Archive for August 2, 2010

Legal fictions: a one-way street

The deck is stacked, the house always wins, etc., etc., etc. Phrases routinely used to indicate that the playing field is not level and is biased for one side against the other. I’ll give you another: consciousness of guilt. A legal fiction of the worst kind, to be sure. Consciousness of guilt is a neat little tactic employed by prosecutors and condoned by courts that seeks to cast every action taken by a defendant post-offense in a light most indicative of guilt.

Did the defendant realize that the justice system is a mess and he was going to get convicted no matter how innocent he was, so he took off? Consciousness of guilt. Did he lie to officers because he mistrusts them? Consciousness of guilt? Did he decline to make a decision about whether to submit to  breathalyzer until his spoke to his lawyer? Consciousness of guilt.

As you’re well aware by now, there is no presumption of innocence, just a presumption of guilt. And how does the court system solidify that presumption? By pairing it with the “guilty conscience”.

Juries routinely get instructed on “consciousness of guilt”. They are told to *wink wink* draw whatever inferences they may from the defendant’s post-offense or post-arrest conduct. But what if the tables are turned? What if there is some post-offense or post-arrest conduct that shows a defendant is not acting like a guilty person (whatever that may mean)? Of course not. Don’t be silly, this is the justice system we’re talking about. There is no such thing as “consciousness of innocence”, because innocent people don’t get arrested.

So if a defendant wants the jury to draw a favorable inference from the fact that he offered to take a polygraph, but the police refused to administer it, he’s out of luck. Or if the defendants wants to tell the jury to consider the fact that he voluntarily turned himself in (which, per the English language, is the opposite of fleeing), he can’t. If he wants the jury to draw whatever inferences they may from the fact that he asked to be submitted to a breathalyzer, he can’t, because dammit these are the rules we made and that’s that.

So Mr. Seekins’ jury gets to draw an inference from the fact that he said he wouldn’t decide whether to take a breathalyzer until he spoke to his attorney (note that he didn’t actually refuse the breathalyzer), but they can’t draw any inference from the fact that he then subsequently asked the police to administer that breathalyzer and they refused:

One man’s regret is another man’s disparity

Statistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular factor entered into some decisions. There is, of course, some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury’s decision in a criminal case. There are similar risks that other kinds of prejudice will influence other criminal trials. See infra, at 315-318. The question is at what point that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable,” Turner v. Murray, 476 U. S. 28, 36, n. 8 (1986). McCleskey asks us to accept the likelihood allegedly shown by the Baldus study as the constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions. This we decline to do.

Justice Powell, writing for the majority in McCleskey v. Kemp.

["I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished."] Asked whether he would change his vote in any of the cases that had come before him, the Justice replied: “Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp.” Indeed, he added that he now found capital punishment itself unworkable and would vote against it in any case.

Justice Powell, to his biographer John C. Jeffries, from this contemporaneous account. McCleskey, courtesy of that opinion by Justice Powell, was the (pardon the pun) death knell for Constitutional challenges to the death penalty itself. Sure, in Federal courts we now challenge the method of the imposition of the death penalty, but any direct challenge to its Constitutionality is foreclosed by a cursory cite to McCleskey. McCleskey was a classic ivory tower opinion: it eschewed the actual effect of a law on the individuals of the country in favor of a more elusive “discriminatory purpose” test. A test that is simply impossible to meet. So while the evidence continues to pile up that there is a severe disparity in the application of the death penalty, the conscience of the country is placated by the hollow mantra that while that may be true, it doesn’t matter, because no State would ever intend to discriminate against minorities. The effect is an unfortunate side-effect.

Gun-waving cop has right to privacy

is that a gun in your hand or are you just happy to see me?

This incident occurred back in April, but is back in the news with an ACLU press release. The ACLU is representing Anthony Graber…well, you know what? Just watch:

That’s Graber, on the motorbike, and that’s Joseph David Uhler, gun-waving, taking-too-long-to-identify-himself, plain-clothed, unmarked-car-driving, off-duty, state police officer.

Graber got a ticket for speeding, which he gladly accepted, but was then subject to some Apple Gestapo tactics, with police getting a warrant to search his home and seize his computers.

He’s charged with illegally recording the conversation he had with the officer in public and thus violating the officer’s right to have a private conversation while waving a gun at a suspect and yelling at him on the offramp of an exit off the major interstate in the country, which is nonsense code for cops are above the law. Plus the fact that there’s a damn video camera stuck to the guy’s helmet.

Popehat (and the multitude of comments) covered this back in April, with an in-depth analysis. I won’t repeat it here, but I’ll give you this extract:

Allegedly, Graber is being charged with “interception of an oral communication” under Maryland’s “wiretap” law, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. §10-402. The law makes it a felony to “intercept” with an “electronic device,” in this case the microphone attached to Graber’s prominent helmet camera, an oral communication in private conversation.

But that isn’t what Graber’s really being prosecuted for.  He’s being prosecuted for contempt of cop.  For embarrassing a cop.  A cop, and a department, that richly deserve the embarrassment they’ve gotten, and the embarrassment they’re going to receive.

Because the charge against Graber is utterly unfounded.  The definition of “oral communication” under Maryland’s wiretap law requires that the conversation be “private,” which is to say that it must be one in which the party being recorded has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Fearnow v. C & P Telephone Co., 104 Md. App. 1, 33, 655 A.2d 1 (1995), aff’d, 342 Md. 363, 676 A.2d 65 (1996).  According to the Maryland Attorney General’s office, it is not a crime to record a very public conversation, such as a political party meeting, even in secret.

It seems that Graber is not alone in this. Here‘s another recent arrest for the same charge, also in Maryland. Of course, law enforcement types are always good for some lulz:

Remarkably, the state Attorney General has already opined that when police record in public, that is not a private conversation subject to the same laws. In other words, in any public interaction between a police officer and a member of the public in Maryland, it is private for one of them but not the other.

I know most law enforcement agencies are opposed to videotaping interrogations, but this is a little ridiculous.

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