. They are:
(1) the judgment on review may be impossible to enforce because the prisoner has escaped, (2) the prisoner’s escape disentitles him to call upon the resources of the [c]ourt for determination of his claims, (3) dismissal will [discourage] the felony of escape and [encourage] voluntary surrenders, and (4) dismissal will [promote] the efficient, dignified operation of the courts.
The court rejects the first three rationales and instead adopts the FDD for that fourth reason “efficient, dignified operation” of the courts.
Seriously. Are you laughing yet? I don’t even know what that means. The court then makes up some nonsense about how since he was gone for so long, a few exhibits went missing so they can’t rule on whether the state actually proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of breaking into some dude’s office. Seriously. Do you see what we have to deal with here in Connecticut?
[Yes, okay, he shouldn’t run. Yes, okay, there has to be some disincentive. But those rationales were rejected by the Court.]
But that’s not all. That merely brings us to Saksena v. Commissioner, which I mentioned above. That’s a habeas corpus case in which the opinion lists the only claim as being that he was not properly advised of immigration consequences pursuant to Padilla v. Kentucky. Until you look at the footnotes4. Footnote 1 says:
The petitioner also claims that the habeas court erred when it proceeded to trial without him present in contravention of his due process rights guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, Practice Book § 23-40, and General Statutes § 52-470. For reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that any error by the habeas court in proceeding to trial without the petitioner present was harmless.
My laughter has turned to tears. In case you don’t get the irony in this, let me spell it out for you.
Habeas Corpus is Latinese for… you have the body. It is a Latin phrase literally commanding the warden to present the physical body of the petitioner and answer why his conviction is legal.
I swear to God sometimes I think I’m living inside an Onion article. In Saksena, he was transferred to ICE custody for deportation purposes and was held in MA. They’d transport him to CT for his trial if the CT judge ordered it, but the CT judge refused to do so5. So, Saksena’s “bring the body” trial was held without the body.
And of course, the Constitutional violation doesn’t matter because he was guilty anyway.