ACOTSOCT decisions*

Two of the other criminal law opinions issued by the ACOTSOCT are State v. Boyd and State v. Orellana.

Boyd was convicted of kidnapping in the first and assault in the third. He allegedly sexually attacked a 16 yr old who was working with him. During the course of this attack, he allegedly banged her head against the floor twice, causing her to lose consciousness both times. Subsequent events, including her being temporarily paralyzed at a volleyball game, led to his arrest.

He raised 4 issues on appeal:

I. The Court improperly deprived him of his right to cross-examine by failing to release medical records pertaining to the victim.

Lucy Puryear, a psychiatrist who had treated the victim, was called by the state as a witness and was qualified as an expert in psychiatry and neurology. Prior to her testimony, the court stated that, as discussed in a chambers conference with counsel, Puryear’s progress notes concerning the assault required redaction.

Puryear testified that she treated the victim for PTSD, with symptoms such as loss of details regarding the traumatic event and reluctance to discuss all the details at one time.

Outside of the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked Puryear about a notation in her progress notes regarding ‘‘family stressors’’ that occurred prior to the assault. These stressors involved certain difficulties facing the victim’s sibling. In Puryear’s medical opinion, these stressors had nothing to do with the victim’s recollection of the assault.

Defense counsel continued to inquire about the victim’s relationship with her family, and Puryear testified unequivocally that the victim’s familial issues were unrelated to the symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder.

The standard for determining whether medical records should be turned over was outlined in State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166. The standard is that the defendant should make a showing that the confidential information must be turned over so as to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights. If such a showing is made, the state should obtain the witness’ permission to allow the court to conduct an in camera review of the documentation and if necessary, turn it over to the defendant. If the witness does not agree, then his/her testimony must be stricken.

However, the Court noted, citing State v. Palladino, 69 Conn. App. 630, that this applies only where there is no voluntary disclosure of the records.

neither our Supreme Court nor this court has held that such an in camera review   is necessary where a victim freely gives up any rights to confidentiality that she might otherwise have

In this case, the victim orally waived her right to confidentiality and turned over the notes to the prosecutor. At that point, the notes should have been turned over to defense counsel and there was no role for the Court to play. So you’d think that the Court would agree with the defendants claim? No. They determined that failure to turn it over was harmless error.

Because the defendant took full advantage of the numerous inconsistencies with respect to the victim’s testimony, any additional attempt to impeach her credibility would have been cumulative.

II. The Court failed to strike testimony that the victim was sexually assaulted.

There was, however, no objection to the questions asked during trial and the Court found that the ruling was not a constitutional evidentiary ruling and therefore did not warrant a Golding analysis.

We previously have stated that the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law and unless there is a resultant denial of fundamental fairness or the denial of a specific constitutional right, no constitutional issue is involved.

III & IV Prosecutorial Misconduct under Brady

These claims are offshoots of the first – in that the prosecutor was in possession of exculpatory material in the expert’s reports and notes and did not turn them over to the defense. The Court holds that upon review,

we conclude that although the records contain some exculpatory evidence, they do not contain any exculpatory evidence that is material under Brady.

Next up – State v. Orellana. This seems to be a more interesting case than Boyd.
In Orellana, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell, conspiracy to sell and possession within 1500 feet of a public housing project. The facts are as follows:

A police detective, Chute, was contacted by an informant he had worked with once or twice in the past, Jusino. Jusino set up a sting with Chute and contacted the defendant to sell her 350 packets of heroin. The defendant (and a Co-D) were to deliver the drugs in a certain specific car between 5:15 and 5:30 at either one of two locations. Ofcourse, everything happened as she said and the two were arrested.

Defendant raised the following claims:
I. His motion to suppress was improperly denied.

Defendant claimed that all physical evidence seized from his car should be suppressed "as the fruits of unlawful searches and seizures". Applying the clearly erroneous standard, the court ruled that, based on Chute’s prior working relationship with Jusino, they did have probable cause based on information from a reliable informant.

Our Supreme Court has ‘‘consistently held that an informant’s record of providing information that led to arrests and seizures of contraband is sufficient to establish the reliability of the informant.’’ State v. Smith, 257 Conn. 224.

On the basis of the court’s findings concerning the events leading to the search and seizure—the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge, the police surveillance that corroborated key details about the narcotics delivery related by Jusino as well as the behavior of [Co-D] when police approached the stopped automobile —we have little difficulty in agreeing with the court’s conclusion that the police had probable cause to believe that heroin would be  found in the automobile.

II. The trial Court improperly permitted evidence of prior misconduct.

One of the defenses put forth by defense counsel was that the defendant did not know that there was heroin in the car; that he was "an innocent bystander". The counter this, the trial court permitted the state to put on evidence of past dealings between the defendant and Jusino. On appeal, the defendant argued that the "limited" probative value of this evidence was outweighed by it’s prejudicial effect. The Appellate Court disagreed,

We conclude that the court properly determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. The admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal conduct does raise concerns that a jury might misuse the evidence by considering it as evidence of a defendant’s bad character or criminal tendencies. ‘‘Proper limiting instructions often mitigate the prejudicial impact of evidence of prior misconduct.’’ State v. Ryan, 182 Conn. 335, 338 n.5, (1980).

Here, the court adequately instructed the jury as to the role the evidence was to play in its deliberations. Specifically, the court instructed the jury not to consider the evidence [...] solely as evidence of the defendant’s intent and knowledge.

*This has become a long, long post. I’ll wrap it up by simply asking a question to regular readers. Do any of you even read these summaries? I do them because they help me and I figure someone who is interested would appreciate them too. Whether you do or you don’t, please leave a comment to let me know.