11. Be (intellectually) honest
Since the last post was mostly tongue-in-cheek, I couldn’t include #11: be honest, or intellectually honest.
The legal profession, despite the number of students graduating from law school every year, is small and insular. The local bar is small. The attorneys who practice in your given field are even smaller. And when you deal with the same attorneys over and over again, there is nothing more valuable than your reputation and your integrity.
Which is why it is imperative that you be honest. That you be intellectually honest. Opposing counsel and judges can see through your prevarication.
The law is not always friendly to you or your client or the position you want to take. It happens to all of us. That doesn’t give you a license to lie, or to make up arguments that ignore the law or the facts of the case. The hallmark of a good lawyer is the ability to take bad facts or bad law and still make a cogent, convincing argument.
The last thing you want to do is pretend that you’re right when you’re not. It’s hollow and transparent. Everyone sees through it and it’s sort of like the boy who cried wolf. No one will believe you again, even when you’re right.
It’s something Jennifer L. Smith, Associated Deputy Attorney General for the State of Tennessee would have been well served by, had she remembered it and followed it.
Smith represented Tennessee before SCOTUS yesterday in Cone v. Bell. At issue in Bell was some boring nonsense about procedural default in habeas corpus practice. But what it devolved into was a discussion of whether the State had intentionally misrepresented the status of a Brady claim to a state court and then made disingenuous arguments to cover it up later.
What happened was this: The defense, in attempting to prove mitigating factors in the penalty phase of Cone’s trial, argued that Cone was a drug user and in the throes of a drug induced psychotic state when he committed the murders. To that end, they provided testimony from two experts. The State, during cross-examination, took greats pains to point out that the experts’ only source of such addiction information was Cone himself and went to some lengths to prove that Cone was not addicted to drugs.
The only problem is that the State possessed a wealth of information that showed that Cone was indeed addicted to drugs and seemed to be in a drug induced state at the time of the murders. The only logical conclusion here is that the prosecutors intentionally did not turn over this evidence to the defense. This is where Ms. Smith starts to get into some trouble. She has hardly begun speaking when she gets hit with the first questions:
JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask — let me get something on the table. Do you agree that the evidence shows that this evidence was deliberately suppressed?
MS. SMITH: Your Honor, I don’t think there’s been any — any finding about the –
JUSTICE STEVENS: But is there any explanation for — was there any explanation for it other than the tactical explanation?
MS. SMITH: There’s no explanation in the record, there has been no finding about whether the evidence has been suppressed at all in this case because both the district court and the Sixth Circuit decided as a matter of law that the materials –
JUSTICE STEVENS: It seems to be relevant because if it was suppressed for tactical reasons, it seems to me hard to say that the prosecution thought it didn’t make any difference.
It doesn’t get any better for Ms. Smith:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you think the prosecutor had an ethical duty to turn over this material?
MS. SMITH: I think that the material — if the material — if the subject was immaterial –
JUSTICE STEVENS: It’s a simple question, yes or no?
MS. SMITH: I think that as a legal matter there was no — no need to turn it over because it was immaterial.
JUSTICE STEVENS: That’s not my question. Can you answer my question? Did he have an ethical duty to turn this material over?
MS. SMITH: I’m unaware of any ethical requirement that he turn it over, and I don’t think that — and certainly under Brady if it’s not material, we don’t think it was material, then it’s certainly not required as a constitutional matter. And the reason is not –
JUSTICE SOUTER: You believe that the materiality judgment is yours to make, the State’s to make as sort of a gate keeping measure? Isn’t the materiality an issue for the fact finder?
MS. SMITH: Well, I think it’s — it’s –
JUSTICE SOUTER: You exclude — do you believe that you can, in effect, suppress any piece of evidence on — on — on the State’s judgment that it will not prove to be material in the context of the whole case?
Yikes. But wait. There’s more. After this little subterfuge of hiding the Brady material, the State twice argued to post-conviction courts and appellate courts that the Brady issue had already been decided. When, in fact, no Court had ever actually ruled on the merits of the issue. So it was deemed procedurally defaulted.
Not content with doing that much damage, the State them proceeded to change its tact on subsequent appeals. Accepting that the issue had not actually been decided, the State then argued that the defendant had waived the issue, despite several paragraphs in the habeas corpus petition alleging the Brady violation.
Any time you get a Justice of a Supreme Court, be it state or federal, to utter the following words, you know you’ve made a misstep along the way:
JUSTICE SOUTER: Then I will be candid with you that I simply cannot follow your argument because I believe you have just made a statement to me that is utterly irrational.
…
JUSTICE BREYER: Well, “waiver,” my goodness.
Why the State feels the need to defend every action it has ever take, however wrong or contrary to the law, is beyond me. If they were being intellectually honest, they would admit previous errors and make an appropriate argument. They might lose a case or two, but they at least wouldn’t end up in the position of having their credibility questioned by Supreme Court justices.
[This is not to say that Attorney Smith herself did anything untenable. It may well be that she was handed a deck of cards that lead to this result, and had to defend the questionable actions of others. It is the institutional resistance to admitting errors that irks me.]
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about 3 years ago
Being dressed down is one thing, having it done by SCOTUS is a new ballgame. My guess is that she’s not done this only once but several times. How she managed to get to SCOTUS and do it is beyond my comprehension.
And here I thought getting a new body cavity chewed by my manager was a bad day. Wow. She’s raised the bar for all of humanity.
about 3 years ago
Yeah, it’s pretty bad. Although Tom Goldstein, representing Petitioner, didn’t fare that much better. He was getting some harsh questions, too, but at least he wasn’t intellectually dishonest. He put the problems with his case up front and confronted them.
about 3 years ago
Putting the problems w/the case up front and confronting them shows honesty. It says “yeah, there are problems and I know they are there so here is what I’ve done with them and what I’m doing to address them.”
Hello, its SCOTUS. This isn’t the County Courthouse.
Sometimes smarts don’t translate to common sense.
about 3 years ago
At the County Courthouse, reputation of a given attorney is MORE important, as the attorneys will appear again and again, and even if they go on to another job they will still be in the same bar.
At the Supreme Court, even now, with lawyers like Goldstein, most lawyers do not have a long-held reputation before the court for honesty or dishonesty. There just isn’t the caseload.
What the above case demonstrates, IMHO, is not personal honesty or dishonesty, but rather the nature of representing an institutional client. Once the line prosecutor lost control of the case, it started being about the institution’s interests, rather than that prosecutor’s credibility.
about 3 years ago
Great post Gid. I disagree with your conclusion. The resistance is not only institutional, but also personal. Think it through. Attorney Smith had options. She does not have to play every deck that the institution hands her. She could have handed it back, and said “I’m not going in there to get hosed.” Or she could have taken the deck, and, at the podium, stood on her integrity.
That would have meant keeping the thought to herself, and the plan to toss the script, wouldn’t it?
about 3 years ago
Well, we’ve all certainly been in the position where we’ve had to defend a position we’re uncomfortable with. It certainly gets more difficult to toss the script before SCOTUS.
about 3 years ago
Admitting problems with the case up front is what appellate judges expect us to do.
about 3 years ago
The transcript shows that the justices put it on the table, to coin a phrase, with their first question, through Justice Stevens: “…Do you agree that the evidence shows that this evidence was deliberately suppressed?” This is a question that the attorney and her handlers should have foreseen. “Our position is that it does not, but I see how it appears that way,” may have been a good answer.
BUT they would have gone after her with hammer and tongs anyway, which is foreseeable. This wanted a very frank discussion before the argument with her collegues who were probably in love with their case. Anyway the best answer was “Yes.”
And back home attorney Smith could shrug and say, “they put it on the table. So fire me. My integrity is important. To me!”
about 3 years ago
And this is why we should have more oral advocacy skills classes in law school.