Archive for March 30, 2005
Death Penalty bill fails
Mar 30th
The anti-death penalty bill, reported on here and here, has failed today in the House, falling by a vote of 89-60.
Proponents acknowledged the bill had no chance of passing but said they wanted to encourage debate. Representative Michael Lawlor, co-chairman of the judiciary committee, said today was an opportunity to think about whether the state wants to use the death penalty.But the possibility that death row inmates might be sentenced instead to life without parole angered some legislators. Among them was Representative Steven Mikutel of Griswold, whose district includes families of some of Ross’ victims. He says the death penalty is about standing up to evil. “It’s about standing up to evil,” Mikutel said. “We should treat the people on death row as enemies of the state. They should die.”
Sure it is.
Also, as expected, Vivian Dobson was present during the debate. Earlier in the day she had made a tearful appearance before television cameras.
“I’m so sorry to the parents because I lived and their babies died and I can’t change that, but I don’t want to be a part of killing somebody else. I really don’t and I don’t think we should either because that’s not what we’re here for. We are not killers, he is but we’re not,” says Dobson.
She said that to execute him would be too easy. It was better to let him suffer by keeping him alive.
“He cannot get off that easily, to put him to sleep? Just to give him a needle and put him to sleep? Do you think those girls went to sleep? Those girls didn’t go to sleep. He raped them, he embedded fear in their souls before they left this earth. What he did to me, I have to live with. I have to heal in some form or way but I would like to say to him that I don’t fear him anymore. He’s got to fear me because I’m going to stop, as much as is possible, and keep on fighting to get rid of this death penalty so he can live and think about and dwell on every little thing he’s done to those girls and what he’s done to me.”
This fight is just beginning. With Ross’ competency hearings scheduled for next month, expect this to escalate and I predict that there will be another bill introduced sooner rather than later.
Curiosity delays
Mar 30th
This has nothing to do with Criminal Law, but…
What the hell is up with curiosity delays on highways? What is this morbid fascination with car accidents. What is the utilitarian purpose in slowing down, ogling at smashed cars, creating traffic jams and then speeding up? It regularly annoys me as frequently there is no real reason for a traffic jam and yet I’m stuck in one.
No one in their right mind would stare out an airplane window to watch two airplanes in the distance crash and explode in a giant fireball, so why do we do it on highways? Can’t we just acknowledge that there is an accident, drive carefully and move on? Must we slow down to a stand-still?
Rant… rant… rant. Don’t tell me I didn’t warn you.
Admissibility of prior crimes – Appellate Court decision
Mar 30th
My eyes are bleeding (not literally) from reading transcripts, so I’m taking a little break to review an interesting appellate case:
The Connecticut Appellate Court today issued State v. Stavrakis [pdf]. The defendant, Stavrakis, raised four separate issues on appeal:
- The trial court improperly admitted evidence of prior convictions and improperly prevented defendant from cross examining victim on victim’s prior misconduct. "Evidentiary Impropriety",
- The trial court improperly instructed the jury on three issues. "Instructional Impropriety",
- Having been acquitted of a lesser included offense, the verdict of guilty was legally inconsistent. "Inconsistent Verdict" and
- Prosecutorial Misconduct
Stavrakis was convicted of Assault in the 2nd Degree, in violation of C.G.S § 53a-60 and Criminal Trespass in the 1st Degree in violation of C.G.S § 53a-107
.
He was found not guilty of Criminal Mischief in the 3rd Degree (C.G.S. §
53a-117) and Disorderly Conduct (C.G.S. § 53a-182).
The Facts:
The defendant, Michael Stavrakis, and his father became involved in an altercation with the victim, Stephen DeLuca. The altercation arose out of the father’s disapproval of a relationship between the victim and Christina Stavrakis, the defendant’s sister. During the course of the struggle, after the victim had pushed the defendant’s father through a glass panel, the defendant struck the victim over the head with a stick.
I. Evidentiary Impropriety
The defendant claimed that the trial court
improperly admitted into evidence an act of larceny that he had committed in 1988 and his conviction in 1989 for possession of narcotics with intent to sell. He argues that the court should have precluded reference to both acts of misconduct because of their
remoteness in time to the present incident. In his other evidentiary claims, he maintains that the court improperly precluded him from presenting evidence of prior violence on the part of the victim and of hospital records describing the extent of the victim’s physical injury.
Relying on State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513 (1982), the Court identified three factors for consideration when admitting prior crimes evidence:
(a) The extent of prejudice likely to arise
(b) The significance of the commission of the particular crime in indicating untruthfulness and
(c) It’s remoteness in time.
In Nardini, the State Supreme Court had adopted the 10-year rule of the FRE in determining remoteness ‘‘a rough bench mark in deciding whether trial court discretion has been abused . . . .’’ The Court ruled that his prior conviction for larceny was properly admitted, because of it’s probative value in determining the credibility of the defendant. The Court also held that the other felony conviction was too remote in time and not sufficiently probative of the crime charged in this case:
The defendant claims that the court improperly admitted into evidence his conviction for a felony that occurred thirteen years prior to the assault at issue in this case. The state concedes that this conviction, which involved the possession of narcotics, was not especially probative of the defendant’s truthfulness.
Explaining a case cited by the State, the Appellate Court stated
In State v. Askew, supra, 245 Conn. 364, 366–71, our Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion where the trial court admitted evidence of a criminal defendant’s conviction for felony larceny that exceeded the ten year benchmark by a mere seven months. This case differs from Askew in that, here, the defendant’s conviction exceeded the ten year benchmark by three years.
The Court, however, then went on to hold that even though admitting this prior conviction was error, the error was harmless.
An evidentiary error does not automatically require a new trial. The defendant also must show that the improper admission of the felony conviction was so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial. State v. Ciccio, 77 Conn. App. 368
In this case, the potential for prejudice arising out of the admission
of the felony conviction was slight. Because the jury already was aware of the larceny incident for purposes of impeaching the defendant, ‘‘it is . . . highly improbable that any additional prejudice arising from knowledge by the jury of [the felony] conviction affected the outcome.’’ State v. Nardini, supra, 187 Conn. 530.
The Court then turned it’s attention to the defendant’s second evidentiary claim, that "he should have been able to inform the jury about previous violent misconduct on the part of the victim". Obviously, generally speaking, evidence of specific instances of misconduct are inadmissible. The only way this evidence would come in is if it fit within one of the exceptions to the rule. The defendant claimed that the exception that applied to specific acts of misconduct by the victim towards the defendant would also apply here. Actually, the misconduct that the defendant tried to introduce was towards the victim’s sister – the defendant’s then girlfriend. The Court naturally affirmed the trial court’s ruling on this matter.
In the present case, the defendant sought to demonstrate that his sister purposely falsified the version of events in her written statement to the police out of her fear of the victim. The evidence that the defendant sought to present in support of this theory had no bearing, however, on the defendant’s self-defense claim.
I’ll quickly jump to the LIO issue in the interest of boredom and space.
III. Inconsistent Verdict
The defendant then claimed that his conviction of Assault in the 2nd was inconsistent with his not guilty verdicts. More specifically, disorderly conduct is a lesser included offense (LIO) of Assault 2 and therefore a conviction for the latter with an acquittal on the former is legally insufficient. The Court explained the standard:
In determining whether a conviction of one offense is inconsistent with an acquittal of the other, we look to whether ‘‘the offenses charged contain different elements.’’ State v. Soto, 59 Conn. App. 500 (2000). ‘‘If the offenses charged contain different elements, then a conviction of one offense is not inconsistent on its face with an acquittal of the other.’’
Reviewing both the offenses, the court identified three differences:
- Both crimes required a different mens rea – assault requires intent to cause physical harm, whereas disorderly conduct requires intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.
- Most obviously, Assault requires a finding of actual physical injury where disorderly conduct requires only a threat of one.
- Assault requires use of a dangerous instrument; such a requirement is not present in disorderly conduct.
Accordingly, the Court found that the jury correctly found him guilty of assault and the trial court was not incorrect in failing to enter an acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.
All in all, a good review of the admissibility of prior misconduct evidence and a brief explanation of LIOs.
Michael Ross victim to testify in House
Mar 30th
Yep, you read that correctly. Vivian Dobson, not very well known in the Michael Ross saga, will testify in the House during a hearing on the anti-death penalty bill. Why is Dobson not well known, you ask? Because she lived. She is the one Michael Ross victim who escaped alive.
But escaped isn’t the right word. Vivian Dobson may have gotten away from Michael Ross that May evening, but she has remained in his clutches since.
Ross beat and raped her before Dobson managed to run to her house and to a life of guilt, exile and silence. She was 21. For four years, Dobson didn’t leave her parents’ home; she barely left
her bedroom. Even the night her 2-year-old daughter wandered off, she
was paralyzed inside the house, listening to her father call out to the
little girl.
Now she is coming out to testify against the death penalty. Yes, you read that correctly too. She testified at Michael Ross’ trial at the behest of the families of the victims.
Do it for our daughters, the parents of the victims told her when she hesitated to testify against Ross in 1987. Do it for them. And she did, because she owed them, she says. And because back then, she thought that if Ross got the death penalty, he’d be dead in a week and her nightmares might end.
"Nobody told me any different," she said.
She doesn’t quite see it as redemption, though. When she expressed ambivalence at the death penalty, her doubts were quashed by her family. She instead sees constant pain for the past 20 years. She says that not only did Ross cause her pain back on the night she was attacked, but ever since then he has had a hold on her. She has lived in fear.
"This really has nothing to do with death," she says. "It has to do with control, with holding people’s lives in his hands. And as long as he stays on death row, he holds our lives in his hands.
"And this is the part that they can’t see. I see it because I’ve been living it for 22 years. I’m at the point now where I’m ready to take control of my own life."
For that reason, she will testify against the death penalty at the hearing today.
This is the one aspect of the death penalty debate that I see quite easily overlooked. While the moral arguments for and against the death penalty are plentiful, the real impact it has on the lives of the victim’s families over the pendancy of a capital case are quite moving and should be taken into consideration as well.
If Michael Ross was to be sentenced to life imprisonment, he would become another member of the inmate population that we so quickly forget. People could move on with their lives and not be reminded of it daily. Just punishment would be served. It seems, though, that this prolonged saga (prolonged for due process reasons – i would never advocate a speedy death penalty process) has a severe psychological impact on the lives of those left behind. I’m certainly glad that Ms. Dobson has decided to speak out, for whatever it is worth.
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