Category Archives: aro

Because restrict does not mean disseminate

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Everyone knows that a sex offender registry exists. Almost everyone knows where to find it online. People use it routinely, even if just for fun. You log on and you search for your town and you see all the creepy people living around you. You may know some of them.

And almost everyone knows that there’s a second “secret” registry. A registry of a much smaller number of individuals, who are permitted to have their names removed from the aforementioned “public” registry (I put public in quotes because all conviction information, whether on the regular list or on the secret list, is still public and you can walk to your local courthouse or police department and get that information) for a variety of reasons – primarily to protect the identity of the victim. There are about 40 people on this “secret” registry. There are thousands on the “public” one.

In an important decision today, the CT Supreme Court reaffirmed that the “secret” registry must remain secret. In Dep’t of Public Safety v. FOI Commission (concurrence), a unanimous court held that “duh! do not disseminate means do not disseminate!” Of course, this all started not because Nosy Neighbor sought this information, but because a reporter did*.

A reporter for the Manchester Journal Inquirer wrote to the department of public safety and asked not for the name and address of the defendant, but basically everything else: the court of conviction, the name of the judge, the name of the prosecutor and the defense attorney. The department refused, the FOI commission ordered the department to turn it over and a trial court supported the commission’s ruling. Until the Supreme Court ruled. The question, boringly enough, turns on the meaning of the phrase “registration information”. Does that mean only the name and address of the registrant, as the newspaper argued, or everything that the department of public safety is required to catalog and maintain, as they argued?

There is no language in Megan’s Law that restricts the meaning of ‘‘registration information’’ to only some of the information in the registry.

The opinion makes the compelling point that for the “public” registry, all “registration information” is available to the public. One cannot then turn around and say that the same word, when applied to the “secret” registry means something different:

General Statutes § 54-258 (a) (1) provides in relevant part that ‘‘the registry maintained by the Department of Public Safety shall be a public record and shall be accessible to the public during normal business hours. . . .’’ There is no limiting language suggesting that only some of the information in the  registry shall be accessible to the public. Correspondingly, General Statutes § 54-258 (a) (4) provides that, ‘‘[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions  (1) and (2) of this subsection, registration information the dissemination of which has been restricted by court order pursuant to section 54- 255 and which  is not otherwise subject to disclosure, shall not be a public record . . . .’’

Because the boldface title of § 54-258 refers to the ‘‘[a]vailability of registration information,’’ we must assume that all of its subsections and subdivisions refer to the same information. Thus, we must conclude that, just as the statute provides that all of the information in the registry is accessible to the public with respect to the overwhelming majority of offenders, none of the information in the registry is accessible to the public in the very few cases in which the court determines that the information should be restricted pursuant to § 54-258  (a) (4).

Judiciary Committee co-chair Mike Lawlor, whose remark (no, that’s not a typo) during the debate on the bill is heavily relied upon by the newspaper in support of its argument, is quoted in this Courant report:

State Rep. Michal Lawlor, co-chairman of the judiciary committee and one of the architects of the online registry, said the restricted list is intended to protect victims from further trauma.

He recalled a case in which a child, under the age of 6, was molested by her father. The man went to prison; the child grew up. When the man got out, he rejoined the family and was receiving counseling. In 1998, when the Internet sex-offender registry was created, the man’s name was posted. The daughter was in high school. She was shunned from events for fear that the father would show up. His name was eventually removed from the public list.

Lawlor noted that conviction information remains available through other channels, “but our concern was to keep it off the Internet registry, where it is obviously more visible.”

(*By the way, given the amount of grief I give newspaper reports and their coverage of legal issues, it is only fair to point out that this Courant piece by Josh Kovner is concise, precise and accurate. Well done, Josh!)

It seems that the Court got the legislature’s intent right. And so the “secret” registry lives on, protecting the identities of 40 victims and allowing them and their families a fair chance at reintegrating into society and living productive lives. Now if we could only do something about those thousands others whose names and pictures are readily available at the click of a button.

Objects in mirror are as pretextual as they appear

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turn left and go directly to jail

Over 4 years ago, a police officer received an anonymous tip that Gregory Cyrus was driving home drunk. The officer followed Mr. Cyrus, but didn’t observe him driving erratically, which is a feat in of itself given the bullshit usually spewed to justify a stop. Armed with a solid anonymous tip, Mr. Police Officer was at a loss. How was he to stop and arrest this man when he wouldn’t oblige and cross a single yellow line? And then it hit him. He saw Mr. Cyrus driving with what looked like a crucifix hanging from his rear view mirror. “Aha!”, he thought to himself, “I’ve got you now, you-person-who-must-be-drunk-because-someone-told-me-so-and-not-because-I-observed-anything!”

Relying on C.G.S. 14-99(f), the trooper pulled Mr. Cyrus over and arrested him for drunken driving. “Wait, just one Constitutional second!”, said Mr. Cyrus (through his lawyers). “You didn’t have reasonable and articuble artilicuable articulable suspicion to stop me, pursuant to the remnants of Terry v. Ohio!”

A learned trial judge agreed and a former supreme court chief justice reaffirmed that decision. But in the fair not-so-Constitution-al-State (okay, I’ll stop with the hyphenation), a win for the rights of each individual is rarely safe, as there looms the spectre of an almost automatic reversal from the law and order state Supreme Court.

Not today. Not this time. In a split 4-3 decision (more on that in a bit), the highest court of the State upheld the trial and appellate courts, based essentially on one simple proposition: that a stop cannot be based on a hypothetical:

The trial court recognized that there must be more than a hypothetical possibility that the driver’s vision would be obstructed or that he would be distracted  to constitute a violation of § 14-99f (c). [Trooper] Mattioli had to have reasonably believed that the statute was being violated or was about to be violated,  and he must have been able to articulate this reasonable belief to the court. It would have been improper to conclude that Mattioli reasonably suspected  that the chain and cross hanging from the defendant’s rearview mirror was in violation of § 14-99f (c) without regard to whether there was a factual basis  for Mattioli to conclude that the defendant’s field of vision appeared to be obstructed or that the defendant appeared to be distracted by the hanging  object.

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Legal fictions: a one-way street

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The deck is stacked, the house always wins, etc., etc., etc. Phrases routinely used to indicate that the playing field is not level and is biased for one side against the other. I’ll give you another: consciousness of guilt. A legal fiction of the worst kind, to be sure. Consciousness of guilt is a neat little tactic employed by prosecutors and condoned by courts that seeks to cast every action taken by a defendant post-offense in a light most indicative of guilt.

Did the defendant realize that the justice system is a mess and he was going to get convicted no matter how innocent he was, so he took off? Consciousness of guilt. Did he lie to officers because he mistrusts them? Consciousness of guilt? Did he decline to make a decision about whether to submit to  breathalyzer until his spoke to his lawyer? Consciousness of guilt.

As you’re well aware by now, there is no presumption of innocence, just a presumption of guilt. And how does the court system solidify that presumption? By pairing it with the “guilty conscience”.

Juries routinely get instructed on “consciousness of guilt”. They are told to *wink wink* draw whatever inferences they may from the defendant’s post-offense or post-arrest conduct. But what if the tables are turned? What if there is some post-offense or post-arrest conduct that shows a defendant is not acting like a guilty person (whatever that may mean)? Of course not. Don’t be silly, this is the justice system we’re talking about. There is no such thing as “consciousness of innocence”, because innocent people don’t get arrested.

So if a defendant wants the jury to draw a favorable inference from the fact that he offered to take a polygraph, but the police refused to administer it, he’s out of luck. Or if the defendants wants to tell the jury to consider the fact that he voluntarily turned himself in (which, per the English language, is the opposite of fleeing), he can’t. If he wants the jury to draw whatever inferences they may from the fact that he asked to be submitted to a breathalyzer, he can’t, because dammit these are the rules we made and that’s that.

So Mr. Seekins’ jury gets to draw an inference from the fact that he said he wouldn’t decide whether to take a breathalyzer until he spoke to his attorney (note that he didn’t actually refuse the breathalyzer), but they can’t draw any inference from the fact that he then subsequently asked the police to administer that breathalyzer and they refused: Continue reading →

One man’s regret is another man’s disparity

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Statistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular factor entered into some decisions. There is, of course, some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury’s decision in a criminal case. There are similar risks that other kinds of prejudice will influence other criminal trials. See infra, at 315-318. The question is at what point that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable,” Turner v. Murray, 476 U. S. 28, 36, n. 8 (1986). McCleskey asks us to accept the likelihood allegedly shown by the Baldus study as the constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions. This we decline to do.

Justice Powell, writing for the majority in McCleskey v. Kemp.

["I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished."] Asked whether he would change his vote in any of the cases that had come before him, the Justice replied: “Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp.” Indeed, he added that he now found capital punishment itself unworkable and would vote against it in any case.

Justice Powell, to his biographer John C. Jeffries, from this contemporaneous account. McCleskey, courtesy of that opinion by Justice Powell, was the (pardon the pun) death knell for Constitutional challenges to the death penalty itself. Sure, in Federal courts we now challenge the method of the imposition of the death penalty, but any direct challenge to its Constitutionality is foreclosed by a cursory cite to McCleskey. McCleskey was a classic ivory tower opinion: it eschewed the actual effect of a law on the individuals of the country in favor of a more elusive “discriminatory purpose” test. A test that is simply impossible to meet. So while the evidence continues to pile up that there is a severe disparity in the application of the death penalty, the conscience of the country is placated by the hollow mantra that while that may be true, it doesn’t matter, because no State would ever intend to discriminate against minorities. The effect is an unfortunate side-effect. Continue reading →

It’s criminal!: an analysis of CT Supreme Ct opinions

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Two long years ago, on a bored Saturday afternoon, spurred by my (now AWOL) muse Miranda, I wrote this post which superficially analyzed Connecticut Supreme Court decisions. The analysis was pretty limited: how many times did the State win and how many times did the defendant win.

Well. I’ve done it again. Here is my updated count, from February 2008 to today.

In that time period, the Supreme Court decided approximately 110 cases dealing with criminal law (I’ve left out the habeas corpus cases because…well, this was fucking depressing enough. If I include habeas cases, the numbers are sure to get worse for defendants).

Of those 110 cases, an astounding 64 were direct appeals to the Supreme Court. This is either a direct appeal by statute (few) or a transfer to the Supreme Court before the Appellate Court got to decide it (many, many more than in years past).

Of those 64 direct appeals, 52 were affirmances of convictions.

Of the 46 cases that went through the Appellate Court, the State was granted cert in 28 cases, the defendant in 18 (the numbers may be off by one or two, because there were a couple of “cross-appeals”. I don’t remember how I counted them).

Of all the cases that came from the Appellate Court, the breakdown is as follows:

  • When the State appealed a reversal of a conviction, the Appellate Court was affirmed 8 times.
  • When the defendant appealed an affirmance of a conviction, the Appellate Court was affirmed 14 times.
  • When the defendant appealed an affirmance of a conviction, the Appellate Court was reversed only twice (!).

and the big kahuna:

  • When the State appealed a reversal of a conviction, the Appellate Court was reversed 21 times.

So, in 29 cases where the State appealed from the Appellate Court’s reversal of a conviction, they won 21 times, which is 75%.

The Appellate Court was reversed by the Supreme Court in 23 cases out of 46, which is a 50% failure rate.

Of the reversals, the defendant “lost” 91.3% of the time.

A conviction upheld by the Appellate Court was upheld by the Supreme Court 87.5% of the time.

A defendant was successful in the Supreme Court in only 10 out of 46 cases, which is a paltry 21% success rate.

[Keep in mind that I have included partial wins as wins.]

Overall, out of the 110 criminal-ish cases considered by the Supreme Court, the defendant was ultimately successful in getting either an acquittal or new trial in 22 cases, which is a 20% rate of success. By contrast, the State “won” in 80% of all cases considered by the Supreme Court.

Also keep in mind that over the course of the last two plus years, the Supreme Court has issued some very, very bad decisions and one or two good decisions, which they promptly started to roll back.

Liberal, defendant-loving judges indeed. Welcome to Connecticut, the Texas of the Northeast.

http://apublicdefender.com/2008/02/02/superficial-analysis-of-ct-supreme-court-decisions/

Where have you gone, Justice Berdon? Part Two

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From State v. Juan V, issued yesterday. Berdon, J., dissenting:

This is a difficult case, not because of the applicable law, but because it involves allegations of sexual assault and abuse of J, a four year old child, allegedly perpetrated by the defendant, Juan V., her grandfather, the  thought of which would arouse the emotions of anyone. But we are a nation of laws, and a jury must decide the guilt or innocence of a defendant on the basis of legally admissible evidence. In such cases, it is the duty of this court to rule on claimed errors even when its decision would result in a new trial. In the present case, I believe that the trial court committed error, that the defendant’s conviction of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child should be reversed and that a new trial should be ordered on both counts.

and:

I am bewildered by the majority’s footnote six. First, Berrien referred clearly to ‘‘the interview.’’ He did not state ‘‘in an interview.’’ I hope that we can all agree that J was interviewed only once at the advocacy center and that this interview was conducted by Agudelo. Second, it is clearly indicated to the reader that I added ‘‘with Agudelo’’ by placing that phrase in brackets. No matter how the phrase is read, Berrien was in essence writing that J’s statement in the interview was credible. By doing so, Berrien overstepped the limits imposed on expert testimony and invaded the factfinding province of the jury.

It must be St. Paddy’s Day – ARO 3/17/08

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I felt like I was drunk this morning (or was it the judges?) when I read the Advance Release Opinions around noon. For there are not one, not two, but three reversals today (and three dissents!).

Goldmine.

First up, from the Supreme Court, State v. T.D.M.. This was a 5-2, after an en banc hearing. On appeal, the defendant claimed that he was not adequately canvassed during his waiver for counsel, the judge improperly charged the jury, he was deprived of due process when the police failed to take adequate steps to locate him and the prosecutor engaged in impropriety during trial.

The Court reversed the conviction on the first claim, addressed the next two (denying them) and did not address the fourth. The thrust of the inadequate canvass claim was that at no point was he told of the consequences of his conviction, i.e., the maximum penalty he could be subject to.

In the present case, as in Diaz, there is simply no evidence present in the record from which we could infer that the defendant had any meaningful appreciation of the period of incarceration he faced if convicted of the charges he faced. ‘‘In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the defendant ‘received a realistic picture from [the court] regarding the magnitude of his decision [to proceed to trial without counsel].’ United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1028, 119 S. Ct. 2380, 144 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1999). In other words, the record does not establish that the defendant ‘knew what he [was] doing and [that] his choice [was] made with eyes open,’ as the constitution requires. . . . State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 828, 661 A.2d 539 (1995), quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975).’’ State v. Diaz, supra, 274 Conn. 833–34.

There is a dissent.

Moving to the Appellate Court, another reversal in State v. Wade. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree (evincing extreme indifference to life) for being unbelievably high and consuming some really, really dangerous drugs and providing them to the victim, who was also unbelievably high and consuming really, really dangerous drugs. (I mean, some of this stuff is NUTS.)

The court, however, found that the State could not prove that the actions of the defendant were knowingly reckless:

The state claims that it is common knowledge that prescription medication has inherent risks and that its administration, therefore, must be overseen by a physician. The state also argues that it is common knowledge that taking certain medications in combination is inherently dangerous. The state, therefore, concludes that a reasonable person would not give another person either a combination of medications or multiple dosages of them over a short period of time because doing so creates a substantial risk of death.We are not persuaded that the average person knows the potentially toxic effects of Methadose and fentanyl taken individually or in combination. Moreover, the circumstance in which the defendant gave the victim the medications was one in which the participants voluntarily sought and took medications and illegal substances in large quantities.

The Court reverses the conviction and orders entry of a judgment of conviction of manslaughter in the second degree, as an LIO.

The third, and final, reversal comes in State v. Martinez. The claim raised on appeal was that the trial court improperly declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of prior sexual conduct of the victim. The court holds that the defendant produced sufficient evidence for the trial court to be able to determine whether the prior sexual conduct was relevant to the issues at trial and fit within one of the exceptions to the rape shield law.

After an examination of the record, we conclude that the police reports provided sufficient proof for the court to be able to determine that J’s prior sexual conduct was relevant to whether the defendant had used force in sexually assaulting J. If the defendant had been able to establish that J’s brother did not use force, he might have been able to cast reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant had used force in having sex with J. Because we conclude that J’s prior sexual conduct was relevant to whether the defendant used force in committing the sexual assault, we do not need to address whether it was relevant to J’s credibility, as the defendant argues.

There is a very lengthy dissent. I expect cert to be granted in this case.

Moving to the losses, first we have State v. Kimble. Here, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, reasoning that gun that was found in a rental car was in plain sight and that the defendant had no standing to challenge any search, because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The defendant also claimed that the gun was the illegal fruit of an illegal detention. This claim was analyzed under the State Constitution, which has been held to provide greater protection. Even then, the claim failed. The defendant claimed that the detention started when the officers approached him and his co-d sitting in the car (I’m simplifying it here). The State claimed that the detention commenced when the defendant fled from the car and the officer pursued him, because at that time, the officer had R & AS that criminal activity was afoot. The Court agrees with the State.

Then there’s State v. Betancourt, which is a sufficiency of evidence and prosecutorial misconduct claim. It is really boring. Read it if you want.

In State v. Devivo, the defendant finished his sentence and probation and then moved to vacate his guilty plea. Since there is no statutory or common law authority for the trial court to entertain such a motion at that stage, the court rightly dismissed it. He then asked the Appellate Court to exercise its supervisory authority to review the claim. The court tried hard not to laugh.

In the lone habeas appeal, Dawson v. Comm’r, the defendant claims that the habeas court incorrectly found that he’d violated the terms of his plea agreement, among other things.  The defendant had pled under what is known as a Garvin plea in CT. Basically, the defendant agrees to a sentence, postpones sentencing on the condition that he shows up for sentencing and if he does, he gets that deal (another frequent condition is to avoid arrest). If he does not show up or gets arrested, the judge may impose up to the statutory maximum.  Here, the defendant didn’t show up at 10, but rather at some point between 10:55 and 2:00pm. The trial court found that he had violated the terms of the Garvin plea and thus imposed a stricter sentence. The Appellate Court affirmed.

That took way too long.