I’m awfully late to this dance, but as a criminal law blog, I might as well shut down completely if I don’t post about Herring. As you may be aware, this past week SCOTUS held in a 5-4 decision that mere negliglence doesn’t require the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a 4th Amendment violation.

Some have called it the death of the exclusionary rule (or certainly the death knell) and others don’t think it’s such a big deal.

The underlying premise of this decision can be traced, in part, to the “good faith” exception enunciated in United States v. Leon. In Leon:

The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. The exclusionary rule, argued the majority, is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. In Leon, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon, where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.

Herring furthers that proposition by holding that mere negligence of a police department does not trigger the exlusionary rule and thus the evidence seized as a result of an arrest made based on a mistake should be admissible.

If you’re not from CT, you can weep now. Those of you in CT don’t have any reason to be particularly concerned about Herring. This is because, in CT, there is no “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule.

19 years ago, our supreme court considered Leon and its application in CT and decided that under the CT constitution, there is no such thing. The issue came before the august tribunal after two rounds of apeals and an adoption of Leon by the Appellate Court, in State v. Marsala. In Marsala:

the trial court issued a written decision in compliance with the directive of the Appellate Court  to make four specific determinations. The trial court concluded: (1) “the affiants did not mislead the issuing judge”; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); (2) there was “no evidence that the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role”; see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); (3) “the police officers did have a reasonable belief that the warrant was valid”; see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); and (4) “the warrant was not so facially deficient in its lack of particularity, regarding the place to be searched or the articles to be seized, that the executing officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid.” See United States v. Leon, supra, 923. In his appeal from this decision, the defendant did not contest the trial court’s first, second or fourth conclusions. State v. Marsala, 19 Conn. App. 478, 480 (1989)

The Court then turned to the question du jour: Whether Article 1, Section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution provides for a good faith exception. Justice Shea and the full panel of supreme court justices simply declined to adopt Leon. Writing for an unanimous court, Justice Shea opined:

Although we recognize that the exclusionary rule exacts a certain “cost” from society in the form of the suppression of relevant evidence in criminal trials, we conclude, nevertheless, that this “cost” is not sufficiently “substantial” to overcome the benefits to be gained by our disavowal of the Leon court’s good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We base this conclusion on both the criticism leveled against the Leon opinion itself and our willingness in other areas of the law to uphold the exclusion of concededly reliable and relevant evidence on the basis of some greater benefit that will be realized by its suppression. Thus, for example, an otherwise voluntary and reliable confession is excluded from a criminal trial on the basis of a violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), an exclusionary rule that we have adopted as an interpretation of the due process clause contained in article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. See, e.g., State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 447 (1987); State v. Brown, 199 Conn. 47, 51 n.3 (1986); State v. Ferrell, 191 Conn. 37, 45 n.12 (1983).

The Court relied heavily on the dissent in Leon and the subsequent criticism of it to reject the good faith exception:

We simply cannot accept the conclusion reached by the Leon court as a result of its weighing of the relevant costs and benefits of excluding evidence obtained through police officers’ good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a detached and neutral judicial official. Initially, we note that the exclusionaryrule, although primarily directed at police misconduct, is also appropriately directed at the warrant issuing process, and that “it is somewhat odd to suppose that the exclusionary rule was not designed to deter the issuance of invalid warrants.” S. Wasserstrom & W. Mertens, supra, 106. Just as with the fourth amendment, when article first, § 7, of our state constitution was adopted, “its purpose plainly was to prohibit the issuance of warrants that did not satisfy its requirements of probable cause and particularity.” 12 Id. The text of article first, § 7, is clear: “[N]o warrant . . . shall issue . . . without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” (Emphasis added.) While we might agree that the exclusionary rule was not  designed “to punish the errors  of judges and magistrates”; (emphasis added) United States v. Leon, supra, 916; we cannot agree that the rule as it stood before Leon was not a significant factor inducing judges to take seriously their obligation to ensure that the probable cause requirement of article first, § 7, had been met before issuing search warrants based on information contained in affidavits provided to them by police officers. We are confident that, at least in this state, search warrants failing to meet the probable cause requirement more often “result from carelessness than from intentional constitutional violations, and just as surely the exclusionary rule is logically directed to those more common violations.” 1 W. LaFave, supra, § 1.3(d), p. 55.

Over the years, I have become embroiled in several discussions with opponents of the exclusionary rule, whose primary argument is far too simplistic and myopic: The Fourth Amendment itself says nothing about the exclusion of evidence obtained via a violation of itself.

I have a hard time responding to this because on its face it makes no sense. To take the stance taken by the anti-exclusionists, one would have to believe that the Fourth Amendment reads something like this:  the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, except if you violate this provision, we will scold you, but not really do anything about the violation, so it’s okay, go ahead and subject the people to unreasonable searches and seizures. So, violate this provision. It is what future generations will call a “technicality” and really, we can’t let those criminals go free on a technicality, can we?

As for Herring, I think my position is a little closer to the doomsdayers than it is to the laissez-fairers. I suspect many defendants will be the victims of “negligence”. But if you’re in CT, you don’t have to worry about this. Unless you’re a fatalist and decide to notice that the entire bench at the time of Marsala is no longer there and we now have 7 new justices who might want to revisit it.

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