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More from Boumediene:

Indeed, common-law habeas corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy. Its precise application and scope changed depending upon the circumstances. See 3 Blackstone *131 (describing habeas as “the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement”); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 319 (1995) (Habeas “is, at its core, an equitable remedy”); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236, 243 (1963) (Habeas is not “a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose”).

Plenty of other commentators have far more intelligent comments and insights on Boumediene [pdf] than I have to offer, so I will direct you to them (see this SCOTUSblog post for a collection of links as well).

I do want to leave you with this quote from Justice Kennedy’s opinion, via Orin at Volokh:

Officials charged with daily operational responsibility for our security may consider a judicial discourse on the history of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and like matters to be far removed from the Nation’s present, urgent concerns. Established legal doctrine, however, must be consulted for its teaching. Remote in time it may be; irrelevant to the present it is not. Security depends upon a sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability of our Armed Forces to act and to interdict. There are further considerations, however. Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.

There is a reason it is called The Great Writ.

Everyone that practices criminal law is probably aware of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and the (usually) appropriate venue for seeking relief for a violation of that right: a petition for writ of habeas corpus. This remedy, however, is difficult to obtain and is backward-looking in nature.

The question I’m currently considering, however, is whether there is a need - or does anyone have the responsibility - to preempt habeas corpus petitions by stopping the damage while it occurs.

Norm has been blogging up a storm recently about Gerry Spence and the Fieger trial in Chicago, talking about taking the opportunity to see the master in action. Of course, when a trial lawyer as celebrated and revered as Spence is “performing”, there is much to learn. But what of the exact opposite? What of the trial where everyone is painfully aware the counsel is performing horribly?

A trial, from the perspective of the State, is the pursuit of justice and a quest for the truth. If, during that trial, the defendant (who, let us remember, is presumed innocent) is being defended in a manner that is obviously deficient, does anyone have the responsibility to step in and say, “let us stop this sham before it goes any further”? Does the judge? The prosecutor?

Does there come a point during a trial when the system has so obviously failed that to continue would be a mockery of justice? Keep in mind that I am talking about extreme cases here - cases where it is apparent either that the defense is not really doing any “defending” or that the quality of representation is so poor that a subsequent habeas becomes an almost foregone conclusion.

Or is that too heavy a burden to place on the system? There are a few things that can be done post-trial (habeas, grievance), but is there anything that can - or should - be done during a trial?

The Georgia Supreme Court issued a 4-3 opinion today, essentially affirming Troy Davis’ conviction. Troy Davis, you will remember, was granted a stay of execution by the Georgia Board of Parole and received a letter of support from The Pope.

EyeID explains:

According to the court, statements by a slew of witnesses who claimed that they had lied at trial under police pressure were insufficient to support a finding that a different result would likely be reached if the case were subjected to a new trial — in a case in which the only evidence presented was the apparently coerced testimony of the same witnesses. As a result of this inexplicable finding, the Georgia Supreme Court refused to stand in the way of the execution of a man who insists he is, and whom many believe to be, innocent.

Here’s a sampling of the recantations:

I kept telling them that I didn’t know. It was dark, my windows were tinted, and I was scared. It all happened so fast. Even today, I know that I could not honestly identify with any certainty who shot the officer that night.
[…]
After the officers talked to me, they gave me a statement and told me to sign it. I signed it. I did not read it because I cannot read.

and another:

I nodded and repeated what they said, whether it was true or not…. I am not proud for lying at Troy’s trial, but the police had me so messed up that I felt that’s all I could do or else I would go to jail.

It really is remarkable that the Ga. Supreme Court did not find that these recantations would result in a different outcome if Davis were granted a new trial.

An absolutely mind-boggling and repulsive decision.

Two separate news items of note on the death penalty in Connecticut today. The first is a hearing in the judiciary committee on a bill that sets absurd time limits on the filing of appeals and habeas corpus petitions. S.B. 320 is a resurrection of an almost identical bill that failed in the last legislative session. The bill would require both the defendant and the state to file its briefs within 4 months of the imposition of the sentence and it would require the Supreme Court to schedule oral argument no later than 6 months from the date of the imposition of the sentence. These time limits are absurd and arbitrary and unworkable. There is no way that all issues that need to be raised in capital cases can be raised in two months.

Further, it requires all habeas corpus petitions in capital cases to be filed within 180 days (or at the same time that oral argument is scheduled) of the imposition of the sentence and a hearing on such a habeas petition shall be held within 180 days of the filing of such a petition.

However, a subsequent petition will not be barred if (1) the facts underlying the claim were unknown to the defendant or the defendant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence prior to the filing of the earlier application, and (2) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would have reasonably led the original trier of fact to have either found the defendant not guilty or not sentence the defendant to death. The court shall hold a hearing on such subsequent application not later than one hundred eighty days after the filing of such application.

Written testimony submitted to the Judiciary Committee is available here. This bill is opposed by the ACLU, the Public Defender’s Office and the State’s Attorney’s Office.

The second news item was a discussion on the state of the death penalty in Connecticut on NPR’s “Where We Live“. The guests include Waterbury State’s Attorney John Connelly, Yale Prof. John Donahue, who conducted the disparity study, Helen Williams - the mother of Richard Reynolds’ victim, Robert Nave - the director of the Connecticut Network to Abolish the Death Penalty, New Jersey Senator Christopher Bateman and State Rep. Michael Lawlor.

Connecticut is one of 2 states in New England that still has a death penalty. New Hampshire is the other—but recently that state has created a commission to study the process including whether the death penalty actually deters crime, just as New Jersey did prior to its abolition of the death penalty.

The discussion included the cost of the death penalty vis-a-vis life imprisonment, its deterrence value and who the focus is on. Quotes from citizens include comments about the fallibility of the justice system as demonstrated by the DNA exonerations and whether we should take that risk with the one truly irreversible punishment. It is an hour long, but definitely worth listening to.

Connelly and even the host keep trumpeting the “fact” that the majority of citizens are in favor of the death penalty. Lawlor mentions that when CT citizens are given the choice between the death penalty and life imprisonment, the opinions are more even.

Then the discussion turns to the hearing scheduled in the judiciary committee and Connelly characterizes it as appeals and habeas corpus petitions filed “ad nauseam“. Where he gets this, I do not know, but apparently NPR didn’t see it fit to have anyone from the defense bar to mention that there is a statutory right to a direct appeal and a Constitutional right to habeas corpus.

Lawlor then says it like it is: This is a political issue and whether abolition proceeds depends on opinion polls and what people think about it. He says they will look to New Jersey’s upcoming elections to see whether the abolition will be an issue there.

Courtesy of NPR, the audio is available below.

 

 Standard Podcast [51:59m]: Play Now | Play in Popup

It’s that time again! The docket has been released, so it’s time to preview the upcoming cases at the Connecticut Supreme Court. It’s no wonder that they sent me a notice saying: “Attorney Trumpet [yes, that's my last name], we regret to inform you that yours was one of the many qualified petitions for certification we received and we have only so many openings, so we will be unable to extend you an invitation to speak before us.”

Anyway, on to the good stuff - and believe you me, there is LOTS of that! There are Constitutional challenges to the validity of statutes and the big Courchesne death penalty appeal.

March 12 @ 10:00am - State v. Fernando A: The certified issue is whether the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a protective order. Section 54-63c, as amended, provides that such a protective order will remain in effect until the arrested person is presented to the Superior Court for arraignment and that, at the arraignment, “the court shall conduct a hearing pursuant to section 46b-38c at which the defendant is entitled to be heard with respect to the issuance of a protective order.” On day one, the defendant requested this hearing. The court said it was too busy, so the hearing would be held four days later and issued a protective order. Four days later, another judge said that he had been heard for the purposes of this section and no evidentiary hearing would be held. The defendant also claims that the protective order deprived him of fundamental rights, including the right to occupy his home and the right to the custody and companionship of his children, constitutional guarantees of due process demand that he be afforded an evidentiary hearing concerning the protective order.

March 13 @ 11:00am - State v. Carrasquillo: This is an Eight Amendment challenge to the application of the murder statute to juveniles. The defendant argues that § 46b-127 (a) and General Statutes § 53a-35a (2) violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause because they automatically subject all fourteen and fifteen year old children charged with murder to the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration without any consideration of mitigating factors regarding their juvenile status. Relying on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), he argues that even juveniles who commit serious crimes cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders because (1) a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in juveniles more often than in adults; (2) juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures than adults; and (3) the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. Further, the prosecutor referenced during closing argument, over objection, “evidence” of the defendant’s motive that was not adduced at trial.

March 18 @ all day - State v. Courchesne: Oh boy. Lots and lots of stuff. Whether an unborn child is a “person”. Whether the defendant intended to murder the unborn child. During the trial stage, the trial court ruled that the aggravating factor - killing in an especially depraved, heinous, cruel manner - had to be proven as to both victims. State took an interlocutory appeal. Supreme Court held that it had to prove that as to only one. It also discussed its approach to statutory construction and stated that it would ordinarily consider all relevant sources of meaning of a statute without first having to determine whether the language at issue is ambiguous. As a direct result of that decision, the legislature passed Section 1-2z, stating that you have to look at the plain meaning of the language first.

The dp claims are: (1) Should the trial court have dismissed the counts alleging murder of an unborn child because an unborn fetus is not legally a “person” and, even if the unborn fetus was a person, the defendant lacked the requisite intent to kill her? (2) If the trial court correctly ruled that someone who injures an unborn fetus can be prosecuted for murder if the fetus is subsequently born alive and then dies, was there sufficient evidence presented to show that the child was alive when the cesarean section was performed? (3) Should the trial court have granted the defendant’s motion to impose a life sentence without release where the defendant argues that Connecticut’s capital punishment scheme gives prosecutors unfettered and standardless discretion to seek a sentence of death, that such discretion is unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions, and that such discretion violates General Statutes § 53a-46b (b) (1), which states that a death sentence shall be affirmed unless it was “the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor”? and (4) Should the trial court have instructed the jury that for the death penalty to be imposed for the capital felony of murder of two or more persons in the course of a single transaction and where the state has alleged the aggravating factor of the offense’s being “especially heinous, cruel or depraved” under General Statutes § 53a-46a (i) (4), the state must prove that factor as to both victims?

That should be a fun hearing.

There are two standby cases:

Bryant v. Commissioner: IAC claim on the grounds that trial counsel did not call 4 credible witnesses who would testify that the victim died not of a beating, which was the theory at trial, but of a gunshot wound. Habeas corpus court granted the petition and ordered a new trial. Appellate Court reversed, holding that trial counsel’s decision not to call the witnesses was a tactical decision. Supreme Court will review.

State v. Boyle: An issue that is becoming prevalent nationwide. Defendant was convicted of a DUI and sentenced to probation. Probation moved to modify conditions and wanted to include sex offender evaluation and treatment. This request was based on the probation officer’s discovery that the defendant was convicted of sexual assault in 1997, that he was on the sex offender registry and that a parole board evaluation indicated that his risk of recidivism for sexual assault was high and his level of dangerousness was severe. At the hearing on the motion to modify, the probation officer testified that it is the policy of the office of adult probation to request that a probationer abide by sex offender conditions of probation when the probationer has a prior sexual offense conviction and is still on the sex offender registry. The probation officer further testified that he believed that the added condition of probation was necessary because the use of alcohol was a factor in the sexual assault case. The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Court reversed, holding that sex offender treatment was not rationally related to the purpose of rehabilitation for a DUI conviction. Supreme Court will reverse review.

Update: Here’s a copy

CT death row inmates’ racial and geographical disparity challenge to the death penalty survived a motion to dismiss. The challenge was made under provisions of both the Connecticut and Federal Constitutions. That might be what saved it (among other things).

In his decision, Judge Stanley T. Fuger Jr. said Connecticut’s constitution affords defendants greater legal rights than the U.S. Constitution, so, therefore, they have the right to present the kind of systemwide bias evidence that the 1987 ruling barred.

“Connecticut is not closing its eyes to this claim as most state courts have done,” said David Baldus, a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law who has studied bias in the death penalty in four states and in the city of Philadelphia. “So that’s why this is an unusual case. Unusual and important.”

This is a serious issue and perhaps it wouldn’t have been the wisest thing to dismiss the claims, as Judge Fuger recognizes:

“In the instant case, the petitioners allege that they are to be deprived of their lives in a proceeding that has been tainted by the imposition of improper racial determinations,” Fuger wrote in his decision. “The stakes are, therefore, extraordinarily high for these petitioners and merit the closest of scrutiny before throwing the complaint out of court without any opportunity to provide the validity of the claims.”

Previous coverage here, here, here and here.

SCOTUS issued its much-awaited (by me, atleast) decision in Danforth v. Minnesota [pdf] today, ruling 7-2 that Teague’s retroactivity prohibition applied to Federal courts on federal habeas corpus review. State courts are hence free to apply decisions articulating violations to cases on direct and/or collateral review.

As Justice Stevens makes clear, what the Court does, in say Crawford, for example, is state that a particular act or omission violates the Constitution. It is then left to the states to decide how to remedy that violation.

Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the authority of the States to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas.

…

Our subsequent cases, which characterize the Teague rule as a standard limiting only the scope of federal habeas relief, confirm that Teague speaks only to the context of federal habeas.

He wraps it up very succinctly:

A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of trial—only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts.

Whatever this means for federal habeas corpus practice, it is pretty clear that us state practitioners can now argue - with a stamp of approval - that our state courts should provide remedies for constitutional violations recently articulated.

It makes much sense, too, if you think about it in the context of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied to the states through the Fourteenth. The Court has maintained that States are free to provide greater protections than afforded by the Federal Constitution. This falls in line with that quite well.

Read the whole decision - it’s very interesting. Justice Stevens conducts an in-depth analysis of Justice O’Connor’s plurality in Teague and cites Justice Scalia heavily. Then there’s this odd footnote; perhaps someone can explain:

13. That same year, we similarly denied retroactive effect to the rule announced in Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), prohibiting prosecutorial comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 (1966). Shortly thereafter, in a case involving a Griffin error, we held for the first time that there are some constitutional errors that do not require the automatic reversal of a conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 22 (1967). Both Shott and Chapman protected the State of California from a potentially massive exodus of state prisoners because their prosecutors and judges had routinely commented on a defendant’s failure to testify.

A much better in-depth analysis from Scotusblog here. More from SL & P.

H/T: SL & P.

As has been pointed out to me by several readers, I missed a troubling portion of an opinion earlier this week when I recapped the latest Appellate Court opinions. In Kaddah v. Comm’r, which I summarily dismissed, I ignored habeas counsel’s shocking admission that he intentionally pled a meritless claim just to please his client.

Perhaps I was subconsciously taking a cue from the Appellate Court who also let it pass without a reprimand.

The story goes thusly: Petitioner, represented by Attorney A, claimed in his first habeas that his appellate counsel, Attorney B was ineffective. However, at the habeas trial, Attorney A did not call Attorney B to testify and seemingly abandoned that claim. So petitioner filed another habeas, this time against Attorney A, alleging IAC for failing to establish his claim the first time around by not calling Attorney B.

At that second habeas:

[Attorney A] testified that the inclusion of the ineffective assistance allegation against [Attorney B] in the first habeas petition was done merely to placate his client—[Attorney A] did not believe the claim had any merit. On the basis of his assessment that the claim was meritless and would fail, [Attorney A] decided it would not be prudent to call [Attorney B] to testify.

Whaaaaaa? Did I just go through a worm-hole and end up in BizarroConnecticut where the rules of professional conduct no longer apply? Let me check. No, Rule 3.1 still exists. For those not in the know, it states:

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

So how does the court get around it? By changing Attorney A’s characterization of the claim as “meritless” to “weak”.

In light of this uncontradicted testimony, [Attorney A]’s abandonment of the claim against [Attorney B] was a strategic decision that merely eliminated a weaker argument from the petition.

Weaker? It’s frivolous! Weak is when the only support for your claim is your client’s testimony. Frivolous is when you have no support for a claim.

They can’t make up their mind, apparently. For, a sentence later, they say:

The petitioner has set forth no persuasive arguments as to why [Attorney A]’s failure to pursue a meritless claim amounts to deficient performance.

At a time when courts openly question why habeas cases take so long to prosecute, you’d think the Court would want to stamp down on those that plead meritless claims just to please their clients.

Oh, and I’ve said this before, but if you’re an attorney whose former client has filed a habeas petition, why don’t you just co-operate and talk about your representation? It would make things so much easier for the habeas attorney. You talk to them; they can better determine if there actually is a claim - then we don’t end up clogging the courts with frivolous weak claims.

On the heels of my post last week about hazardous duty pay comes this decision from the Appellate Court today. In State v. Damato, the Appellate Court affirmed convictions for attempted assault and murder of a prosecutor. The State alleged that the defendant sought to hire someone to hurt a prosecutor who he felt was “riding his son” in an unrelated prosecution. The defendant argued that the State did not prove that he took a substantial step towards committing the murder and assault of the prosecutor. Specifically, he argued that the evidence presented could not establish that he had followed the prosecutor and reconnoitered his residence.

In rejecting the claim, it summed up the evidence as follows:

In the case before us, the jury heard testimony that the defendant wanted to injure or kill [the prosecutor]. The jury also heard [witness one's] testimony that the defendant had told [witness one] that he had somebody follow [the prosecutor] to Steve’s Boston Seafood restaurant and [witness two's] testimony that the defendant provided detailed information about [the prosecutor's] place of residence. [Witness two] testified that the defendant ‘‘mentioned an address . . . he says the name of a house on a dead-end street, across the railroad tracks. . . . [The defendant] told [witness two] where [the prosecutor] lives. . . . He said it was on a dead-end street, across some tracks and accessible by boat.’’ The defendant also told [witness two] that there were bushes on the property that one could go through to get to the house. The jury heard [testimony from the prosecutor that confirmed that the above descriptions were true].

The Court also rejected a claim of instructional error because the jury instruction mirrored what the defendant requested and then went on to reject a claim that the trial court failed to give, sua sponte, an instruction on jailhouse informant credibility because it was up to the defendant to request it. Finally, there was a claim of improper admission of prior misconduct and rebuttal testimony. Both were rejected.

Next up, State v. Nelson. The court rejected a claim that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he conspired to use a knife from the victim’s home in the commission of the robbery. Basically, defendant and co-defendant broke into victim’s house to rob him. While there, defendant used a knife from the house to hurt the victim. The Court said that there doesn’t need to be an express agreement to prove conspiracy and they could have formed the intent while in the commission of the crime. The fact that he didn’t bring the knife with him doesn’t mean anything.

The court also rejected a claim that a 911 recording made by the victim while he was tied up in his car, just after the defendants left him somewhere was improper as it was not an excited utterance. The focus of the claim was that the victim did not have the opportunity to observe what he later spontaneously uttered.

The test of whether a declarant sufficiently observed the subject of his spontaneous utterance is ‘‘whether the evidence supports a finding that the declarant had an opportunity to observe the matters described in his or her statement.’’ State v. Westberry, 68 Conn. App. 622, 631 (2002). In this case, the state presented evidence that [the victim] not only observed but also experienced the events in question.

Another of the defendant’s claims failed because he did not preserve it at trial and Golding review doesn’t apply to evidentiary claims (that the trial court improperly instructed the jury it could consider the 911 call for its substance).

Then there was a habeas denial, which was affirmed: Vidro v. Comm’r. Nothing noteworthy, except for the fact that trial counsel was Norm.

Finally, there’s Kaddah v. Comm’r, in which the Appellate Court goes into the merits of the IAC claim (it was against prior habeas counsel), but then ends by affirming, deciding that the denial of petition for certification to appeal wasn’t an abuse of discretion.

While all the hullabaloo surrounding SCOTUS today may have been centered around Baze, the Court also issued a minor, but nevertheless terrifically interesting decision. In Wright v. Van Patten [pdf], the Court wrote, per curiam, that the Circuit Court’s grant of a habeas was improper because the State supreme court’s decision denying the habeas was not contrary to clearly established federal law (which is one of the two grounds on which a valid State conviction can receive federal habeas corpus review).

Mr. Wright sough habeas review in the first place because at his plea hearing, his lawyer phoned it in. Not phoned it in in the colloquial sense (or even the widely used “he was crappy” sense that forms the basis of most habeas petitions), but rather in the literal sense. He appeared for the plea hearing via telephone.

In a state as small as CT, that is unheard of. Perhaps in them larger jurisdikshuns where theys gots lots of open land and such, it may be common practice (what was I going for there? I have no clue). Still, the idea seems very…dirty. If my client is pleading guilty, I want to be there to stand by him - if for nothing else than to offer support. It’s not only my client’s case, it is my case as well and having been through the whole process side by side, I’d rather not end it speaker to ear.

Anyway, the Court reserved for another day the substantive question of whether appearing by telephone is legally adequate (maybe that answers your question, Scott?). This case was reversed on purely procedural grounds.

Image license info here.

A very faithful reader sent along this humorous decision from the Court of Appeals of Texas, Seventh District. It’s not from today, or yesterday, but a day almost 4 years ago. Yet, it is funny enough for me to pass along.

Here’s the excerpt from Lexis:

Assistance of court-appointed counsel was not rendered ineffective by the fact that counsel was on the indicting grand jury. Apart from bald assertion of conflict, defendant failed to show how attorney could have represented him more effectively.

As they say, only in Texas. At least it wasn’t a death case.

“Falling on the sword”. This is a phrase you will hear often if you are a criminal defense lawyer. What it generally refers to is owning up to your mistakes during your representation of a client, at a later habeas corpus proceeding. In other words, take responsibility for any errors you made during trial - big or small.

Unfortunately, the only ones you ever hear use this phrase are the good ones; the ones that hardly make mistakes and if they do, they’re minor and don’t really affect the outcome of a trial. The hacks - the ones that routinely plead clients out without investigating, or give bad advice or are just plain clueless never use this phrase. Perhaps their guilty conscience pricks them.

Skelly seems to be one of the good guys. He writes here at length about the inner turmoil he experienced when called to testify at a former client’s federal habeas.

He wanted to help; he really did. The problem was he didn’t do what the client said he did and like any ethical lawyer, he couldn’t lie.

My former client’s federal petition claimed that back in 2002, prior to his guilty plea, I told him that he did have a particular plea bargain, and that I lied when I told the trial judge that he did not. I testified that I did not tell him that he had a plea bargain. I testified that once he and I rejected the state’s first offer, there was no other plea bargain. Offer, counter-offer, and second counter-offer, sure, but no acceptance from the state, no meeting of the minds, no deal. I testified today just I said in open court that day in 2002, at the moment when my old client’s words turned from “not guilty” to “guilty,” there was no plea bargain. His current counsel referred to that statement as my “perception.” I replied that the state appellate courts also had reached the same perception. And I had tried so to stay pleasant! When the insinuation was that I lied either to my client, to the state trial judge, or to both, well, maybe I bristled just a bit more than I intended to.

Scott points out an obvious mistake here - calling him a “liar”. That certainly is not the way to get a former attorney to help.  Scott also asks: why don’t habeas attorneys try to contact the trial attorney in advance? Talk to them?

It’s a darn good question. In all the habeas cases I’ve handled, I’ve made it a point to try and contact the trial attorney before filing the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, so as to weed out any frivolous claims (or claims that there is just no support for). Unfortunately, not all attorneys do that and on the flip side, not all trial counsel are willing to co-operate. There are some that just won’t return phone calls. Why they don’t get that if they do return the phone calls, there’s a good chance the habeas will go away, I don’t understand.

Anyway, habeas is an extremely uphill battle and in only the right circumstances - in the rarest of rare cases - does a petition get granted. It isn’t the State that the defendant is battling, it is the standard. Strickland sets the standard so high, that in most ineffective cases, it is almost impossible to meet, unless the error is so blatant and glaring that even a judge cannot ignore.

But in those cases, don’t count on help from counsel. They don’t know what “falling on the sword” means.

Intriguing news out of SCOTUS today. The IAC during plea bargaining case, Arave v. Hoffman, reported with much fanfare here, may not go forward after all. Per Scotusblog (via SL&P), attorneys for both sides have asked the Justices to vacate the Ninth Circuit opinion and dismiss the case as moot. Defendant’s motion is here [pdf] and the State’s response is here [pdf]. It really is curious. It seems that the defendant wants the relief imposed by the federal habeas court: vacate the death sentence and impose life.

Hoffman was convicted of first degree murder in 1993 and sentenced to death in an Idaho court. Almost a decade later, a federal habeas court vacated the death sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of the trial. The habeas court rejected a separate ineffective assistance claim relating to pre-trial negotiations, when Hoffman’s attorney advised him not to accept the state’s offer of a life sentence on the mistaken theory that Idaho’s death penalty scheme would later be found unconstitutional. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed on the pre-trial claim in mid-2006, requiring the state to release Hoffman unless officials offered him the original plea bargain. Idaho appealed, and the Court granted certiorari on November 5.

In the motion to vacate and dismiss, Hoffman’s lawyers say the inmate wished to withdraw the pre-trial ineffective assistance claim in order to proceed with the resentencing originally ordered by the federal habeas court for the penalty phase ineffective assistance claim. According to the motion, a status conference is set for December 13 before an Idaho state judge. Joan Fisher of the Federal Public Defender’s office in Idaho wrote that Hoffman made his decision “[a]fter extensive consultations with counsel,” and that his “trial and habeas counsel fully concur with his decision.”

I wonder what made him decide to do this. It’s not like the State was arguing that the death penalty should be re-imposed. Anyone have any ideas?

It’s disappointing that this may not be heard. The issue was truly interesting and I would have liked to see what today’s justices had to say about it.

More opinions than you can shake a stick at and yet not a single win. Not one good thing for defendants. Well that’s not true. There’s one nice footnote. Let’s get to that first.

In State v. Carmona, the Court denied an appeal from (stay with me here) the trial court’s denial of a Motion to Correct. A Mtn to Correct is CT’s procedural vehicle for raising certain claims before bringing them via a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Mr. Carmona claimed that the State breached his plea agreement and that the DOC’s application of jail credit violated double jeopardy. The trial court (and the State) both said that the habeas court was the appropriate place to raise those claims.

What brings joy, however, is that apparently the State, in the habeas court, claimed procedural default for not raising these claims in the trial court! The State’s position, essentially, was: Can’t go to the trial court because you should go to the habeas court and you can’t go to habeas court because you should go to the trial court, where you can’t go because you….well, you get it. The Appellate Court dropped this gem:

Despite that representation to this court, in her return to the defendant’s amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed during the pendency of this appeal, the commissioner of correction nevertheless has alleged a procedural default on the part of the defendant for his alleged failure to appeal from the trial court’s ruling on the motion to correct his sentence in the present case. We find that incongruity troubling.

Next comes State v. Hannah, in which the defendant claimed that the court erred in not admitting two recorded phone conversations that proved his innocence. The court found that the defendant did not create an adequate record by not transcribing the phone conversations, so it could not review the claim. It is notable because some of the participants have nicknames like “Too Cool” and “Wheatie”.

The next loss is State v. David O, in which the defendant claimed prosecutorial misconduct impropriety. The claim was that the prosecutor talked about the law and appealed to the jury’s emotions. You know how this ends.

In the first of the habeas cases (and the summary dismissals), Bowens v. Comm’r, the court found that the habeas court’s decision to deny cert. to appeal was not an abuse of discretion. That’s when I stopped reading. That’s when you should, too.

In another habeas case, Madagoski v. Comm’r, the petitioner claimed that he was denied his right to Due Process because the state didn’t preserve the evidence, namely a van, indefinitely. The Court couldn’t even find that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying cert. to appeal.

Back to the direct appeals. In State v. Ruben T, the defendant was tried before a three-judge panel. He claimed that the panel incorrectly found that he had not proven EED and also erroneously admitted testimony under the state of mind exception to hearsay. The panel found (and was affirmed) that the defendant’s loss of self-control was not caused by ‘‘an extremely unusual and overwhelming state that was not mere annoyance or unhappiness.’’

Back to habeas. In Wooten v. Comm’r, the petitioner raised ex-post facto, equal protection and separation of powers challenges to the retroactive application of a judicial decision interpreting a jail credit statute. Quite summarily denied. Which is disappointing, because there are about 5600 inmates affected by this retroactive application.

Finally, in State v. Valentin, the claim was that the judge inadequately charged the jury on self-defense and on reasonable doubt. The claim was rejected because it was not preserved and it did not rise to one of Constitutional magnitude.

But that’s only 8, you say! That is correct. The other three were disposed of with Memorandum Decisions. Which basically means an opinion wouldn’t have been worth the paper it was written on. Or that they didn’t want to spend the time it would have taken to print the opinion discussing it.

By the way, if you’re a public defender in CT, you need to check out the revitalized New Case News. The powers that be (you know who I’m talking about) have done a terrific job with it.