a public defender

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The Sixth Circuit held last week [pdf required] that when one gives consent to a confidential informant to enter one’s home and the confidential informant,  establishes probable cause, there is "consent once removed" for police officers to enter the home and conduct a search and arrest.

Crim Prof disagrees but Mike at Crime and Federalism isn’t bothered by this.

I did a little quick research on CT law in this area and found State v. Vargas, 34 Conn. App. 492 (1994). In Vargas, the undercover officer received information from an informant that persons were selling heroin to anyone who came to the door of [defendant's home]. The undercover officer and three other undercover police officers went to the apartment with the intent of conducting a "buy-bust." Upon arrival at the apartment, the officer knocked on the door while the other officers positioned themselves out of view, standing against the outside wall. The defendant opened the door, but left the screen door latched, and asked, "What do you need?" The officer replied, "I need a bag of dope." The defendant then unlatched the screen door and motioned to the officer to follow him. The officer opened the screen door and followed the defendant into the kitchen. The other officers remained outside. One of them positioned himself so that he could see into the apartment in order to keep the undercover officer in view at all times.

One of the things Vargas claimed on appeal was that the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of inevitable discovery. Vargas argued that the entry into the apartment by the three other officers, after the prearranged signal by the undercover officer, was a warrantless entry not provided for by an exception and, therefore, the evidence seized must be suppressed.

The appellate court held

He claims that Battistone’s signaling to the other officers, "inviting them in," exceeded the scope of consent, if any, destroying any legal basis for Battistone’s presence in the apartment, and, therefore, the discovery of the evidence could not have occurred by legal means already in process. It is curious that the defendant claims, in essence, that because the other officers’ actions were either in bad faith or illegal, the doctrine should not apply. It is precisely in this type of situation that the doctrine is intended to apply. The application of the doctrine anticipates a lawful entry, a subsequent constitutional violation, and an inevitable discovery. It then provides for the admission of the evidence obtained, in spite of the constitutional violation.

So CT has not yet (from what I could find) addressed the issue of consent once removed. Maybe I can ask around and see if anyone has ever tried to raise this.