Category Archives: ct state law

Guilt by association and retconning reality

[This is going to be a lengthy post, so bear with me, but you must read it in its entirety. This has tremendous implications for those who are concerned about the imbalance of power in our society, especially when it comes to the ever-increasing encroachment of the government into our civil liberties and the already alarming abuse of power against minorities.]

I’m going to posit two scenarios. First, imagine you are walking down a public street with your friend. You’re both on your way to the local grocery store to buy some hummus. The police pull up, take a look at you friend and mistakenly believe that he’s a notorious wanted criminal. They order him to stop. You, not wanting to be caught up in this police business, keep walking, but they order you to stop, even though they don’t know you, don’t suspect you and you haven’t done anything wrong. You have rights, dammit and you know the Fourth Amendment. Can they stop you and force you to give up your freedom?

The second is this: what I’ve just described above is a version of the events that transpired. They’re “facts” in a sense that they’re your recitation of the events. But that’s obviously not good enough, right? There is another version – that of the police officers. So who gets to decide which is the “truth”? Which is believable and accurate and should be relied upon? Because – and this is critical – the law is entirely fact-dependent. How the law applies depends on the nuances of the factual scenarios. And that is left entirely up to the trial judge: the judge that hears the evidence from you and the police officers and then decides what “actually” happened. That’s called fact-finding and will only be overturned if “clearly erroneous”. Meaning almost never. There is a deified deference paid to the trial court’s “findings of fact”.

This is all important, as you will see in a second, because the Connecticut Supreme Court yesterday [PDF] in State v. Jeremy Kelly, in its ever expanding love-affair with convictions and a not-so-shocking-anymore disregard for Constitutional protections, engaged in some blatant retconning of “factual findings” with the help of the trial judge to ensure that the “facts” supported their interpretation which supported a conviction.

But first:

You can now be legally detained/seized/stopped on a street by police even if they have absolutely no reason to stop you.

As I wrote in my preview post and then the argument recap post, the police and the prosecution in the State of Connecticut were seeking extraordinary authority to detain/seize anyone lawfully walking down the street in a public place in Connecticut, if they believed that people in the vicinity may have committed a crime. One of the bulwarks of the Fourth Amendment protection is that the police need something called particularized suspicion, meaning that they need to have some evidence to believe that you have committed a crime in order to stop you.

This opinion does away with that. In fact, the police don’t even have to be correct about the person in your vicinity they are seeking to stop. In Kelly, the opinion at issue, they had the wrong guy they wanted to stop. In other words, they completely botched their job and as a result, we’ve all lost our ability to freely walk down the street without being forced to submit to police authority for no reason at all.

In some other countries, we call that martial law. In America, we call that officer safety.

I would encourage you to read the masterful dissent [PDF] that lays waste to all the majority’s purported “reasoning”. Here’s a sample:

I agree with the majority that the police have a legitimate interest in protecting themselves. There must be, however, some restrictions placed on the intent. In my view, there are several potential unconscionable ramifications to the majority opinion. For instance, if a suspect with an outstanding warrant is talking to his neighbor’s family near the property line, can the police now detain the entire family as part of the encounter with the suspect? If the suspect is waiting at a bus stop with six other strangers, can they all be detained? If the same suspect is observed leaving a house and stopped in the front yard, can the police now seize everyone in the house to ensure that no one will shoot them while they question the suspect? What if the suspect is detained in a neighborhood known to have a high incident of crime, can the police now seize everyone in the entire neighborhood to ensure their safety while they detain the suspect? There simply is no definition of who is a ‘‘companion’’ in the majority opinion. I would  require more than mere ‘‘guilt by association.’’ Ever mindful of Franklin’s admonition, we cannot use the omnipresent specter of safety as a guise to authorize government intrusion. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

Oceania has always been at war with Eastasia

What problem is?

What problem is?

As mentioned above, one of the chief conceits in the legal system is that facts exist not as they are, but as a judge or jury finds them to be. This has great value in the way our system operates because it defines a universe according to rules of evidence and the primary goal is to ensure reliability.

In recent months, the Connecticut Supreme Court has shown a greater willingness, on appeal, to consider legal arguments that were not raised before. While this has raised some hackles, I generally view it as a good move.

Never before, in my opinion, however, has the Court engaged in retroactive fact-finding. So here’s the setup from the majority opinion:

The defendant next claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court properly had found that Detective Rivera and Lieutenant Angeles were justified in detaining the defendant because they had a reasonable concern for their safety. In support of this claim, the defendant asserts that the trial court’s conclusion was based on clearly erroneous factual findings and, further, that the Appellate Court ignored those erroneous findings and improperly upheld the trial court’s ruling on the basis of facts that the trial court never found.

In other words, the trial court, in finding the need for officer safety, relied on clearly erroneous fact A and then, the Appellate Court ignored the trial court’s error as to fact A and instead said that the trial court was correct because of fact B. The trial court had never explicitly considered fact B.

You will have guessed by now that both fact A and fact B support a conviction.

In support of the finding of officer safety, the trial judge found that the guy the police were looking for (who, of course, was neither of the guys stopped) had a felony warrant for possession of a firearm, and that’s it.

The Appellate Court found that the stop was justified because of the felony warrant for a firearm and credible evidence that the guy they were looking for was armed and dangerous, a fact omitted by the trial court.

The Supreme Court had to agree that the “felony possession of a firearm” factual finding was clearly erroneous because no witness testified as to those words. It was, in fact, a warrant for a violation of probation.

But here’s where it gets weird. After the case was argued in the Supreme Court, they send a letter to the trial judge and asked:

  1. Did you mean felony warrant for violation of probation?

  2. Did you consider the evidence that they received a tip that the guy was armed and dangerous?

The answers, of course, to both were yes, despite there being absolutely no evidence of that in the trial court’s ruling.

It is certainly very curious that the Supreme Court would take the extraordinary step of clarifying “factual findings” by the trial court in an effort to support the conviction, when the clear record below – the words said by the judge in open court – would support a reversal.

This is highly unusual and should trouble everyone. I’m not assuming that there was anything malicious about it – that would be ridiculous – but even with a benign intent to “get to the truth” or whatever you want to call it, giving a trial judge an opportunity to change his responses in order to conform them to what the Supreme Court is clearly looking for really undermines faith in the process and the system.

Where does it stop? Are facts only facts as long as they’re convenient? Are rights only rights as long as they don’t get in the way of governmental authority?

Oh, right.

Oceania has always been at war with Eastasia.

Connecticut still lacking in its treatment of children

My latest at the CT Law Tribune is up and it focuses on the disparate treatment of children when they come into contact with the criminal justice system and we suddenly treat them as the “other” criminal, and not the children that they are.

The column focuses on three areas of injustice:

1. The legislature’s failure to enact legislation in light of Miller v. Alabama that not only eliminates LWPOR as a mandatory punishment but also provides a second chance for all juvenile to demonstrate their rehabilitation.

2. The legislature’s completely blockheaded legislation of years past that vested only the prosecutor with the power to return cases to the juvenile docket and their seemingly oblivious decision to enact harsh mandatory-minimum sentences, which would then apply to these 14 year olds automatically transferred to adult court.

3. The legislature’s failure to correct an incongruence in the juvenile statutes that prohibits the use of statements taken from juveniles without parents or guardians present, but if the case gets transferred to adult court, then that very same statement is somehow now admissible as evidence of guilt.

And, as if on cue, here’s a great photo series in Time magazine focusing on the story of one family’s loss to juvenile incarceration.

The Unexamined Trial

A free people [claim] their rights as derived from the laws of nature, and not as the gift of their chief magistrate.

So wrote Thomas Jefferson in 1774, foreshadowing his more famous quote about the “inherent and inalienable rights” of men, in the Declaration of Independence.

To me, what Jefferson meant by that is that we, as humans and citizens of a great free democracy have certain inherent rights that are ours by the very nature of our existence and these rights are not dependent upon the charity of ministers, politicians and judges.

Yet, for the most part, the realm of criminal law has continually drifted away from this Jeffersonian concept of “self-executing” rights and toward a more passive, dormant view of individual liberties and freedoms that need to be invoked to be awakened into performing their duties as our guardians. The right to remain silent now only applies if you break that silence and state out loud that you wish to remain quiet. The right to an attorney has to be unequivocally and explicitly invoked. The police cannot enter your home without a warrant except when they can and may do so even over your objection.

There is, then, a new generation of jurisprudence that has turned our jurists into something akin to DMV clerks whose primary function is to determine whether the forms have been filled out correctly.

But for those that don’t practice criminal law, let President Jefferson remind you why you should care:

What is true of every member of the society, individually, is true of them all collectively; since the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum of the rights of the individuals.

It is thus critical that each and every one of us is aware of the ministerial treatment given to our rights. And the primary way in which courts have done that is to make the defense attorney the steward of those rights and placed her in the driver’s seat.

Of course that makes sense, you will no doubt say. The attorney is in the best position to safeguard those rights and to make sure that they are exercised as needed. True, but when you change the very nature of the rights to make them not self-executing, but rather dormant, awaiting the utterance of an incantation by a defense attorney, is when you strip the judge of her traditional role of overseer of due process and justice and hand that responsibility to the defense attorney.  By shifting the responsibility of ensuring a fair trial to the defense attorney instead of the judge, you’re making jurists nothing more than glorified legal clerks.

Maybe now it’s clear that prisons aren’t the place for teenagers

20130410_jail__1

I suppose it takes a blatant misstep by a governmental agency to draw attention to any injustice and so it seems is the case with Jane Doe, the transgender self-identifying girl who has been transferred from DCF1 custody to the adult women’s prison by way of the men’s young-adult prison.

Don’t get me wrong, I’m glad that this attention is being paid to the state of our juvenile detention facilities, our prisons and their inadequacy in meeting the needs of troubled teenagers, but just remember as you read about Jane Doe and her predicament that there is probably no substantial difference between her story and that of hundreds of other teenagers in state custody other than her gender identity.

Her story, unfortunately for us in the business, is depressingly familiar:

[She] first entered [state care] at age 5 because her family members were incarcerated, sexually abusive or addicted to drugs.

Jane reports that by age 15, she had been raped dozens of times (including at facilities she was sent to live at by DCF), sold for sex, beaten up and addicted to crack cocaine.

Her behavior eventually turned violent, as chronicled by DCF, who reports that the teenager “has an extensive history of violence,” including stabbing a female peer with a fork, four assaults or threats of assault while in a pre-trial detention facility in Bridgeport, and 10 assaults on staff while at the state’s psychiatric center for children.

Another CT town will put cameras on its school buses

Apparently this is a thing. School buses are now mounting cameras on their outside to capture the license plates of cars that do not stop for the school bus.

Fine, but if you get a ticket, remember to read up on the law. For instance, revisit my post from 2008 in which I informed you that you don’t have to stop for a school bus that’s on the other side of a divided road.

Knockout bill KOs logic, advances in legislature

swing-and-a-miss

Listen, if you’re going to propose a bill that criminalizes a “trend” in assaultive behavior and you want to single out juveniles for especially harsh treatment, you better have a more concrete response than this:

Verrengia said it was difficult to determine how many of the attacks have occurred when he was asked Monday if there was any evidence suggesting that a large number have been committed by 16- or 17-year-old offenders.

“I tried to wrap my arms around it, I tried to get statistics, but it’s very difficult to do so by virtue of the present reporting requirements by various law enforcement agencies,” he said. “. . . I think if you were to ask [victims] how many assaults have there been throughout the state of Connecticut, they would say, ‘One too many.’”

You know why he couldn’t “get statistics”? Why he tried to wrap his arms of justice around this issue and failed? I mean, if the ‘knockout game’ is such a big problem that you need to specifically legislate against it in ass-backwards ways, shouldn’t the statistics be abundant? Shouldn’t there be data flowing out your rear hole?

Revenge porn bill makes it to senate: better but still unconstitutional

The Connecticut judiciary committee has voted by a margin of 39-11 to send that awful ‘revenge porn’ bill that I warned you about to the full senate. Except they’ve made a change or two to the bill that makes it better than before but still, in my opinion, quite damn unconstitutional.