Man-Min sentences for juves: no (constitutional) problem

It was a longshot, but by definition, it means that it was worth a shot. The CT Supreme Court recently held in State v. Carrasquillo that mandatory-minimum sentences for juvenile offenders don’t violate the Eight Amendment to the Constitution. This properly should be considered a companion case to the “Life without parole is not cruel and unusual” decision from a few months ago (my post on that decision here).

Like the previous case, the defendant in this case relies heavily on Roper v. Simmons. The defendant argued that juvenile possess characteristics different from adults that make the application of a mandatory-minimum sentence unconstitutional. The defendant did not argue that juveniles cannot be sentenced to 30, 40 or even 50 years in prison, but that a sentencing scheme that deprives a judge the ability to take into consideration the mental development of a teen and sentence less than 25 years is cruel and unusual punishment.

Once again, the court relies on a tested phrase to justify its decision: death is different. Roper spoke only to death, not to any other punishment and thus is inapplicable.

This, in my opinion, is too literal a reading of Roper. While Roper may have dealt only with the death penalty, the studies cited in Roper should have some applicability in the general field of juvenile punishment.

The argument in support of the defendant’s claim is this:

[N]ew technologies have revealed significant differences between the adolescent brain and the adult brain, including differences in psychosocial functioning. [A]dolescents are more readily influenced by their peers and have different attitudes toward risk and risk taking, with less orientation toward the future than adults. [T]he defendant was a typical  teenager who still exhibited methods of thinking characteristic of an adolescent. [A]lthough the legal system considers a defendant’s actions in light of what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances, an adolescent’s actions should be measured against what a reasonable adolescent would do under the circumstances.

If an adolescent cannot fully comprehend the actions he has taken, if he is prone to growth and further understanding of his actions and development of his moral compass, then a mandatory-minimum sentence of 25 years, to be imposed in every single case, regardless of what the individual circumstances are, can start to seem cruel and unusual.

By mandating that a juvenile automatically be sentenced to 25 years, we are snuffing out any chance at rehabilitation; any glimmer of hope that the adolescent mind grows and learns and can become a contributing member of society is snuffed. Much like the life that the juvenile took away, his life will also be wasted.

There is a significant difference between an adolescent spending 10 years in jail and being released at 25 and spending 25 years in jail and being released at 40. What is he to do at 40, having spent half his teenage years, his entire 20s and 30s in prison? Will he have any tools or skills to succeed in life? Will he know anything of life?

Some cases might definitely warrant long sentences of juvenile offenders. But certainly not all, and that is what this statute does. It does not discern between the still forming adolescent mind that has a chance to fully develop a sense of right and wrong and one that has and makes a decision cognizant of the consequences.