Archive for March 24, 2009

WHAT THE HELL IS THIS? SHOW ME THE REST OF THE POST!

The resulting definition that long has been in use has its origins in State v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 403, 6 A.2d 359 (1939), an appeal in which this court approved the following jury instruction explaining what it meant to operate a vehicle: ‘‘A person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of [the] statute, when in the vehicle he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle.’’

Adoption of that definition established, and subsequent cases confirmed, that the term ‘‘ ‘operating’ encompasses a broader range of conduct than does [the term] ‘driving.’ ’’ State v. Haight, supra, 279 Conn. 551. After a number of decisions made clear that sitting at the wheel of a nonmoving vehicle with the engine running constituted operation; see, e.g., State v. Wiggs, 60 Conn. App. 551, 554–55 (2000); State v. Marquis, 24 Conn. App. 467, 468–69 (1991); State v. Ducatt, 22 Conn. App. 88, 93, cert. denied, 217 Conn. 804 (1990); the question arose whether the definition could be satisfied when a defendant had been seated in a vehicle that neither was in motion nor had its motor running. See State v. Haight, supra, 552. In Haight, this court concluded that it could. Specifically, we held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a prosecution under § 14-227a (a) when the defendant was found sleeping in the driver’s seat of his legally parked vehicle, with the key in the ignition9 and the headlights illuminated, but without the motor running. Id., 547. We explained: ‘‘The act of inserting the key into the ignition and the act of turning the key within the ignition are preliminary to starting the vehicle’s motor. Each act, in sequence with other steps, will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle. . . . Each act therefore constitutes operation of the vehicle under the definition set forth in Swift.’’ Id., 553.

So, if it’s illegal to sit in a car, with the key in the ignition, without the motor running, Cyr stood no chance. The Court has really outdone itself this time and its illogical reasoning in this case is evident. The Court is jumping through untenable hoops to reach this absurd conclusion. Imagine if this line of cases were pro-defendant. The horror.

What, exactly, would not constitute “any act which alone or in sequence will set it motion the motive power of the vehicle”? Opening the door? No, I don’t think so. Walking to the car? Perhaps.

What this does, in reality, is remove any incentive for people to not drive. Why would you sit in your car when you can be convicted of DUI just the same as if you drove home? I mean, if you can’t even turn on the battery to get some heat, what’s the point?

So what is one to do, besides abstain from drinking? Turn on the heat and sit in the passenger seat with the keys in the trunk? Perhaps, but I wouldn’t bet my law license on it. Leave you keys with you, but you can’t turn the car on. Preferably sit in the back seat and always keep a blanket around or take your chances with the weather.

I think “activist” is a fair term here.

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