359875172_14194d1074_b.jpgStarting…well…today, I am introducing a new feature for my CT friends who are too busy to follow the latest goings on in criminal law in the State. This Month at the Supreme Court! (trademark pending) will summarize the criminal cases scheduled for oral argument with a date and time, if you’re so inclined. Why am I doing this? Because I’m that nice.

So, without further ado (but with a drumroll, please!), here’s the docket for February 2008:

February 5 – Washington v. Commissioner: In Washington, the petitioner seems to challenge the DOC’s retroactive application of those wonderful Harris, Cox and Hunter decisions, which said that jail credit can be applied only once, even though earned on several different sentences. The blurb says there’s a due process claim and I bet it’s got to do with Bouie. Interesting, but not much general appeal.

February 7 – State v. Melendez: This is an interesting one. The state task force and DEA conducted an undercover operation. Part of that was getting an informant suited up with a video cam. The cam caught the informant and Melendez. When the tape was turned over as part of discovery, it was of really poor quality. So Melendez rejected whatever offer was on the table and chose to go to trial. At trial, however, the State engaged in some sorcery and produced a clear copy of the tape. On seeing this enhanced tape, the defendant said that the disclosure was untimely and demanded specific performance of the plea. He claims that the late disclosure deprives him of a meaningful plea bargaining process and that he should be given specific performance, among other evidentiary issues.

February 11 – State v. Griggs: The defendant was charged with assaulting a 77-yr old man that he knew and then leaving him on the floor, struggling, taking the man’s cellphone with him. The claims is whether his failure to help constitutes a substantial step sufficient to convict him of attempt. He sought to have the bill of particulars amended to omit that fact, which the judge denied. Curiously, during jury instruction, the court explained that the defendant’s failure to render assistance to the victim, in and of itself, did not constitute a substantial step planned to culminate in the commission of murder. So, who knows.

February 11 – State v. Simpson: This is a case that implicates the confrontation clause and Crawford. The accuser is a young girl who, at the time of trial, cannot remember any details. State used that to designate her “unavailable” and enter into evidence a videotaped interview with an evaluator at a guidance clinic – for substantive purposes under Whelan. The defendant claims that she had not recanted her earlier statements, her testimony was not inconsistent with her statements (requirements under Whelan), that the videotaped statement was not under circumstances assuring its reliability. He further claims that even if permissible under Whelan, it should be barred under Crawford, because it was made as part of an investigation and since she can’t remember now, she’s unavailable for cross-examination. I’m intrigued by this one.

February 14 – State v. Winer: This is another interesting case. The issue revolves around who requested a continuance that placed the case on a trial list for 3 1/2 years without any action. The trial court found that because the defendant rejected the offer and wanted to go to trial, it was placed there at his request and so it could not be dismissed due to inaction for 13 months (the requirement of the statute). The Appellate Court reversed, finding that it was the prosecutor who wanted it placed on the trial list and so reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed will decide what to do.

February 15 – State v. Jenkins: I guess this is interesting to some. On nine occasions between December, 2002, and May, 2006, the court found that the defendant was not competent but that he was restorable to competency. The defendant received inpatient treatment for three periods that totaled twenty-one months. Subsequently, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming, among other things, that his twenty-one month placement for treatment exceeded the maximum period that he could be confined because it would exceed the period of the maximum sentence which he could receive on conviction, or eighteen months, whichever is less. The court disagreed, concluding that the period of placement referred to in the statute is not a cumulative period, as the defendant argued, but rather a consecutive period. It is also an interlocutory appeal.

Well, there you go. This has been your guide to the Supreme Court this month!

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