Archive for March, 2005

My eyes are bleeding (not literally) from reading transcripts, so I’m taking a little break to review an interesting appellate case:

The Connecticut Appellate Court today issued State v. Stavrakis [pdf]. The defendant, Stavrakis, raised four separate issues on appeal:

1. The trial court improperly admitted evidence of prior convictions and improperly prevented defendant from cross examining victim on victim’s prior misconduct. "Evidentiary Impropriety",
2. The trial court improperly instructed the jury on three issues. "Instructional Impropriety",
3. Having been acquitted of a lesser included offense, the verdict of guilty was legally inconsistent. "Inconsistent Verdict" and
4. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Stavrakis was convicted of Assault in the 2nd Degree, in violation of C.G.S § 53a-60 and Criminal Trespass in the 1st Degree in violation of C.G.S § 53a-107
. 
He was found not guilty of Criminal Mischief in the 3rd Degree (C.G.S. §
53a-117)  and Disorderly Conduct (C.G.S. § 53a-182).

The Facts:
The defendant, Michael Stavrakis, and his father became involved in an altercation with the victim, Stephen DeLuca. The altercation arose out of the father’s disapproval of a relationship between the victim and Christina Stavrakis, the defendant’s sister. During the course of the struggle, after the victim had pushed the defendant’s father through a glass panel, the defendant struck the victim over the head with a stick.

I. Evidentiary Impropriety

The defendant claimed that the trial court

improperly admitted into evidence an act of larceny that he had committed in 1988 and his conviction in 1989 for possession of narcotics with intent to sell. He argues that the court should have precluded reference to both acts of misconduct because of their
remoteness in time to the present incident. In his other evidentiary claims, he maintains that the court improperly precluded him from presenting evidence of prior violence on the part of the victim and of hospital records describing the extent of the victim’s physical injury.

Relying on State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513 (1982), the Court identified three factors for consideration when admitting prior crimes evidence:
    (a) The extent of prejudice likely to arise
    (b) The significance of the commission of the particular crime in indicating untruthfulness and
    (c) It’s remoteness in time.

In Nardini, the State Supreme Court had adopted the 10-year rule of the FRE in determining remoteness ‘‘a rough bench mark in deciding whether trial court discretion has been abused . . . .’’ The Court ruled that his prior conviction for larceny was properly admitted, because of it’s probative value in determining the credibility of the defendant. The Court also held that the other felony conviction was too remote in time and not sufficiently probative of the crime charged in this case:

The defendant claims that the court improperly admitted into evidence his conviction for a felony that occurred thirteen years prior to the assault at issue in this case. The state concedes that this conviction, which involved the possession of narcotics, was not especially probative of the defendant’s truthfulness.

Explaining a case cited by the State, the Appellate Court stated

In State v. Askew, supra, 245 Conn. 364, 366–71, our Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion where the trial court admitted evidence of a criminal defendant’s conviction for felony larceny that exceeded the ten year benchmark by a mere seven months. This case differs from Askew in that, here, the defendant’s conviction exceeded the ten year benchmark by three years.

The Court, however, then went on to hold that even though admitting this prior conviction was error, the error was harmless.

An evidentiary error does not automatically require a new trial. The defendant also must show that the improper admission of the felony conviction was so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial. State v. Ciccio, 77 Conn. App. 368

In this case, the potential for prejudice arising out of the admission
of the felony conviction was slight. Because the jury already was aware of the larceny incident for purposes of impeaching the defendant, ‘‘it is . . . highly improbable that any additional prejudice arising from knowledge by the jury of [the felony] conviction affected the outcome.’’ State v. Nardini, supra, 187 Conn. 530.

The Court then turned it’s attention to the defendant’s second evidentiary claim, that "he should have been able to inform the jury about previous violent misconduct on the part of the victim". Obviously, generally speaking, evidence of specific instances of misconduct are inadmissible. The only way this evidence would come in is if it fit within one of the exceptions to the rule. The defendant claimed that the exception that applied to specific acts of misconduct by the victim towards the defendant would also apply here. Actually, the misconduct that the defendant tried to introduce was towards the victim’s sister – the defendant’s then girlfriend. The Court naturally affirmed the trial court’s ruling on this matter.

In the present case, the defendant sought to demonstrate that his sister purposely falsified the version of events in her written statement to the police out of her fear of the victim. The evidence that the defendant sought to present in support of this theory had no bearing, however, on the defendant’s self-defense claim.

I’ll quickly jump to the LIO issue in the interest of boredom and space.

III. Inconsistent Verdict

The defendant then claimed that his conviction of Assault in the 2nd was inconsistent with his not guilty verdicts. More specifically, disorderly conduct is a  lesser included offense (LIO) of Assault 2 and therefore a conviction for the latter with an acquittal on the former is legally insufficient. The Court explained the standard:

In determining whether a conviction of one offense is inconsistent with an acquittal of the other, we look to whether ‘‘the offenses charged contain different elements.’’ State v. Soto, 59 Conn. App. 500 (2000). ‘‘If the offenses charged contain different elements, then a conviction of one offense is not inconsistent on its face with an acquittal of the other.’’

Reviewing both the offenses, the court identified three differences:

1. Both crimes required a different mens rea – assault requires intent to cause physical harm, whereas disorderly conduct requires intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.
2. Most obviously, Assault requires a finding of actual physical injury where disorderly conduct requires only a threat of one.
3. Assault requires use of a dangerous instrument; such a requirement is not present in disorderly conduct.

Accordingly, the Court found that the jury correctly found him guilty of assault and the trial court was not incorrect in failing to enter an acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.

All in all, a good review of the admissibility of prior misconduct evidence and a brief explanation of LIOs.