a public defender

CDW is reporting three very interesting Florida opinions. In all three cases, a guilty verdict was overturned. In Offord v. State [pdf] (a capital case), the death sentence was overturned as disproportional.

In fact, Offord’s case is notable because it is one of the most documented cases of serious mental illness this Court has reviewed. Through the uncontradicted medical records, a picture emerges of an individual with two serious mental illnesses—schizophrenia and bipolar disorder—who has been in and out of institutions since he was just five or six years old. During a 2001 hospitalization in Texas, the staff considered Offord’s prognosis poor and predicted that he would be unable to function well outside of a facility. This proved to be an accurate assessment because Offord was admitted to hospitals numerous times during 2002, 2003, and 2004. After coming to Florida, he was admitted to Bay Behavioral four times, the last on July 4, 2004, only weeks before the murder.In addition, Offord was receiving permanent social security disability payments because of his mental illness. Although Offord also has a substance abuse problem, his medical history indicates that his mental health significantly contributed to the murder.. . .

In Kopsho [pdf], a juror who held the following beliefs was allowed to sit on the jury. Thankfully, a new trial was ordered.

Like juror Russell in Overton, Mullinax expressed a belief that the law should require a defendant to testify. Most importantly, when asked if he could set aside his personal beliefs while deliberating, Mullinax repeatedly answered that he was not sure if he could disregard a defendant’s decision not to testify. Mullinax never stated that he would be able to deliberate impartially if seated on Kopsho’s jury were Kopsho to decide not to testify. Mullinax’s consistently equivocal responses raise reasonable doubt about his fitness as a juror.

How the heck did he make it onto the jury….

Finally in Mendoza [pdf], there was a remand to conduct an IAC hearing. Counsel was alleged to have done (or not done) the following:

Mendoza asserts that his counsel was ineffective because his counsel relied on inconsistent theories as to the identity of the shooter in opening and closing statements; failed to call Lazaro Cuellar to testify; deficiently prepared the sole defense witness at trial; did not hire an investigator; failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence; improperly opened the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence; and called an improper witness at the penalty phase.

Good stuff from CDW, as always.